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This paper uses laboratory evidence from four strategically equivalent 
voluntary contribution games to evaluate differences in contributions toward a 
public account due to framing, risk, and uncertainty. I test four hypotheses. (1) 
Individuals contribute more to a public account when the dilemma is framed as 
the mitigation of a public loss than the provision of a public good. (2) Individuals 
contribute more to a public account when the loss is certain than when faced with 
the risk of a loss. (3) Individuals contribute more to a public account when the loss 
is certain than when environmental uncertainty is associated with the public loss. 
(4) Individuals contribute more to a public account when the probability of loss 
is known than when the probability of loss is unknown. I find that contributions 
are greatest when the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a certain public loss. 
Contributions diminish when environmental risk and uncertainty are introduced, 
but remain higher than for public good provision. Preliminary laboratory evidence 
suggests that government intervention may be more necessary in the provision of 
a public good than in the mitigation of a public bad. Furthermore, much of the 
debate surrounding optimal allocations of insurance and infrastructure investment 
seems to be the result of environmental uncertainty as opposed to strategic 
uncertainty. 
I. INTRODUCTION
 Decisions under risk and uncertainty frequently deviate from the risk 
neutral predictions associated with expected utility theory. Infrastructure and 
insurance markets provide two examples where policy makers find it difficult to 
accurately forecast benefits and costs often leading to inefficient decision making. 
Chichilnisky (2006) estimates that an investment of 18 billion dollars in New 
Orleans’ infrastructure prior to Hurricane Katrina could have averted a 200 billion 
dollar loss. Conversely, Viscusi (1996) estimates the cost of asbestos removal 
to be upwards of 104.2 million dollars per life saved2. Chichilnisky claims that 
our decision-making tools under uncertainty have failed. More precisely, she is 
referring to expected utility theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argue that 
expected utility theory is fundamentally flawed, as it emerged as a normative 
model of the ideal decision maker instead of from a psychological analysis of risk 
and value. They claim that accounting for psychological preferences allows for a 
1  This thesis would not have been possible were it not for the Dr. and Mrs. William F. Railing Fund Fellowship 
for Faculty-Student Research in Economics and funds received from Pi Lambda Sigma. I am also indebted to my 
thesis advisor Dr. John Cadigan for his help and guidance as well as the Gettysburg College Economics Department 
and students in Econ 420 for their helpful comments and suggestions.  Feel free to contact me with any questions or 
comments at justin.eric.holz@gmail.com
2  Estimate was made in 1996 using 1984 dollars.
6better representation of decision making under risk. This paper uses the Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism to examine decision making in the presence of definite, 
risky, and uncertain losses.
  The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) is a conventional 
experiment used to analyze decision making in the presence of a public good. In 
a VCM game, participants are endowed with a set amount of tokens or currency 
and then given the option to contribute a portion of their endowment toward the 
provision of a public good. The contribution is multiplied by some efficiency factor 
greater than one and then distributed evenly to all group members. The payoff to 
the group is greater than the sum of individual contributions, but the payoff to 
the individual is less than their contribution. The Pareto efficient outcome occurs 
when every player chooses to contribute their entire endowment into the group 
account, as this strategy maximizes the aggregate payoff. However, each player 
has incentive to defect from Pareto optimum and contribute nothing, causing free 
riding to become the unique dominant strategy of the game.
Choices in the VCM game emulate public policy decisions such as the 
provision of public parks, museums, police protection, or schools. The decisions 
made in the laboratory should reflect decisions made in these instances and results 
can be used to draw inferences about public choice on a much larger scale. The 
use of real monetary incentives reduces inaccuracies that occur when using 
hypothetical bids.
VCM games similar to those used in this paper have been studied 
extensively in the past (e.g., Fehr and Gätcher 1999; Holt and Laury 2002; Isaac 
and Walker 1988; Sonnemans and Schram 1998). However, the vast majority 
of existing research focuses on environments where contributions to the public 
account add to the wealth of subjects in a deterministic manner that is known to 
participants. In reality, most local public goods are provided to limit potential 
damages with risky or uncertain outcomes such as fire and police protection, 
infrastructure development, public defense, or health risk-reducing regulations. 
Experimental research incorporating risk and uncertainty is limited with 
few exceptions (e.g., McClelland et. al 1993; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009). In 
McClelland’s experiments individuals could choose whether or not to purchase 
insurance that protects from a loss at varying probabilities. While only a portion 
of the players with the highest bids were able to obtain the insurance, bidding did 
not benefit other players. Gangadharan and Nemes’ public good experiments add 
elements of environmental risk and uncertainty, but do so maintaining a positive 
framework. 
In order to capture the effects of framing, risk, and uncertainty with 
respect to voluntary contributions, this paper utilizes four treatments of the 
VCM game. These treatments include a standard positively framed VCM game, 
a variation where individuals contribute towards the mitigation of a public loss 
instead of the provision of a public good, and two treatments where individuals 
contribute to mitigate a potential public loss with a 50% chance of realization. In 
7one of these two treatments the probability of loss is known to participants and 
in the other treatment the probability is unknown. Group size and the marginal 
per capita return on contributions toward the public account are equivalent 
across all treatments. I find that there are statistically significant differences in 
contributions depending upon the framing of the dilemma, and whether or not risk 
or uncertainty are associated with the public loss. Contributions are greatest when 
the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a definite public loss and diminish 
when environmental risk and uncertainty are introduced, but remain higher than 
contributions toward the provision of a public good.
In Section II, I provide a review of the literature and experimental 
methods used to examine similar topics. Section III presents the theoretical model 
and section IV translates the model into the experimental design. In Section V, 
I state the hypotheses to be tested. Section VI contains the statistical results of 
the experiment with respect to those hypotheses. In Section VII, I examine the 
limitations of the results. In Section VIII, I discuss the results and possibilities for 
future research. Complete instructions are available in the appendix.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
 Expected utility theory is based on four key assumptions: cancelation, 
transitivity, dominance, and invariance. While these assumptions are intuitively 
attractive, they are often violated and do not provide a realistic view of human 
decision making. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) discuss these assumptions and 
propose an alternative by modifying the value function to incorporate preferences 
that are anomalous in expected utility theory.
Cancellation claims that states of the world that yield equivalent 
outcomes, regardless of one’s choice, are eliminated. For example, suppose there 
are two different gambles, Gamble A and Gamble B. In Gamble A there is a 50% 
chance that x will be realized with nothing happening otherwise. In Gamble B 
there is a 50% chance that y will be realized with nothing happening otherwise. 
If x is preferred to y, then Gamble A will be preferred to Gamble B since the two 
gambles yield the same outcome if not realized. Under this assumption individuals 
make decisions based solely on states that yield different outcomes. Allais (1953) 
provides a counter example that is supported by an experiment by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979).
In this experiment subjects faced two paired lottery choice situations. 
In the first situation, individuals chose between having a 33% chance to gain 
$2,500, a 66% chance to gain 2,400, and a 1% chance to gain nothing (option A) 
or gaining $2,400 with certainty (option B). In the second situation, individuals 
chose between a 33% chance to gain $2,500 and a 67% chance to gain nothing 
(option C) or a 34% chance to gain $2,400 and a 66% chance to gain nothing 
(option D). Out of the 72 subjects, 82% chose option B over option A and 83% 
chose option C over option D, conflicting with the cancellation axiom.
8The transitivity assumption states that A is preferred to B whenever the 
utility gained by A is greater than the utility gained by B. For example, suppose 
one has three options: A, B, and C. If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, 
then A will be preferred to C. Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (1991) found that this 
axiom does not hold up in the laboratory. In their experiment they constructed two 
sets of twenty choice problems. Subjects chose between A and B, then between B 
and C, then between A and C where options A, B, and C were all random lotteries 
with different expected values, returns, and probabilities of return. One option 
used was a 30% chance of gaining $18 and a 70% chance of gaining nothing 
(option A), a 60% chance of gaining $8 and a 40% of gaining nothing (option 
B), and a 100% chance of gaining $4 (option C). Individuals participating in the 
experiment consistently violated the transitivity axiom in a way that could not be 
explained by random error.
Dominance states that if option A provides more utility than option B in 
one state and at least as much utility as option B in all other states, then option A 
is dominant over option B. The dominant option should be chosen. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) refuted the Dominance axiom with another experiment. Subjects 
considered the following two lotteries describing the percentage of marbles of 
different colors in each box and the amount of money they won or lost depending 
on the color of the randomly drawn marble. They were then asked to specify 
which lottery they preferred.
Option A
 90% white 6% red 1% green 1% blue 2% yellow
 $0 win $45     win $30 lose $15      lose $15
Option B
 90% white 6% red      1% green 1% blue      2% yellow
 $0 win $45     win $45 lose $10      lose $15
 In this example the dominance of option B over option A is transparent. 
The payoff of option B is at least as high as the payoff of option A, regardless of 
the color. All of the 88 participants chose option B over option A. Next, Tversky 
and Kahneman combined the outcomes for drawing red or green marbles in B 
and yellow and blue marbles in A and asked 124 subjects which lottery they 
preferred.
Option C
 90% white 6% red  1% green 3% yellow
 $0 win $45 win $30   lose $15
Option D
 90% white 7% red  1% green 2% yellow
 $0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
 In this problem, the dominance of option D over option C is not 
transparent and 58% of the participants chose C. This suggests that the dominance 
rule is obeyed when its application is transparent, but not when its application is 
masked.
9Finally, invariance states that different representations of payoff 
equivalent dilemmas will yield the same preferences. Refuting Invariance, 
McNeil et al. (1982) present a study of preferences between two potential medical 
treatments, surgery and radiation therapy. They used a survey containing statistical 
information about the effects of treating lung cancer using two different frames. In 
the first frame, the statistics were given in terms of survival rates and in the second 
frame statistics were given in terms of mortality rates. Respondents indicated their 
preferred treatment.
 Radiation therapy had a higher mortality rate (lower survival rate) than 
the surgery treatment after the end of five years and the expected survival/mortality 
rates were equal across treatments, but the respondents’ preferences were not. 
Only 18% of the respondents preferred radiation therapy in the survival frame, 
while 44% of the respondents preferred radiation therapy in the mortality frame. 
Results were similar for physicians, business students, and the clinic patients, 
refuting the invariance assumption.
Instead of using a weighted average of potential outcomes and their 
respective probabilities, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that individuals 
make decisions by evaluating alternative prospects with respect to a subjective 
reference point. In this model people are risk averse in the domain of gains and 
risk seeking in the domain of losses. One criticism of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work is the use of hypothetical bids as opposed to real monetary incentives. 
However, decades of experimental research finds that their proposed challenges 
to expected value theory hold up when using monetary incentives.
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) define a risk as a situation where all 
possible future outcomes and the probabilities of those outcomes are known. 
Examples include the chance that a building will catch on fire, a crime will 
be committed, or that a person will be involved in a car accident. In these 
instances the law of large numbers allows for the extrapolation of probabilities 
of occurrence. Knowledge of these probabilities allow for a risk to be mitigated 
using infrastructure investment, insurance, and laws or regulations. 
Uncertainty refers to the case in which outcomes are known, but the 
probabilities associated with those outcomes are not known, or impossible to know. 
A further distinction is made between ‘strategic’ and ‘environmental’ uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty refers to cases in which the probability distribution 
of potential losses is not known. Examples include terrorist attacks, rare natural 
disasters, and climate change. In these cases, it is not clear what the optimum 
group action is regardless of how individuals respond. Strategic uncertainty refers 
to the unknown probability distribution of potential decisions made by others. 
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) investigate differences in the perception 
of risks and uncertainties when making decisions about private and public 
goods. In their experiment subjects received an endowment and chose between 
contributing to a private account and a group account. Their experiment contained 
seven different treatments: a standard public goods game, 2 treatments where there 
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is a known probability of obtaining the return for the private and public accounts, 
2 treatments were there is an unknown probability of obtaining the return for 
the private and public accounts, and 2 treatments were the participants have 
the opportunity to increase the probability of return from the private and group 
accounts. Each of the seven treatments lasted for 15 periods. Environmental risk 
and uncertainty varied along treatments, but strategic uncertainty was held constant. 
At the end of each period, subjects were told the aggregate level of contribution 
to the public good and their return from the private and public accounts. They find 
that environmental risk and uncertainty with respect to the provision of private 
and public goods is a significant factor when making decisions.
 McClelland et al. (1993) created an experiment to determine how 
individuals respond to different levels of environmental risk. Subjects faced risks 
of various magnitudes and probabilities with a constant group size of eight over 
eight periods. The magnitudes of the potential losses were $4 and $40 and the 
probabilities ranged from 0.1 to 0.9. The risk was operationalized using a bag 
containing 100 poker chips. Subjects received an endowment at the beginning 
of the experiment and each round the experimenters drew a chip from the bag. If 
a red chip was drawn the loss would be realized and if a white chip was drawn 
each individual would have a marginal increase in their wealth in order to keep 
them funded. An auction for insurance was held before each period. Participants 
entered a bid for insurance against the loss and the fifth highest bid became the 
reigning insurance price. The four players bidding higher than the reigning bid 
received insurance at that price.
Mean bids for both the $4 and the $40 treatments were close to the 
expected value at all probabilities except for the lowest (0.1). At this probability, 
the distribution of bids became bimodal (players chose to either ignore the risk 
entirely or overestimate its chance of occurrence). The most pronounced difference 
between the two treatments was a decrease in the amount of zero bids when the 
loss was increased to $40. McClelland claimed that results of the study may have 
been influenced by the gambler’s fallacy. That is a series of white chip draws 
would be accompanied by higher insurance bids and a series of red chip draws 
would be accompanied by lower insurance bids even though the probability that 
the loss would be realized was independent across periods.
McClelland claims that while the $4 and $40 losses do not approach those 
found in the high-consequence situations he is trying to model, the losses are high 
enough to entice players into acting as they would in those situations as individuals 
would all prefer to avoid the losses. In addition, he cited that players reacted with 
visible unhappiness when the losses occurred, providing some antidotal evidence 
that players were concerned with the earnings from the experiment. Furthermore, 
Smith and Walker (1993) found that real monetary rewards limit deviations from 
expected utility theory. Providing evidence that using monetary incentives instead 
of hypothetical bids will cause the decisions made in experiments to approach 
decisions made in similar real world situations.
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Sonnemans and Schram (1998) provide laboratory evidence that the 
framing of a dilemma as a public good or a public bad has a significant impact 
on the decision making processes of the subjects involved. Their experiment 
consisted of several periods with two different frames. The first frame was a 
provision of a public good that would only occur if investment into the public 
account exceeded a certain threshold. The second frame was prevention of a 
public bad in which individuals could withdraw resources from a public pool 
yielding negative externalities to the other group members. Both of the frames 
were made strategically equivalent.
They did not find a statistically significant difference in decision making 
between frames in the initial periods; however, differences developed during the 
game. Differences in the observed behavior from expected utility theory could not 
be explained by differences in value orientation. This is largely because they did 
not have an a priori way of determining the subjective reference point of those 
participating. The experiment also tests the Pruitt hypothesis that subjects will 
perceive themselves to be more interdependent in step level public goods games 
than in the step level public bads games. The Pruitt hypothesis was not refuted; 
although it was unable to explain why differences in cooperation between the two 
frames increased over the periods.
Their explanation for the differences in decisions over time was learning. 
When players were dissatisfied with their choices in previous periods, they 
modified their decisions in the new periods. Most of this dissatisfaction arose 
from inequity aversion on the behalf of the contributors as subjects had a greater 
distaste for contributing to a public good or prevention of a public bad when the 
contribution was so small that they did not reach the threshold than when their 
decision was not necessary to reach the threshold.
My design synthesizes the negative frame similar to that in Sonnemans 
and Schram (1998) and the environmental risk and uncertainty elements found 
in some treatments of Gangadharan and Nemes (2009). Unlike Sonnemans and 
Schram (1998), I incorporate elements of environmental risk and uncertainty. 
Unlike Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), the environmental risk and uncertainty 
treatments are framed negatively. Each treatment is a single period. Since each 
treatment is strategically equivalent, differences in contributions towards the 
public account should be the result of the frame and whether or not environmental 
risk or uncertainty exists in the treatment. 
III. MODEL
The four treatments use the payoff function found in equation 1. Each treatment 
is strategically equivalent3.
3  In a strict sense the first two treatments are strategically equivalent and the second two treatments are 
strategically equivalent, but the ex post payoff in the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments are slight 
modifications designed to keep the payoff reasonable.
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where  is the payoff to player . Each participant is endowed with mi and 
chooses to contribute xi into a public account. L represents the loss faced by the 
group, b represents the efficiency factor of contribution, Σgi is the sum of the 
contributions from other group members, and n is the number of participants 
in a group. In the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments the loss has a 
probability of occurrence equal to . If the loss is not realized any contributions 
made to mitigate the public loss are forfeited. 
The public account is given by . making the public 
account non-rival and non-excludable. In addition, , so individuals can only 
benefit from the contributions of others, making the public account a public good. 
For all treatments, . Therefore, it is impossible for participants to leave 
the experiment with less money than they entered with. Each individual must 
choose a value of  between 0 and 6. Participants view each treatment as a utility 
maximization problem represented by the following equation.
Since, , utility is maximized at  regardless of 
the contribution of the other group members.  is the unique dominant 
strategy of the game. The aggregate payoff function is given below in equation 3. 
Introducing a probability to the loss and public account terms does not alter the 
dominant strategy of the game.
Since, , group utility is maximized when each player 
chooses to invest everything into the public account . Notice that while 
individuals benefit from cooperation and suffer from defecting, the game provides 
incentives for individuals to choose the inefficient strategy of defecting. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
 The laboratory experiments were conducted in two sessions involving 12 
and 16 participants, respectively4 for a total of 28 observations; 25 observations 
were used. In each of these sessions, decision-making scenarios differed in framing, 
probability of loss, and knowledge of the probability of loss. At the beginning of 
each treatment subjects were placed randomly in anonymous groups of four. At 
the end of each period, subjects learned the aggregate level of contribution to the 
public account; but were not told the individual contribution of each other group 
member. Subjects were also told their payoff from each treatment. 
The baseline treatment was a positively framed VCM game. Equation 4 
represents the expected payoff of each group member with the loss that the group 
4  Participants were undergraduate students taking Game Theory or Advanced Topics in Microeconomics 
seminar at Gettysburg College. Three of the observations in the second session were excluded from the final data. 
Two of these observations consisted of the people who ran the experiment and the other subject was omitted due to 
participation in the previous session. Participation of these individuals was necessary to produce balanced groups. 
13
faces, , equal to 0. The first variation is the negatively framed treatment where 
the loss is equal to -$24. Investing $1 into the public account decreases the loss 
to each group member by $0.40. The endowment in this treatment was increased 
to $16. The expected payoff for the negatively framed treatment is described in 
Equation 5. 
The third and fourth treatments were also negatively framed with an 
endowment of $16. The probability of loss in these treatments was equal to 0.5. 
In order to determine if the loss is realized, a poker chip was drawn from a bag 
containing 50 red chips and 50 white chips. If a red chip was drawn, the loss 
would be realized, if a white chip was drawn, the loss would not be realized. 
If the loss was not realized, all money invested into the public account would 
be lost. In the environmental uncertainty treatment the probability of loss was 
unknown to participants. However, they were shown that both a red chip and 
a white chip existed in the bag making it possible for the loss to occur and the 
loss to not occur. The expected payoff functions of the environmental risk and 
uncertainty treatments are described in equations 6 and 7, respectively. Notice 
that the efficiency factor was increased to 3.2 to preserve the marginal per capita 
return on contributions.
The order of the treatments was the environmental uncertainty treatment, 
the environmental risk treatment, the negative frame treatment, and then the 
positive frame treatment. Subjects were told prior to the experiment that upon 
completion they would be paid for one of the four treatments to be determined 
randomly by the flip of two coins in front of the students. 
V. HYPOTHESES
In this paper, I tests four hypotheses. (1) Individuals contribute more to a 
public account when the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a public loss 
than the provision of a public good. (2) Individuals contribute more to a public 
account when the loss is certain than when faced with the risk of a loss. (3) 
Individuals contribute more to a public account when the loss is certain than 
when environmental uncertainty is associated with the public loss. (4) Individuals 
contribute more to a public account when the probability of loss is known than 
when the probability of loss is unknown.
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The results from Sonnemans and Schram (1998) provide some reason to believe 
that the quantities contributed toward the public account in the positively framed 
treatment and the negatively framed treatment will be statistically significant in 
difference from each other. Prospect theory suggests that contributions will be 
higher in the negative treatment. The payoff from contributing in the public account 
in the negatively treatment is framed as prevention of a loss. Since individuals 
weigh losses heavier than gains, contribution in the negative treatment is seen as 
having greater return than contribution in the positive treatment.
Hypothesis 2 stems from the reflection effect described in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). The reflection effect states that individuals are risk-averse in the 
domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses. The risk treatment is 
framed as mitigation of a probabilistic loss, so participants should also choose to 
invest less to the public account than when the loss is certain.
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) find that when the probability distribution of 
the environmental risk is unknown, individuals tend to be “optimistic” and predict 
that the desired outcome will be realized. Since individuals should all prefer a 
higher payoff to a lower payoff, the desired outcome should be the loss not being 
realized. Therefore, contributions toward the public account should be lower in 
the environmental uncertainty treatment than in the negatively framed treatment. 
In the environmental risk treatment, the probability of loss is clearly defined 
and individuals are therefore able to evaluate the expected value of the loss. 
The optimism effect should also cause the investment levels to be higher in the 
environmental risk treatment than in the environmental uncertainty treatment. 
Hypotheses will be tested using t-tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, and an 
OLS regression. Hypothesis 1 would be supported by statistically significant 
differences in the average contribution in the negative and positive treatments 
with a greater average contribution in the negative treatment. Also, a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the dummy variable representing the 
negatively framed treatment would support this hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 would 
be supported by mean contributions in the environmental risk and negatively 
framed treatment being statistically significant in difference from each other 
with the average contribution being greater in the negatively framed treatment. A 
coefficient on the dummy variable representing the environmental risk treatment 
that is statistically significant and greater than the coefficient on the negatively 
framed treatment dummy variable would also support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 would be supported by the mean contribution in the negative 
treatment being statistically significant in difference from and greater than the 
mean contribution in the environmental uncertainty treatment. The dummy 
variable representing the environmental uncertainty treatment having a statistically 
significant coefficient that is greater than the coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing the negatively framed treatment would also support this hypothesis. 
Mean contribution in the environmental risk treatment that is greater and 
statistically significant in difference from mean contribution in the environmental 
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uncertainty treatment would support hypothesis 4. A statistically significant 
coefficient on the environmental risk dummy that is greater than the coefficient of 
the environmental uncertainty dummy would also support this hypothesis.
VI. RESULTS
A. Overview
Figure 1 reports the amount of strong free riders in each treatment. 
Following the definition used in Isaac and Walker (1988), strong free riders are 
participants that chose to contribute less than one third of the Pareto efficient 
contribution into the public account . The vast majority of the subjects 
in the positively framed treatment chose to invest nothing. While free riding did 
not disappear entirely in any of the treatments, it is much less prevalent. Isaac 
and Walker (1988) found in their public good experiment that the level of strong 
free riders tends to increase over periods. In this experiment the trend is not as 
distinct.
Figure 1
Figure 2 presents the distribution of contribution toward the public 
account over each treatment. Using the negative frame, more contributions 
approached the Pareto optimum than in any other treatment. The data suggests 
that individuals are more likely to cooperate when faced with a public loss than a 
public gain. As environmental risk is introduced into the loss, the amount of Pareto 
efficient contributions falls by 85%. Comparatively, Pareto efficient contributions 
fall by only 57% when the probability of loss is uncertain. The distribution of 
contributions in the uncertainty treatment does not seem to indicate optimism. If 
individuals predicted the desired outcome, then one would expect the majority 
of contributions to approach zero; however, in this treatment many individuals 




Table 1 presents the average contributions to the public account for 
individuals and as a group in dollars and as a percentage of maximum possible 
investment. The average contribution toward the public account is five times 
greater when the dilemma is framed negatively than when the dilemma is framed 
positively. When environmental risk or uncertainty is introduced to the negative 
frame, average contributions fall by approximately 20% of the endowment with the 
decline being slightly more distinct with environmental risk than environmental 
uncertainty. 
It is clear from these results that the framing of the dilemma and whether 
environmental risk or uncertainty is associated with potential losses has a significant 
impact on contribution towards public account. This data supports hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3, but refute hypothesis 4. Statistical tests for significance reinforce 
these results. Table 2 contains pairwise t–tests for significant difference in the 
means across treatments as well as Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The results for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are presented in parenthesis under the results for the 
t-tests. These two measures of significance are particularly attractive as require 
minimal statistical assumptions. Both tests find that all treatments are statistically 




Total Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. 
Dev
Positive Frame 15 0.60 (10%) 1.38 2.2 (9.1%) 2.66
Negative Frame 78 3.12 (52%) 2.57 11.56 (48%) 4.44
Environmental Risk 41 1.64 (27%) 1.80 6.36 (26%) 3.69
Environmental Uncertainty 51 2.04 (34%) 2.03 7.84 (32%) 3.68
Table 2
Pairwise T-Tests and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests


















*Difference is significant at the 10% level, ** difference is significant at the 
5% level, and *** difference is significant at the 1% level. Wilcoxon signed-
rank test results in parenthesis. 
B. Econometric Results
 The following multivariate regression model evaluates the contribution of 
individuals to the public account, , as a function of three dummy variables. The 
first variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution was made in the negatively framed 
treatment and 0 otherwise. The second variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution 
was made during the environmental risk treatment and 0 otherwise. The last 
variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution occurred during the environmental 
uncertainty treatment and 0 otherwise. The regression uses ordinary least squares 
with the functional form given below in equation 8. A summary of the results are 




The omitted dummy variable is contributions made during the positively 
framed treatment. The coefficients of all of the variables are statistically 
significant in difference from zero at the 10% level of significance. At the 5% 
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level the coefficient on the environmental risk dummy is no longer statistically 
significant. The R2 value in this regression is very low, 0.17, but statistically 
significant in difference from zero. Moreover, low R2 values are not unusual in 
VCM experiments because of the innate randomness surrounding the participant’s 
decisions. 
 The most striking result is that using a negative frame as opposed to a 
positive frame increases the predicted value of the contribution by $2.52. This 
supports the evidence found using t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and the 
hypothesis that individuals will contribute more to mitigate a public bad than they 
would to provide a public good.
 The introduction of environmental risk or uncertainty to the mitigation 
of a public bad reduces the contribution, while remaining greater than contribution 
for provision of a public good. It is possible that individuals chose to invest less 
in the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments because of risk-seeking 
preferences. Decisions are more cooperative with uncertain losses than when the 
probability of the loss is well defined. The relative magnitudes of the coefficient 














*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** coefficient is significant at the 
5% level, and *** coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
VII. LIMITATIONS
The claim that contributions toward a public account depend on framing, 
risk, and uncertainty is supported by the laboratory evidence obtained in this 
study. However, decades of previous VCM research document that learning 
occurs in experiments similar to mine, which could cause the explanatory power 
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of framing, risk, and uncertainty to appear greater than it actually is. Running 
these 4 treatments with the same subjects causes the results to be statistically 
interdependent. However, this was a deliberate and necessary design choice made 
to reduce the cost of the experiments and adhere to time constrains. In addition, 
previous research documents decay in contributions using the same treatment 
over several periods. Each period in my experiment is a new treatment.
Figure 3 shows the average individual contribution for each treatment. 
Overall, there is a decay trend similar to that found in Isaac and Walker (1988). 
The decay appears to be linear; however, average individual contribution in the 
negatively framed treatment is an outlier. If learning was the only effect causing 
differences in contributions across treatments, this trend would not be seen. 
Moreover, the results of the experiment are not indicative of the gambler’s fallacy. 
The potential loss in the first treatment was not realized in either of the sessions. 
If the participant’s were falling victim to the gambler’s fallacy, one would expect 
an increase in the amount invested into the public account from treatments 1 to 2, 
predicting the loss to be realized in the second treatment. On average this trend 
was not present, so changes in individual contribution cannot be explained by the 
gambler’s fallacy.
Figure 3
Sonneman and Schram (1998) found that subjects altered their behavior 
when unsatisfied with the results in the previous period. For that experiment, 
dissatisfaction was seen if the threshold level of the public good was not reached. 
In this experiment, subjects may be dissatisfied with other group members 
contributing small portions of their endowment toward the public account. Two 
OLS regression models, given in equations 9 and 10, are used to test for learning 
in the experiment.
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where  is the contribution to the group account made by other group 
members in the previous period. A summary of the results follow in table 4.
Table 4
                                         




















*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** Coefficient is significant at the 
5% level, and *** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Individual contribution in the previous period has statistically significant 
effect on the predicted value of contributions to the public account in the current 
period in both of the regression models. In both of these models the coefficient 
estimate is less than one. This suggests that learning occurs during the experiment 
and that the learning is in the form of decay found in previous work. The 
contribution of other group members toward the public account in the previous 
treatment does not have a statistically significant impact on the contribution of 
the individual in the current treatment in the first regression model. However, 
the coefficient is statistically significant in the second model. Overall, the first 
model is not statistically significant while the second model is jointly significant. 
Controlling for learning, both the coefficient estimates for the negatively framed 
treatment and the environmental risk treatment are still statistically significant5. 
5  The residuals of both of the models are not normally distributed and plagued with other violations of the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions making their results unreliable.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
 The number of strong free riders in each treatment as well as the distribution 
of individual contributions in each treatment supports the claim that the framing 
of the dilemma and whether or not environmental risk or uncertainty is associated 
with the potential loss has a statistically significant impact on contribution 
toward the public account. Statistical tests as well as an OLS regression find that 
contributions across all treatments are statistically significant in difference from 
each other. Individuals contribute more to a public account when the dilemma is 
framed negatively than positively. Contribution is also greater when the loss to 
the group is certain than when there is a probability of loss (known or unknown). 
My hypothesis that individuals would contribute less to a public account when the 
probability of loss was unknown than when the probability of loss was known was 
not supported by laboratory evidence. This could be due to 0.5 probability chosen 
for environmental risk. McClelland et al. (1993) provide reason to believe results 
may be different at different probabilities. 
Two possible concerns regarding the validity of the results are the small 
sample size and that all of the treatments were done in succession with the same 
group of participants causing the results to be statistically interdependent. Similar 
VCM research documents decay in contributions over time in multi-period 
environments. Decay found in previous research occurs when experiments run 
the same treatment over a series of periods. In this experiment, each period is a 
new treatment. In addition, these design choices were deliberate and necessary 
in order to reduce the cost of the experiments and to adhere to time constraints. 
Contributions in the negative frame treatment deviate from the overall downward 
trend in contributions. When controlling for learning, coefficient estimates for the 
negative frame and environmental risk treatments remained statistically significant 
in difference from zero.
Another possible area of concern is the necessary trivialization of losses. 
The losses in this experiment do not approach those from a hurricane, terrorist 
attacks, or asbestos poisoning; however, it is not possible to replicate high-
loss situations in the laboratory. The use of real monetary incentives should be 
sufficiently high so that each participant makes decisions in a way analogous to 
much larger losses. 
Assuming these concerns are not a significant factor in determining 
individual contribution, these results suggest that individuals are able to reach 
more cooperative decisions when faced with public losses than when faced with 
public good provision. In terms of public policy, this suggests that it may be 
more necessary for the government to intervene to provide public goods than 
protection against public bads. Individuals are less likely to make Pareto efficient 
contributions when environmental risk or uncertainty is involved. Moreover, 
difficulties in reaching efficient levels of infrastructure and insurance investment 
are largely due to environmental uncertainty as opposed to strategic uncertainty. 
Unlike Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), an optimism effect was not seen for losses 
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with an unknown probability. When environmental risk was defined at 0.5, subjects 
appear to be more risk-seeking. It may also be necessary for the government to 
intervene in instances such as natural disasters (where the probability distribution 
of losses is not well defined) or public health hazards (where aggregate losses 
are well-defined). Also, in VCM type fundraising may be most effective when 
phrased as mitigation of a certain public loss. 
Two interesting questions arise from these results that I will pursue in 
future research. First, contributions when the probability of loss was known to be 
0.5 were less and statistically significant in difference from contributions in the 
negative frame. However, it is possible that the probability associated with the loss 
influenced decision making. Replicating the experiment using probabilities ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.9 would add some robustness to these results and better examine 
how decisions are made in low risk high-consequence scenarios as compared 
to high risk low-consequence scenarios. Second, one of the most interesting 
features of public dilemmas such as climate change is that the probability of the 
loss’s occurrence is endogenous to the actions of those facing the losses. Private 
consumption and pollution emission today increases public damages in the future. 
Further experiments could examine the actions of individuals in situations where 
private investment in the current period increases the probability of potential 
losses in later periods. 
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—APPENDIX—
Instructions (Negatively framed Public Good)6:
This is an experiment in decision making. The instructions are designed to inform 
you of the types of decisions you will be making and the results of those decisions. 
All earnings you make during the experiment will be totaled and paid to you in 
cash, privately, at the end of the experiment. If you have any questions concerning 
the instructions feel free to raise your hand and one of the experiment monitors 
will assist you. 
You will be randomly and anonymously placed in a group with 4 members (you 
and three other participants). Each member of the group begins the experiment 
with an endowment of $16. 
Each member of your group will decide how much to allocate to a ‘group account.’ 
In particular, you must choose how many dollars to allocate to the group account 
with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $6. Allocations must be made in $1 
increments. In other words, you must choose among the following allocations to 
the group account: $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, or $6. The amount you choose to allocate 
to the group account will be deducted from your endowment. Each member of 
the group will be informed of the total amount allocated to the group account, 
but will not receive any information about the specific choices made by any 
individual. Since group pairings are anonymous and individual allocations will 
not be revealed, your decision will be confidential. In other words, no member of 
your group or any other participant in the experiment will be able to identify your 
allocation decision. 
The return from the group account will be determined as follows. The account 
begins with a deficit of $24. Each dollar that is contributed to the group account 
(by you or any other member of your group) will be multiplied by 1.6. Thus the 
final amount in the group account will be:
-$24 + 1.6 * (Total Group Contributions).
The return from the group account (which may be either positive or negative) will 
be split evenly among the group members. This means you will receive ¼ th of the 
final amount in the group account. 
To summarize, your payoff from the experiment will be determined as follows:
$16 – your contribution to the group account + ¼ * (-$24 +1.6*(Total Group 
Contributions))
6  Copies of the instruction for other treatments are available upon request from the author.
25
Another way to think about this decision is as follows. You are part of a group 
with 4 people. Initially, your group has to pay a cost of $24, of which your share 
is $6. You can invest in a group account to lower the cost your group must pay. 
Every dollar you invest lowers the group’s cost by $1.60, meaning that for every 
$1 you invest your cost decreases by $0.40, and so does the cost of each other 
member of your group.
 
If you have questions, please raise your hand at this time, and an experiment 
monitor will assist you. Otherwise, simply follow the instructions on your 
computer screen. Once you have completed all of your decisions, please wait for 
the experiment to conclude. The experiment monitors will then call participants 
out of the room one at a time and pay you your earnings from the experiment.
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A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
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ABSTRACT
 This paper presents a comprehensive plan to fix the ailing American 
economy, through a five-step approach. First, the Federal Reserve must continue 
to broaden the scope of monetary policy, by purchasing and selling long-term 
securities. Manipulating expectations through FOMC statements is another 
tool at the Federal Reserve’s disposal. Secondly, the government must enact 
fiscal stimulus to stabilize the economy in the short and medium runs, through 
investment in infrastructure projects, green technology, fusion technology, and 
science education. Additionally, the new fiscal policy must tackle the mortgage 
meltdown, which is weighing down the entire economy. Third, the regulatory 
system must be changed to reduce the likelihood of another financial collapse, 
starting with the nationalization of the ratings agencies. Ratings should be 
updated faster, with a numeric grading system rather than the pre-existing letter 
grades. Fourth, our globalized economy insures that a coordinated globalized 
response is necessary to recover. Global cooperation to reduce inflation and avoid 
protectionist policies is vital. Finally, the American bailout policy must be made 
clear, only giving bailouts to companies that are sound but financially strapped 
and those that are too big to fail.
I. Introduction
Often heralded as the most dominant economy in modern history, the 
American economy has reached a critical point. The real economy is faltering at 
an alarming pace. We have witnessed the bursting of the housing market bubble, 
rising unemployment, and just last quarter saw output decline substantially. 
Deflationary pressures have now set in, making real interest rates appear higher, 
further curtailing investment. To no surprise, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research has officially declared us in a state of recession since December 2007. 
 Taking the recession from a downturn to an economic catastrophe has 
been the financial crisis. The true risk levels of many securities, such as mortgage-
backed securities, were not known, causing financial institutions to severely 
misprice their assets. As foreclosure rates increased and the value of mortgage-
backed securities fell, many financial institutions were left grasping for cash. 
The overleveraging that took place magnified the existing problems. We have 
witnessed the failure and rescue of financial institutions we thought “too big to 
fail”, such as Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, AIG, Lehman Brothers 
and Citibank. The interconnectedness of the major financial corporations, and the 
fear of more bank collapses, froze the credit markets. Although the government 
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stepped in with a $700 billion package, the credit markets remain in disarray. 
Now, with our government having a substantial stake in the economy, the financial 
crisis has taken on even greater importance. The lack of available credit worsened 
the situation companies found themselves in with the ongoing recession.
  Dramatic and forceful responses are needed by all sectors of the 
government to combat the economic tribulations we face. The 2008 Macroeconomic 
Policy Senior Seminar at Gettysburg College compiled a collection of essays on a 
variety of economic categories that strive to give policy makers a guide to escape 
the mess we face. Monetary policy has entered a new horizon, as the target federal 
funds rate is below a quarter. The future will entail nontraditional methods aimed 
at a more expansionary policy and methods of altering expectations. President-
elect Obama is promising a massive fiscal policy response to inject large amounts 
of money into the economy, looking to stabilize job loss get the economy turning 
again. Global trade may be a vital solution to these problems, as the world has 
become increasingly globalized. A unified response from different sectors of the 
world may be appropriate. Based on the financial mess, regulation and bailout 
policy must be reanalyzed. Poor regulation has been widely accepted as a cause of 
this crisis and bailouts give bring forth major questions which need to be answered. 
Our senior seminar presents these essays to tackle the economic crisis through a 
comprehensive approach from all angles of the world economy, as inactivity or 
too narrow a response by the government is not an option. 
II. Entering a New Frontier: Monetary Policy
 The U.S. economy is currently in a recession, while still experiencing 
the effects of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Traditional 
monetary policy has been ineffective in combating the problems that have arose and 
stimulating the real economy, forcing the Federal Reserve to take exotic actions. 
The Federal Reserve has and should continue to conduct monetary policy through 
a broader lens, no longer deciding on only the target federal funds rate but instead 
making broad moves toward expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. 
Important on the Federal Reserve’s agenda must be to use its public statements to 
influence such things as inflationary expectations and the risk premium. Despite 
the importance of the short term needs of the economy, it is vital for the Federal 
Reserve to keep in mind long term issues, such as its independence from the 
Treasury and future inflation.  
 Traditional uses of monetary policy have proven to be ineffective at 
the present time, as the Federal Reserve has exhausted its use as a method of 
manipulating aggregate demand.  In January of 2008, the funds rate was as high 
as 4.25%. In less than a year, the Federal Reserve made historic changes, dropping 
the target federal funds rate to between a quarter and zero percent. Never before in 
America has the target federal funds rate been 
so low. There is effectively no room for the Federal Reserve to lower the target 
rate, making traditional manipulation of the target federal funds rate nonexistent. 
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Furthermore, the effective funds rate has begun to deviate from the target rate, 
because of the large risk premiums and financial uncertainty in the current 
economy. Even before this latest rate 
cut, when the target federal funds rate could be lowered somewhat further, the 
effective federal funds rate could not have gotten much lower. We can no longer rely 
on the funds rate to get us out of the recession, which has induced a state of panic. 
The most recent rate cut most likely will not instill confidence in financial 
markets, due to the fact that the effective funds rate is no longer closely tied to the 
target rate and the fact that the funds rate was already approaching the zero bound. 
Additionally, the reduction in the funds rate will make little difference in manipulating 
long term risky interest rates, because it will do nothing to alter expectations on risk. 
The impression that the Federal Reserve has run out of weapons in which to fight 
the current crisis, may be given due to the most recent cut. 
 Decreasing the risk premium must be a top priority for the short term. 
One way the Federal Reserve can continue to reduce risk is through its FOMC 
statements.  Bernanke’s erratic use of exotic monetary policy has called his 
credibility into question, putting excess importance on those critical statements. 
For example, the current financial crisis has likely reached its lowest point, as 
credit markets are slowly beginning to function once again. Thus, the Federal 
Reserve can publicly say with confidence that it does not foresee any major bank 
failing in the future, but if one does then it will 
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guarantee its survival. The Federal Reserve has basically enacted such a policy 
(Citibank), but it has not stated it clearly. This would have the effect of increasing 
interbank lending, as lenders will be less concerned about the possibility of bank 
failure and the loss of their loaned funds. FOMC statements can play an important 
role in calming fears that are influenced by media outlets and politicians alike.  
Another realm in which FOMC statements can affect short term policy 
is through inflation expectations. The Federal Reserve, through issuing statements 
showing a strong commitment to keeping interest rates low, can raise inflation 
expectations which could help in lowering the real interest rate. Currently 
there are fears concerning deflation in the economy, which has not been seen in 
America since the Great Depression. The graph below shows that the markets are 
anticipating deflation over the next five years.  Convincing the public that deflation 
will not occur could be a method of enticing people to spend their money.  
       Another action the Federal Reserve can take, despite limitations, is to attack 
the term premium through conducting open market operations to purchase long 
term securities.  Purchasing long term securities will increase the price of these 
assets, which will drive down interest rates. Lowering interest rates will help 
relieve pressure on companies looking to invest, which would provide a stimulus 
to the economy and promote growth. If it becomes necessary, the Federal Reserve 
could even purchase mortgage-backed securities to prop up mortgage prices and 
help banks, or they could continue to buy equity in banks to keep them afloat. All 
of these actions in the short-term strive to reduce the amount of unemployment. 
 Once these immediate concerns are resolved, monetary policy needs 
to focus on our long run objectives. The Federal Reserve must closely monitor 
the state of the economy in the following years to make sure that our current 
aggressive expansionary policy does not lead to long term inflationary pressures. 
As businesses begin to recover, the amount of money that has been injected by 
reducing the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet must be contracted. Allowing the 
money to remain in the economy too long could create a system where businesses 
are dependent on liquidity injections from the Federal Reserve. Additionally, we 
do not want to remove the money too quickly, which could render banks unable to 
make loans and exacerbate the already weakened financial system.  
 As we move forward another consideration for long term policy is the 
relationship between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Historically there has 
been a wall of independence between the two entities. For example, the 1951 
Accord was put in place to reestablish the independence of the Federal Reserve 
from the Treasury, after Truman and the Treasury tried to strong arm Chairman 
Eccles of the Federal Reserve into keeping interest rates low in order to better 
finance government debt. Currently the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
share the same objectives, which will be convenient with Geithner as Treasury 
Secretary. However, in the future if their objectives no longer coincide their close 
relations may hinder the Federal Reserve’s ability to act independently of political 
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pressures. Once this crisis has subsided, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
must sever their ties as soon as it is feasible to do so.      
The Federal Reserve is in a historic period, as it enters a horizon it has 
never reached – a zero percent target federal funds rate. Although Bernanke has 
written extensively on financial crises and what to do at the zero bound, what 
waits before him is unchartered territory. The actions taken by him and the Federal 
Reserve over the next few months and years will be revolutionary, essentially 
writing a new chapter in Monetary Policy textbooks. The Federal Reserve must 
act aggressively to foster an expansionary monetary policy, though it remains 
without traditional tools, while keeping in mind the long-run consequences that 
may result. 
III. A New Government Agenda: Fiscal Policy
The current global financial crisis has thrown the United States and 
much of the world into crisis. While the exact depth of recession is not yet known, 
it is becoming obvious that the country is facing its worst economic problem in 
recent history. This paper attempts to present recommendations for the United 
States government in regards to short term and long term fiscal policy measures 
that could be adopted to mitigate the effect of this crisis on the United States. We 
propose creating a massive fiscal policy package that will pump money into the 
economy in the short and medium run to help stabilize the economy from the 
shocks that the financial system has caused. We propose investing large amounts 
of capital into infrastructure projects, green technology, fusion technology, and 
science education. In addition to these conventional fiscal spending measures, 
we include suggestions for fixing problems that are more closely associated with 
the current slowdown. These measures address the foreclosure problem that is 
threatening American’s homes.  
The first part of our plan, which all the others are predicated on, is short-
term deficit spending. To pull the nation out of recession, output and consumption 
must rise. To do this, a fiscal stimulus must be introduced which pumps money into 
the economy in a way that encourages consumption spending. At the current time, 
we believe the agent best able to spend the money in an efficient way would be the 
United States government. We do not believe that simply mailing rebate checks 
to families would be as effective since people will be more likely to pay off bills 
and debt than consume new goods and services. We have explored many different 
ideas about requiring the tax payers to spend the money within a short period of 
time and restricting them from paying off bills but this seems too difficult. We 
believe that telling the public that they can’t pay off debt with the check they are 
sent would be cruel, considering that many of them need help paying off their 
debt. While we are aware of the problems associated with a large national deficit, 
we believe that the country must spend money to pull itself out of the recession. 
For the time being, therefore, the United States should not concern itself with the 
federal deficit until GDP growth is positive. Once this happens, the country can 
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begin to pay off its large debt and must drastically change the tax code in a way 
that would allow the government to get out of debt.
We recommend making $400 billion available to be used on 
infrastructure projects over the next year. This money will be used to cover all 
forms of infrastructure including roads, bridges and highways as well as electric 
and hydro infrastructure. In addition to the use of this money at the national 
level, states can apply for funding for projects that they have on their books. Two 
independent commissions should be set up to allocate the money to the states. The 
first commission should be set up under the department of transportation and the 
second under the department of energy. States can apply for funds for anything that 
would fall under conventional infrastructure projects. For example New Jersey 
plans to spend $2.8 billion on transportation improvements next year which could 
be covered by this part of our plan. This plan in New Jersey is expected to create 
26,000 jobs over the next year. By the federal government paying for these plans 
the state governments would be better able to balance their budgets.
We believe that government spending must focus on infrastructure 
because transportation and communication are incredibly important to growth in 
all parts of the United States economy. Currently, the nation’s roads and bridges 
suffer from neglect and lack of support from the taxpayer. Rolling brownouts are 
still a problem in some highly populated parts of the country, and the means through 
which we power our cities are extremely outdated. We need to immediately begin 
building new roads and bridges, as well as better water and electric systems. This 
will create new jobs and improve efficiency in both the short and long-run. Over 
the next ten years even more money will need to be spent on infrastructure with 
many estimates ranging from $800 Billion to $1.2 trillion. 
In order to maintain the proud history of technological innovation the 
United States has had we propose spending $100 billion on developing green 
technology. In regards to energy, we must strive to create energy sources that 
are green and do not require the consumption of oil or coal. Likewise, we must 
not focus on energy sources, which create large amounts of waste. Green energy, 
which includes wind and solar power, must be the top priority. 
We propose allotting $10 billion for developing nuclear fusion as a power 
source.  This builds more specifically off our Green energy plan. We must expand 
our efforts to harness nuclear fusion, which promises to be an incredible source 
of energy in the future. It is important that the United States lead the world in the 
creation of green energy, as we believe that the economic benefits of controlling 
the green technology market are immense. 
A large portion of our fiscal policy focuses on health care. We believe 
that America’s health care system is extremely lacking when compared to the rest 
of the world. Millions of Americans are not covered in the case of illness or injury. 
The average American is much less healthy than many citizens of other nations 
with lower standards of living. The government must provide health care to all 
citizens. We propose creating a national healthcare agency that will be placed 
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under the Secretary of Health and Human services. The creation and organization 
of such a new national health care system may be expensive to implement but we 
believe it to be necessary. We will spend money ensuring that every American is 
covered under a national health care policy. For these policies to be implemented 
we are allocating up to $100 billion. The true nationalization will take a bit longer, 
but we believe it will increase efficiency in the industry. Restructuring this system 
will be extremely expensive in the short run, but investing in this project will 
create many jobs and stimulate the economy overall. Also in the long run this 
program may save taxpayers money since they will not need to pay the ever 
increasing private sector health care costs. Since, health care costs for the United 
States totaled $2.16 trillion in 2007, we only allocated less than 5% to reframe 
the system. 
We are also proposing large increases in educational spending over 
the next year at the federal level. We propose a $10 billion dollar program to 
encourage students to study math, science and engineering. While we will offer 
economic benefits for studying science in the higher levels of education, we 
recognize that the impetus must come from the bottom. In this sense, we will 
use money to encourage young children to study science. If we can make science 
fun and interesting to kids at a young age, we believe that they will continue this 
passion through high school and into colleges and universities then finally into 
the work force. 
We propose creating a government taskforce aimed at stabilizing the 
housing market by serving as an arbitrator between lenders and borrowers who 
are in foreclosure. The arbitration will be binding for the borrower and the lender. 
The government taskforce will negotiate mortgage replacement loans, which will 
split the loss from falling home values equally between borrowers and lenders. 
What this will do is prevent lenders from entering foreclosure because they would 
lose more money by doing so. Under this program, lenders will only lose half of 
the difference between what they are owed and what the home is valued at in the 
market, instead of somewhere between 20 and 50% of the debt, which has been 
the case with recent foreclosures. It will also create positive equity for borrowers 
who have found that they owe more than their home is worth. This plan will 
split the loss from falling home values between lenders and borrowers so that 
each party accepts 50% of the difference between home value and mortgage debt 
outstanding. This will be done by requiring banks to write down 50% of this 
difference. Then, borrowers will take a loan from the government amounting to 
20% of the remaining mortgage debt outstanding, up to some yet to be determined 
dollar amount, at a lower interest rate. Borrowers will use this loan to pay down 
20% of their mortgages. This way, their outstanding mortgage debt will be less 
than their home’s value, in most cases, and borrowers will again have positive 
equity in their homes. This will also benefit lenders as the loans will be used to 
pay off large portions of the mortgages they hold. This will effectively lower the 
interest rate being paid by borrowers and ultimately make foreclosure a poorer 
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option. Such a program would strengthen the financial sector, stabilize the sub-
prime debt crisis, slow the rate of foreclosure, and ease the burden of borrowers’ 
mortgage debts. We believe this would go a long way to help the economy recover 
and the financial sector regain liquidity.
We also propose giving the Commerce department up to $50 billion to 
spend on small business investment. This money will be allocated to help owners 
cover start up expenses which they could not otherwise find funding for. Priority 
of funding will be given to the best business plans and applications will be 
thoroughly reviewed so that the money is not just being gambled on unpromising 
endeavors. The commerce department shall spend the money as quickly as good 
ideas present themselves. 
This package will require a total of $620 billion to be spent over the next 
year. Our ten year plan will include $1 trillion for infrastructure, $500 billion for 
green technology, $200 billion for national health care, $50 billion for developing 
nuclear fusion, and $50 billion to encourage education in the sciences. This ten-
year plan requires the spending of $2.8 trillion over the period. This combination 
of a large short-term stimulus and a prorated ten-year spending policy will result 
in the creation of new jobs, the expansion and increased efficiency of the economy 
through infrastructure building, and a better standard of living for nearly all 
Americans.
As previously stated, we understand the extreme volume of our fiscal plan, 
and realize that there are costs in running up a large federal deficit. We maintain 
that the deficit must increase in the short run in order to help the economy, but also 
offer some alternative sources of funding for these projects. Our first source of 
funding would be the implementation of a federal gas tax. This tax will encourage 
green technology and discourage the use of inefficient SUVs and similar vehicles. 
The tax will give several billion dollars to the government and allow us to pay off 
our deficit once we have emerged from recession. Our second proposal for creating 
revenue is to nationalize health insurance. Doing this will save billions of dollars 
every year on administrative costs that goes to HMOs and insurers. We recognize 
that though nationalizing health care does increase government spending, it will 
cut costs for society. Third, we propose a major change in income taxes after we 
get out of the recession. Income taxes will have to rise since they make up such a 
large portion of government revenue. Finally, we will let the Bush tax cuts expire 
which we believe will raise revenue in the future. 
IV. Making Sure the Past Does Not Repeat: Regulatory Policy
In the midst of the current economic crisis, a number of faulty regulations 
within our financial system have surfaced.  We suggest adopting new regulations 
to address the failures of the rating agencies, mortgage industry, and capital 
requirements of all financial institutions.  In addition, to solve the complexity 
accompanied with this globalized financial turmoil, there is a need to adopt an 
International Securities and Banking Regulatory Agency. 
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In order to eliminate all credit rating bias, the entire industry must be 
nationalized. Rating agencies, in their current establishment, have an incentive to 
give ratings that make financial institutions happy. This unnatural ratings inflation 
has made investing less transparent, contributing to the situation we are currently 
in. Having a government rating institution, with a uniform credit rating standard, 
would instill confidence among all investors that know their rating agencies have 
no ulterior motive. With a clear and objective set of standards for what constitutes 
a certain rating, the added transparency will allow firms and investors to optimally 
evaluate their risk portfolios. 
 Recent massive losses in the collateralized debt obligations market have 
exposed the need for rating agencies to frequently update their assed ratings. 
Credit Suisse, for example, issued $340.7 million of collateral debt obligations 
that resulted in losses of approximately $125 million despite having a AAA 
rating from Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Group, and Moody’s. In response, the rating 
agencies asserted that their ratings constitute only a “point-in-time” analysis and 
which does not guarantee the validity of their rating at any point in the future. This 
example shows the need for constant reevaluation and updating of credit ratings 
on a quarterly basis at a minimum. 
It is also important to consider, however, the effects of downgrading a 
firm’s credit rating. In some cases, large loans to companies include clauses that 
state if the company’s rating falls below a certain level than it must immediately 
repay its loan in full. These clauses were essential in the collapse of many 
companies, for example Enron. Since the collapse of Enron, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) required every public company to disclose if they 
have taken out a loan with similar terms. It is essential that credit ratings are 
reevaluated regularly and if a company has debt that is affected by its rating then 
it must be taken into account in an initial evaluation. To help reduce the panic that 
ensues from a drop in ratings, a 1 to 100 rating system should be used in place of 
the old letter grade rating system. 
 As a government institution, rating agencies must not charge fees to debt 
issuers, which would eliminate the conflict of interest that the agencies might 
have to provide inflated ratings to the debt issuers that are paying them. It is also 
essential that the methodology used by the rating institution be a matter of public 
record. Making the rating methodology public will not only allow investors to 
better understand the risk associated with a certain rating, but it will also cause 
investors to pay more attention to the underlying fundamentals of the securities 
that they hold. 
The subprime mortgage crisis has exposed the shortcomings of subprime 
lending.  With little to no down payments being made on houses via non-traditional 
loans, subprime borrowers7 secured mortgages for homes they were unable to 
afford. When the housing market collapsed, mortgage defaults and foreclosures 
skyrocketed. The mortgage industry now faces questions of how it has contributed 
7  Borrowers with a heightened perceived risk of default, usually with a credit score lower than a specific level
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to the current mess and what can be done to solve these issues.  In our opinion, the 
following measures must be taken:
 Instead of the former subprime mortgage lending practices, a different 
form of mortgage lending must be encouraged by subsidizing homeownership 
through the establishment of a down payment matching program similar to those 
used by many European Nations. This would help those who formally using 
traditional subprime mortgage lending. The government would match dollar for 
dollar the down payment on mortgages up to 20% of the house value, depending 
on income levels.  Borrowers with lower income levels below $50,000 would 
qualify for a match of the full 20%, while higher income levels would qualify for 
matches on a decreasing percentage of the home’s value.  Through this program, 
homebuyers would have an incentive to obtain a higher down payment, reducing 
the number of subprime loans made.  This strategy promotes homeownership in a 
way that reduces overall risk.
 An additional method to discourage lending to subprime borrowers 
is to use a broader, more comprehensive set of eligibility factors for potential 
borrowers. Stringent requirements must be put in place regarding mortgage 
eligibility for potential homebuyers. We propose establishing a set of minimum 
qualification which establishes multiple factors that deliver a more complete image 
of the borrower—rather than simply a credit score which include: education, 
disciplinary history and work history. Also, lenders should be made to obtain 
proof of a borrower’s income before making a loan. These requirements would 
force lenders to pay closer attention to a borrower’s ability to repay.
 The Fair Mortgage Practices Act (FMPA) should be signed into law. 
This act calls for all mortgage lenders to require a license and would set up a 
national registration system. It entitles the simplification of disclosures, making 
loan terms more transparent to borrowers. The FMPA limits prepayment penalties 
for certain introductory adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and requires a creditor 
to establish, in connection with a subprime mortgage transaction, an escrow or 
impound account for payment of taxes and hazard insurance. The passing of 
the FMPA will help balance the playing field between mortgage originators and 
borrowers.   
 For the subprime mortgages that do occur, require that subprime 
borrowers complete a seminar on homeownership prior to obtaining a loan. These 
courses would be offered for no charge by state governments (with federal funding) 
and open to all potential homebuyers. Loan-based incentives would be given 
to homebuyers (specifically first-time homebuyers) conditional on completion. 
A strong emphasis must be placed on homebuyer education in order to inform 
borrowers of the risks of buying a home.
 In an effort to arrest the increasing number of mortgage defaults and 
to stabilize housing prices, the federal government should implement a program 
of mortgage replacement loans. These loans would offer all homeowners with 
mortgages the opportunity to replace a fifth of their existing mortgage (up to some 
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dollar limit) with a government loan. Unlike most mortgages, these government 
loans would be full-recourse loans that would have to be repaid regardless. They 
would carry a substantially lower interest rate than the individual’s mortgage, 
thereby making it easier to make payments and prevent default.         
 These recommendations will lead to a sounder mortgage industry in 
which subprime mortgages, defaults, and foreclosures are scarce.   
The banking industry has long based asset reserve and capital requirement 
systems on rating agency modeling. The disclosure of risk to potential investors, 
while providing enormous amounts of opportunity over the short term, has 
substantially increased the amount of risk taken on by investors in the dark 
about many of the banks’ long-term and unrealized capital held apart from their 
disclosed core capital reserves (Tier 1 capital). The opaque information available 
on financial institutions regarding their remaining long-term capital reserves (Tier 
2 and 3) is unknown to private market participants and regulators.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) defines Tier 2 and 
Tier 3 capital as consisting of five types of reserves: undisclosed, revaluation, 
general loan-loss, hybrid debt capital instruments, and subordinated term debt. 
Undisclosed reserves are unpublished reserves by institutions similar to published 
Tier 1 core capital reserves that have passed through the profit loss account, but 
lack proper transparency.  The revaluation reserves are assets that the financial 
institution recalculates based on estimated current values instead of their historical 
value.8  Financial institutions that own an asset with an unrealized loss or gain 
constitute the general loan-loss delimited Tier 2 category of reserves.  Hybrid debt 
capital instruments are assets that combine certain characteristics of equity and 
certain characteristics of debt such as cumulative preference shares.9 Tier 3 capital 
consists only of subordinated term debt instruments issued to outside buyers 
which pay a fixed maturity and are unable to absorb losses except in liquidation. 
This instrument is used to raise short-term capital to cover market risks such as 
losses incurred by mortgage backed security holdings.  
 The lack of previous regulation to require institutions to disclose Tier 2 
and 3 reserves increased the incentive to take riskier positions in hopes of greater 
potential profits during boom-times.  The SEC further exacerbated this risk taking 
in 2004 by allowing the five largest financial institutions to have debt-to-net 
capital leverage ratios of 40 to 1 as opposed to the previous limit of 12 to 1. 
This over-leveraging and subsequent losses formed Special Investment Vehicles 
which allowed institutions (such as Citibank) to hold risky assets like subprime 
mortgage backed securities off their books to give the appearance of financial 
health. The creation of SIVs and over-leveraging by banks were a direct result of 
the lack of transparency of their long-term Tier 2 and Tier 3 assets.  Any reform 
of banking regulation must include an unconditional disclosure of all assets by 
institutions to investors and regulators.  
8  An example of this type of reserve would be a security or other asset which changes value
9  Cumulative preference shares are equity shares which ensure a payment of a missed dividend for a future date
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 The solution to all of the sub-topics explored is the founding of a new 
International Securities and Banking Regulatory Agency (ISBRA).  The focus 
of this new ISBRA would include the regulation of international markets and 
ensuring investment standards across international borders.  Such a solution exists 
for international aid, war, and politics but the globalization of financial markets 
has yet produced proper oversight of the formation of complicated derivatives 
across sovereign national economies.  Long-term stability in the interconnected 
globalized market cannot be achieved without the formation of an ISBRA like 
institution. 
V. Solutions for a Global World: International Trade Policy
The increasing amount of economic interdependence since the end of 
World War II and the subsequent creation of modern financial institutions and 
trade agreements requires that the recent financial crisis be dealt with on an 
international scale.  Such an approach is necessary in order to promote worldwide 
stability and prevent the situation from escalating to levels unforeseen since the 
Great Depression.  Regulatory, monetary, and fiscal actions taken by each nation 
now will have an ultimate effect on the terms of trade and future conditions 
of the worsening financial situation; therefore, all issues must be addressed 
with universal cooperation.  Below are four policy recommendations directed 
toward all participants of the international economic system, without regard to 
developmental status or particular share of the global market.  
The implementation of any new or extensive protectionist measures 
must be avoided by all nations participating in trade at this time of financial crisis. 
The economies of developing nations must be taken into special consideration to 
uphold the current world economic order and maintain relative stability within 
the international system.  Any implementation of new or further regulations and 
barriers to trade would have a negative effect on the growth rate of such economies, 
consequently escalating the crisis to unprecedented levels.  The consequences of 
additional protectionist measures can be prevented as long as they are addressed 
now.  
The World Trade Organization strongly advises that governments do 
not attempt to protect their domestic industries that potentially could be affected 
by the crisis.  The latest WTO Agenda for Doha Development rounds calls for 
“special and differential treatment” to be given to countries that lack key financial 
institutions, like governmental agencies and central banks free of corruption, 
which are necessary in order to maintain overall economic stability.  It also calls 
for a dramatic decline in agricultural subsidies and import barriers, as has each 
Agenda since 2001.  The most recent 2008 rounds request developed nations to 
see to a 50% or higher reduction in import tariffs; while asking developing nations 
to open up by at least 33% within the next two years.  Prior agreements formed 
after the 1994 round are causing a conflict of interest with these suggestions, due 
to their allowance of safeguards in response to the decision to replace quotas and 
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other barriers with strictly tariffs.  Lastly, it is recommended that the WTO work to 
take full precautionary measures to monitor all countries involved in international 
trade agreements, with particular attention given to those that hold a large share 
of the world market. 
The best example of the problems associated with protectionism during 
a financial downturn occurred during the Great Depression.  From 1929 to 1932, 
world trade declined tremendously due to a number of factors; the increase in both 
tariffs and nontariff barriers significantly influenced the decline.  For example, the 
United States’ Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 alone produced serious repercussions 
for the entire world system.  The Act no longer allowed for easy entry by 
foreign competitors into U.S. agricultural markets and placed tariffs on tens of 
thousands of previously imported goods.  Entry was difficult for some products; 
for others it was nearly impossible.  Smoot-Hawley encouraged other nations to 
generate additional regulations on imported goods, specifically agriculture, which 
ultimately led to the considerable decline in the world market and individual 
economies’ balance sheets.  Smoot-Hawley also reduced the United States’ role as 
a major world creditor by prohibiting the issuance of new loans and discontinuing 
previous loans, upon which other economies had become dependent to finance 
their trade deficits.  This reduction in available credit also contributed to the 
decline in world trade; therefore it is recommended that actions similar to those 
promoted by Smoot-Hawley be averted. 
 Independence among the executive board of the IMF from being 
involved in individual government agendas is important as well as an expansion 
of its lending capacity. It is important to ensure that Amendments to the Articles 
of the Agreement on which the Fund was founded will ensure more transparency, 
independence, and accountability of the Executive Board, and not that the 
members do not focus on their respective home country’s national interests. 
These amendments should include making the Executive Directors accountable 
for their decisions. If they are pursuing private government agendas, an Interim 
Committee should be able to step in and remove the Executive Director from his 
or her position. If the IMF were more independent from political and sovereign 
influence, financial institutions would have a better opportunity to understand the 
true risks facing them, as there would be no political pressure clouding their view 
of risk. 
 Currently the IMF has a lending capacity of $250 billion, which would 
not be sufficient for an emerging market in financial need. An increase in the IMF 
lending capacity to at least $700 billion is necessary to help liquidity-strapped 
countries that are suffering from the spillover of the financial crisis. Asian 
governments must be incorporated in the restructuring of the IMF to expand its 
lending capacity because these countries have the financial backing that is needed. 
Incorporation of China and other emerging economies to the fund’s board will 
help expand the lending capacity and loosen the stigma associated with borrowing 
from the IMF.
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Latin America has felt the spillover of the U.S. financial crisis. As the 
recession worsens in the U.S., export revenues and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) will decline in Latin America. The UNCTAD (U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development) reported that for the first six months of 2008 international 
transactions were down 29% as compared to the same period in 2007. In addition, 
they reported that FDI decreased by 10% for 2008. The World Bank revised its 
growth estimates for Latin America in 2009 from 4.2 percent to between 2.5 and 
3.5 percent in light of the U.S. recession. This spillover effect is due to the shrinking 
of global credit and the decline in commodity prices. If the crisis continues, export 
industries dependent on the U.S. textile, steel and other mineral imports will see a 
decrease in the U.S. demand, and therefore a decrease in their exports. Increased 
lending capacity of the IMF is important for struggling nations that will be hurt by 
the decrease in the U.S. imports and FDI.
The reality of bankruptcy is evident in the financial crisis therefore the 
establishment of an International Bankruptcy Court to deal with international 
cooperation and the liquidafication their assets is needed. Mexico and Venezuela 
will be hurt by the decline in U.S. imports because of their dependence on external 
consumption. Venezuela depends on exporting its crude oil to the U.S. as it is one 
of the only countries that can refine their oil. The lower prices of petroleum may 
spark a decline in demand for Venezuelan oil exports. Venezuela was affected 
by the financial breakup of Lehman Brother’s assets—among other countries. 
Since Lehman Brother’s was an international financial institution, when it went 
bankrupt, regulators in each country froze its assets in the home country branch to 
protect the small investors within the country causing a global credit crunch and 
stock market crash. The global credit crunch and stock market increased the fear 
that no banks were safe and interbank lending seized up. However, international 
bankruptcy laws differ across countries and therefore the liquidation of asset 
position and returning assets to the creditors is extremely difficult and timely. 
Lehman Brothers is an example of how an international system to deal with the 
bankruptcy of international financial institutions is needed to avoid the moral 
hazard dilemma and governments being forced to bail them out. 
 Initially established in response to the 1970s’ oil supply crises, the annual 
Group of 8 (G8) summit meetings have proven useful in theory and practice in the 
past. However, in the event of the recent financial crisis, the original framework is 
now outdated and inefficient in its current form.  The full potential of the Group is 
not being met due to the absence of valuable input from all regions of the world, 
and it highly recommended that new seats be added or prior seats be replaced.  
Within the current system, emerging market economies such as nations in 
Asia and Latin America are not represented, and neither is Africa.  The European 
Union, on the other hand, offers a single representative when the summit is 
held outside of their jurisdiction; two when its member-nations act as host.  The 
immense size and power of the EU market requires more than one contributing 
voice to accurately present its position to the forum.  Global representation, in 
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terms of a more regionally balanced set of participating delegates, will help 
the IMF better understand world crises from a more well-rounded prospective, 
helping them create a more effective agenda for addressing its relevant issues in 
the future.
The increasing significance of these relatively new markets has a direct 
effect on global conditions.  The prospect of a worsening recession or worldwide 
state of economic depression calls for full participation.  The 1999 introduction 
of the Group of 20 (G20) summit meetings allows for industrial and developing 
nations to come together to discuss international finance and economic concerns, 
but the size of the forum generates some concern over the effectiveness of their 
efforts.  Therefore, adjustments to G8 will be presumably more beneficial and 
productive in structural nature.
The existence of a wide range of political and economic systems within 
countries engaged in trade requires that international objectives be met by a 
heterogeneous plan of action, in which all G8/G20 members regulate accordingly 
with respect to their individual system.  It is not recommended that a single 
monetary or fiscal approach be agreed upon amongst all nations, but rather a 
spectrum of adjustments be pursued in order to reach the common goal.
 An international commitment to fighting inflation will help ensure 
that excessive bubbles do not occur in the future. As the U.S. consumption is 
decreasing, imports decrease as well. Foreign governments will be tempted to 
inflate their currency and build up U.S. reserves. This may have worked for China 
in the short-run, as now they are in a position to protect themselves from the global 
credit crunch and the foreign capital flight, although it is monetary practices like 
that which help create bubbles and the eventual demise of the current financial 
system. Current account surpluses or deficits are a good monetary tool to cope 
with shocks in the finance and investment; however, the massive trade imbalances 
only would worsen the crisis. 
 To ensure that these excessive booms and busts do not occur in the future 
the IMF should regulate the exchange rates of countries to represent their true 
market value. Countries that peg their currencies must commit to adjusting their 
interest rates to target keeping inflation low. Countries such as China would need 
to float their exchange rate in order to be able to increase interest rates if there 
was a threat of high inflation. This would not work unless there was international 
commitment to coordination, especially among trading partners. Along with 
targeting inflation, each country should look at its financial situation to help 
balance the international financial system. Countries such as China and Germany 
should coordinate fiscal stimulus, however countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. 
should refrain from large fiscal stimulus packages that could offset and possible 
worsen the international financial imbalance.
The U.S. must lead the global economic response out of the financial 
turmoil that ensued from the financial and housing bubbles. It must make push for 
reforms to the IMF to create independence, accountability and transparency that 
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will increase the lending capacity of the IMF. The G8 should expand to include 
Asian and Latin American markets. Reforms to the Work Bank are encouraged 
to set a standard for international bankruptcy laws. The U.S. should avoid 
protectionism measures at all costs to ensure that there is no greater spillover 
effect to other countries. The WTO should monitor countries to ensure that no 
new protectionist measures are implemented. Countries should be committed to 
low inflation and a flexible exchange rate.
VI. What is Worth Saving?: Bailout Policy
Government money should go to companies with sound business models 
that have proven to be profitable and efficient in the past but are in desperate 
need of money for survival. This is the case with the banking industry. Many 
of the banks have been very profitable in the past (if not too profitable from the 
excessive risk taken on) but their assets have dramatically decreased in value 
while their liabilities remain very high. An injection of cash can bring their assets 
and liabilities back to equilibrium, allowing them to function properly. Breaking 
up a big conglomerate company such as Citigroup is a dangerous proposal and 
one that should be generally avoided as the sections a company often rely on each 
other for support and provide diversification. Taking a sector of the business away 
will cause problems even in the previously healthy segments.
Despite our support for bailouts of certain industries, we believe that 
using taxpayer money for private companies should be avoided whenever 
possible, as it will create a moral hazard problem by allowing companies to take 
on excessive risk knowing that they will not be allowed to fail by the government. 
Bailouts must come with stipulations to avoid these problems. Our solution to this 
problem is both simple and complex.
First, we suggest that one of the requirements of bailout money is the 
immediate firing of the CFO or CEO. The reason for this perceivably harsh 
decision has its basis in simple business class teachings. Hypothetically speaking, 
let’s say one day the CEO or CFO of a regular publicly owned company was to 
walk into the board room and explain to its members that they needed to give 
him a blank check or the company would fail. I would suggest that nearly every 
company’s board would demand the immediate firing of the CFO and in many 
cases they would go after the CEO as well. Furthermore, the idea that the board 
would then sit down and listen to the proposed idea of the CFO is clearly absurd. 
Yet, the United States government has done exactly that thus far. They have 
allowed these companies’ CEOs to walk into Congress and ask for large sums of 
money without showing any signs of structural change within their companies. 
Yet, if one of the requirements of bailing a company out involved the dismissal of 
one of the company’s chief officers it would begin to solve the problem of “moral 
hazard.” Practically speaking, if the chief officers of these large public companies 
know that their jobs are on the line if the companies are forced into this type 
of bailout situation then we believe these individuals will act more responsibly 
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and take fewer risks. The firing of the CFO or CEO of a company also signals 
an enormous commitment to change that the general taxpayer can see. This 
helps to reestablish the government and the general public’s trust in a company’s 
commitment to change and eventual ability to become profitable in the future. 
Cases will arise where companies in crisis have replaced their management, 
leaving new executives to save the failing company. The new officer or officers 
seeking the bailout may be able to keep their jobs if it is determined by the task 
force that they were not responsible for the current position of the company and 
are in fact the right people for the job post bailout money and requirements. 
 Our second requirement of companies who are seeking a government 
sponsored bailout is their submittal to a third party review board. This review board 
or task force would be temporary and compiled only in necessary situations, like 
the current crisis. More specifically, the review board would consist of a group of 
individuals outside of Congress who would go over and review the finances and 
the application of the business model of any companies who are seeking bailout 
money. This board would be appointed by members of congress and would work 
with congress to determine which companies are appropriate candidates for a 
bailout. When you are dealing with large amounts of taxpayers’ money, the elected 
officials should have the final say. We are suggesting, however, that this board 
consist of members outside of Congress who are much more knowledgeable in the 
workings of various businesses in specific industries. The Treasury department 
is filled with highly capable men and women who are extremely familiar with 
the financial markets and private firms. For example, as secretary, Hank Paulson 
has previously worked for Goldman Sachs. When it comes to other industries, 
however, such as car manufacturing, lawmakers are not the best suited to evaluate 
and allocate money to best support the industry.  In this scenario, there would 
need to be a specialized review board for each bailout case. This would ensure 
that every company would have people on their review board who are extremely 
familiar with their industry and business model. This second stipulation would 
make the entire process seem more credible to the general public and also point 
out the obvious flaws in each company’s business, making the use of the bailout 
money as efficient as possible. 
Unfortunately, not just companies that do not have enough money in 
the short term are in need of a government bailout. Ailing businesses turn to the 
government with varying degrees of necessity. One situation in which bailouts 
are a necessary evil is when a company is too big to fail. In other words, if the 
company is allowed to fail it will have ramifications for the entire industry, which 
has the potential effect of causing major long term damage to the macroeconomy. 
The big three auto-manufacturers are an example of this. If one of these auto 
giants is allowed to fail it has the potential to start a chain reaction that will bring 
down the entire auto industry. One estimate is that there will be three million 
lost jobs in 2009 if there is a 50% decline in the U.S. auto production.10 This 
10  Hight, 2008
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number includes not only the workers for the big three auto-manufacturers, but 
also workers at companies that supply the big auto companies. Additionally, if 
these auto companies go under there is a chance that their retirees will not receive 
the full pension that they rely on, making the stress on the macroeconomy, and 
in particular aggregate demand, even greater. In our current economic state, on 
the verge of one of the biggest recessions in recent history with unemployment 
already at 6.5%, this collapse could be catastrophic, deepening and prolonging 
the recession.
 In a similar circumstance in 1980, Chrysler was given a bailout through 
the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act. This loan was paid back in three years, seven 
years before the scheduled deadline. This shows that bailouts of this type have 
been successful in the short and medium run in the past. The overall goal, however, 
should be to ensure that these companies never have to be bailed out again. For 
this to happen there needs to be some significant changes in these companies and 
perhaps U.S. policy. First, the third party review board and new management must 
work with the United Auto Workers union to make concessions in its members pay 
and benefits. This restructuring of benefits should focus on the overly generous 
pension plans that these companies offer. It is extremely unproductive for these 
companies to be paying such large amounts to workers that they no longer 
employ. While we recognize that these workers are entitled to those benefits, 
some compromise must be worked out to restructure the benefits to ensure that 
the companies can compete and do not fail. Additionally, one policy that the U.S. 
Government may need to consider is a socialized medical plan. The big three auto 
companies, as well as many other U.S. companies that employ unionized workers, 
have very comprehensive health plans that represent huge costs. These substantial 
costs make it hard for U.S. companies to compete internationally with companies 
that do not have such comprehensive health coverage plans. Another policy that 
the U.S. Government may want to consider is leveling gas prices by utilizing a 
floating gasoline tax. This would stabilize the demand for fuel efficient autos, 
eliminating the large swings in demand that can occur when oil prices are allowed 
to fluctuate wildly. (Hight, 2008) This policy of a gasoline tax, however, would be 
best if implemented after the economy has recovered from its current recession.
On Friday December 12th, both General Motors and Chrysler failed 
to secure a government bail-out. Although we had suggested that it was in 
our economy’s best interest to bail-out these firms that are “too large to fail,” 
congressional Republicans obviously disagreed. Ideally, the plan to bail-out these 
firms would have used a completely different source of funds to provide the $14 
billion bailout that GM and Chrysler were seeking. Ironically, the plan had the 
support of the Democrats and the White House yet President Bush’s own party 
would not side with him on the matter, and the result could be disastrous.
GM and Chrysler came to Congress this month pleading that the 
government bail them out. The two giants of the auto industry claimed that if the 
government did not temporarily bail them out they were within weeks of running 
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out of funds that they needed to continue to operate. Here we are a few weeks 
later and both of these companies have been refused the requested bailout money 
and are on the steps of bankruptcy. This leaves President Bush with two options: 
let the automakers fail or bail them out with TARP money. Unfortunately, neither 
option seems very pretty. Allowing these large companies to fail would leave a 
significant portion of the work force unemployed. In addition, the ripple effect 
of these two companies’ collapse could hurt the economy in ways we haven’t 
imagined. On the other hand, bailout money from TARP would have a terrible 
effect in the long run. Under the guidelines of TARP, these companies would not 
be forced to adhere to any of the guidelines we had set out for them earlier in 
our proposal. In addition, these companies would not be forced to restructure or 
remove any of their chief officers. Essentially, by using TARP money, we would 
literally be “throwing taxpayers’ money at the problem.”
The fallout from Congress’ decision was almost immediate. After 
Congress refused to bail-out GM and Chrysler on Friday, rumor had it that 
President Bush has already put in motion the decision to tap into the $700 billion 
bailout money congress had set aside for the failing financial industry. TARP 
or the Troubled Asset Relief Program is controlled by the Treasury Department 
who also voiced a strong opinion in favor of tapping into the remaining money 
was a stopgap help for the automakers. In a statement released Friday by the 
Treasury stated, “because Congress failed to act, we will stand ready to prevent 
an imminent failure until Congress reconvenes and acts to address the long-term 
viability of the industry.”11
Ultimately, it seems that there is little anyone can do to prevent President 
Bush or the Treasury from tapping into the remaining funds left in TARP. However, 
it is essential for our future economic well being that when Congress reconvenes 
on January 6, 2009 that they immediately address the issue of using TARP money 
to bailout GM and Chrysler. Hopefully, the conditions under which these two 
companies are allowed to access these funds will have a limited lifespan which 
will expire at some time in January. This would allow Congress to re-examine, 
under a new administration, how it plans to handle bailouts for automakers in the 
long run. Hopefully, at this January meeting Congress will come to its senses and 
agree that using separate funds to bailout these companies under stricter conditions 
(as we have proposed) is a necessity.
11  Isidore, Chris. “Treasury bailout targeted for big 3.” CNNMoney.com. December 14, 2008.
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LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND THE PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM
Elizabeth Purcell
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the principal-agent problem within professional 
sports. Imperfect information between managers and players, as well as the 
guaranteed income a long-term contract provides, are predicted to provide players 
with the incentive to alter effort over the length of a contract – especially during 
the first year of a long-term contract. Regression analysis indicates that players’ 
performance levels decline during the first year of a long-term contract, suggesting 
that the effects of the principal-agent problem may outweigh competing effects. 
The study does not, however, suggest that players increase performance in the 
final year of a contract. 
1.  Introduction
 The benefits of long-term contracts to firms have been under debate for 
some time. On the one hand, employees may focus better on their work if they 
are not concerned about losing their jobs. On the other hand, a long-term contract 
guarantees income for a certain time period, regardless of the effort put forth. 
As employers are not able to monitor every action employees make, employees 
are able to reduce effort once a long-term contract is signed. This opportunistic 
behavior is most likely to occur when employers are unable to distinguish between 
shirking, or not trying, and poor performance due to the stochastic nature of the 
environment.
 Behavior patterns arising from long-term contracts exemplify the 
principal-agent problem. The principal-agent relationship exists when a principal 
(the employer) needs to hire an agent (the employee) with specialized skills to 
perform a task. The principal must motivate the agent to perform like the principal 
would prefer, while facing difficulties in monitoring the agent’s every action 
(Sappington 1991). The principal-agent problem occurs when principals and 
agents have conflicting goals. 
 The principal-agent relationship can be seen in various situations in the 
real world. In academia, for example, professors are expected to teach classes and 
conduct research that will eventually be published. However, once professors have 
tenure, they may care less about teaching or may start publishing fewer papers. 
With internships, there is an incentive to work hard and perform well because 
there is the opportunity for a full-time offer at the end of the internship. However, 
once a full-time job has been obtained, there is less urgency for the former-interns 
to impress their superiors, as there is no immediate room for advancement. 
The motivation behind this study is to examine the principal-agent 
problem in the realm of professional sports. Sports is used as a venue for this 
study because it is an industry in which labor productivity is easily quantifiable 
and the data is openly reported. The existence of imperfect information between 
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managers and players, along with the guaranteed income a multi-year contract 
provides, may lead players to alter effort over the term of their contracts. In the 
contract year, the last year of players’ contracts, players may exert more effort, 
hoping to receive long-term contracts with higher salaries the next year. Once 
they have signed long-term contracts, however, players may reduce effort, as 
they have guaranteed income for the remainder of their contracts, regardless of 
performance.
Whereas previous studies have examined long-term contracts in a 
specific sport, this paper looks to examine the impact of long-term contracts across 
Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Hockey League (NHL), and the National Basketball Association (NBA). The 
paper proceeds as follows: the next section analyzes the principal-agent problem 
and the incentive to shirk given the structure of contracts in the various sports, the 
third section provides a literature review, the fourth section describes the data, the 
fifth section provides the methodology behind the study, the sixth section presents 
and analyzes the results, and the final section draws conclusions and implications 
from the study.
2.  The Principal-Agent Problem and Collective Bargaining Agreements
Employers are willing to offer secured income contracts because they can 
act as incentive mechanisms that motivate employees to put forth as much effort 
as they can so they can obtain the contract. Long-term contracts can be beneficial 
for both employers and employees. Employers benefit from being able to secure 
productive employees and prevent them from moving to the competition (Maxcy 
1997), while employees, once they obtain a long-term contract, are promised a 
salary for a specific period of time.
Principal-agent theory suggests that when parties of a contract have 
different objectives, shirking can occur. When compensation or job security is 
dependent on performance, workers are likely to exert as much effort as they can. 
However, when compensation is no longer dependent on performance, workers 
have less incentive to put forth the same amount of effort. Once agents have 
secured income through a contract, effort put into work lowers utility. 
Shirking will not necessarily occur, however, because workers may gain 
utility from contributing to the success of the firm. For example, professional 
athletes derive utility in helping their team win a championship (Maxcy 1997). 
Athletes are unlikely to see shirking as beneficial from this standpoint because 
if they are not performing at their best, they will contribute to the team losing. 
On the other hand, there is less need for workers to be concerned about employer 
perceptions of them and their productivity once a long-term contract is signed 
(Stiroh 2007). Therefore, there may be less incentive to exert effort once a contract 
is signed.
Monitoring shirking is sometimes difficult because individual contribution 
is not always easily identified. The free-rider problem can exist, as the team can 
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still perform well if one player is not exerting all his effort (Prendergast 1999). If 
players can enjoy wins without putting forth all their effort, there is incentive for 
them to shirk. 
Shirking can occur during games and in other ways as well. Once a long-
term contract is obtained, athletes may not train as diligently during the off-season. 
Players that are at the end of their contracts want to show that they are willing 
work hard to improve their skills and do their best for the team. If players know 
they have another five years left on the contract, however, they may spend the off-
season relaxing rather than training every day. In addition, whereas athletes who 
are at the end of a contract may be more likely to play with an injury in an attempt 
to show they are still valuable to the team, athletes who still have time left on their 
contracts may avoid playing while injured to avoid the risk of further injury and 
shortening their careers. 
 In order to examine the impact long-term contracts have on performance, 
performance needs to be considered at various stages over the length of a contract. 
Ideally, effort would be used as the measure of whether players shirk once they 
have a secured a long-term contract; however, changes in effort are difficult to 
observe. Therefore, performance will be used as the dependent variable, assuming 
that if players put forth more effort they will perform better.
 The year directly preceding contract negotiation is when players are 
likely to put forth the most effort. While there is more information in players’ 
performance history as a whole, salaries are based more on the most recent year of 
performance rather than past performance. Healy finds that teams put about twice 
as much weight on performance from the past season than on performance from 
two or three years ago (Healy 2008). This suggests that shirking is more likely to 
occur early in the contract and diminish as players get closer to the contract year.
While principal-agent theory suggests that players have the incentive 
to shirk, there are other factors that may impact players’ behavior. Players are 
paid not only by salary, but also by endorsements. Players receive endorsements 
because they are large contributors to their teams’ success and are popular with 
fans. Therefore, endorsements are a disincentive for players to shirk because if 
their performance starts declining, they risk losing their endorsements as well 
as popularity. As some endorsements rival players’ salaries, the cost of losing 
the additional income may be greater than the benefit received from lowering 
effort. In addition, if players enjoy having fame, the disutility they may face from 
losing fans due to a drop in performance may outweigh the utility players get 
from shirking. Many athletes want to leave behind a legacy and be remembered 
for being great. Shirking has the potential to taint this legacy, which may prevent 
some athletes from shirking. Therefore, endorsement incentive effects, as well as 
utility derived from popularity, may offset the shirking that is predicted by the 
principal-agent problem. 
The principal-agent problem predicts that long-term contracts can create 
inefficient pay and performance, unless mechanisms exist within the contract to 
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prevent these (Maxcy et al. 2002). When implementing mechanisms in contracts, 
incentives should be used carefully. Certain mechanisms, such as tying rewards to 
performance, can lead to dysfunctional responses, where agents focus solely on the 
specific performance measures listed in the contract (Prendergast 1999). This can 
end up damaging firm performance overall, as agents begin to ignore other aspects 
of their jobs that do not bring rewards. For example, Ken O’Brian, a quarterback, 
was given a contract in which he was penalized any time he threw the ball to the 
opposing team. While he threw fewer interceptions, his solution was to hold the 
ball rather than throw, instead of working to improve his accuracy (Prendergast 
1999). This in the long run hurt the team because its quarterback would not throw 
the ball, even in cases when he should have. When used improperly, contract 
incentives may be more detrimental than beneficial.
 Contracts and other labor issues in professional sports are governed 
by collective bargaining agreements (CBA). The CBA, which determines many 
parameters that teams and players face when negotiating contracts, is agreed 
upon between the league and the league’s respective player’s union. As this study 
focuses on the impact of long-term contracts, only the key factors relating to 
the contracting framework of each sport will be discussed. The information is 
summarized in Table 1. This study focuses on the regular season; therefore, post-
season incentives and regulations are not addressed.
 Minimum salary levels are a commonality across the four CBAs 
examined, however the minimum salary implemented varies between sports. The 
existence of a minimum salary predicts that players will be more likely to reduce 
effort in the first year of a long-term contract because they know they will at least 
get a certain level of income even if they shirk. 
 The ways in which salary maxima are handled in the different sports show 
more variation than salary minima. In MLB, for example, there is no maximum 
mandated by the CBA. However, there are limits on how much players’ salaries 
can be reduced (MLB CBA 2007), which provides players with the incentive to 
shirk after signing a long-term contract because even if performance declines, 
their salary can only be reduced by a certain amount. In a sense this is a security 
blanket because players are guaranteed a certain salary level in a new contract, 
which in many cases is probably higher than the minimum salary requirement. As 
such, it is less likely that MLB players will increase effort in the final year of a 
contract compared to other 
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leagues. Similarly, the NFL places no limit on maximum salary unless the salary 
cap goes into effect (NFL CBA 2006).
Salary maxima in the NHL and NBA depend on player experience (NHL CBA 
2005 and NBA CBA 2005). The differences in maximum salary levels that exist 
between players of varying experience levels in the NBA and NHL may provide 
incentive for players not to shirk as they approach the next experience bracket. 
In the NHL for example, if players are nearing the end of their entry level status, 
they may avoid shirking in hopes of boosting their salary in the next contract, 
which has the potential to increase more than it was able to as an entry level 
contract. However, overall, the existence of a salary maximum in the NHL and 
NBA diminishes the likelihood of players increasing effort during the contract 
year compared with MLB or the NFL because once players reach the maximum 
salary, there is no incentive to continue putting in increasing effort because they 
will not be rewarded with a higher salary if performance improves. 
 The four leagues vary in how they handle performance incentives. While 
individual contracts may have performance incentives, these contracts are not 
made public, and therefore it is not possible to analyze these differences. However, 
the CBAs of the different sports have varying league-wide performance incentive 
mechanisms that can be examined. The MLB CBA mentions post-season incentives 
for players, but these are not relevant to this study. However, as the reward for 
MLB players depends on the performance of the team as a whole and whether 
the team makes it into the post-season, the lack of performance incentives in the 
regular season potentially provides the incentive to shirk, as there are no individual 
performance benefits. Because of the lack of individual performance benefits, it 
is more likely MLB players will decrease effort in the first year of a long-term 
contract. In the NFL, players are part of a performance-based pool (PBP). The 
pool starts off at $3 million per club in 2006 and increases each subsequent capped 
year by 5%. Players are allocated their share of the fund by dividing their PBP 
index12 by the sum of the PBP indices for each player on the team and multiplying 
that percentage by the club’s total PBP allocation (NFL CBA 2006). As players’ 
allocation of the PBP depends on their playing time, players are provided with 
an incentive not to shirk because they will have more playing time and more 
opportunities to make plays if they are performing at full potential. The presence 
of the PBP reduces the likelihood that players will shirk after signing a long-term 
contract because if performance declines, players’ shares of the PBP drop. In the 
NBA, performance incentives are required to be structured so that they provide 
incentive for positive achievement by players (NBA CBA 2005). While there are 
opportunities for players to get performance-based incentives worked into their 
contracts, these incentives may lead players to focus on improving certain skills 
that are in the contract, and ignore other skills. While developing the other skills 
may help the team as a whole, if there is no monetary incentive attached to them, 
12  PBP index = play time percentage/PBP compensation , Play time percentage = player’s total plays on 
offense or defense / team’s total plays on offense or defense, PBP compensation = full regular season salary + 
prorated signing bonus for current league year + earned incentives + other compensation for current league year
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the opportunity cost of improving those skills over those that are in the contract 
rises. However, the existence of performance incentives diminishes the likelihood 
that NBA players will show a decline in effort after signing a long-term contract. 
Finally, the NHL only allows for performance incentives for certain players (NHL 
CBA 2005). As such, there is the potential for players to shirk because there is no 
reward for them to make additional effort. 
 Similarly to how the MLB limits the amount salaries can be reduced, 
the NBA CBA mandates that contracts only be extended upward (NBA CBA 
2005). Because the length of a contract cannot be reduced during renegotiation, 
there may be more incentive for players to shirk early in their contracts because 
current contracts cannot be shortened. This increases the likelihood that players 
lower effort in the first year of a long-term contract. As players reach the end of a 
contract, they can boost performance and still receive a new long-term contract, 
based on the idea that teams focus on recent performance more than historical 
performance (Healy 2008). In this regard, players’ performance is expected to 
increase during the contract year. 
 Free agency is present in all of the sports included in this study, but 
there are differences between leagues. Players are only eligible for free agency 
if they have not signed a contract for the next season. The NFL, NBA, and 
NHL differentiate between restricted and unrestricted free agents. Unrestricted 
free agents are able to sign with any team they choose. Restricted free agents, 
however, are eligible to negotiate with any team, but their former team has the 
ability to make an offer in order to retain the players. MLB free agency operates 
differently, as there is no distinction between free agents. The existence of free 
agency increases the likelihood that players will put forth more effort in the 
contract year because players will want to be desirable to team owners in hopes of 
getting a higher salary. 
 The presence of guaranteed contracts in sports increases the likelihood 
that players will lower effort in the early portion of a long-term contract. If players 
sign a long-term contract for five years and the contract is guaranteed, they are 
more likely to shirk, as they know that they have a guaranteed salary, regardless 
of their performance. MLB, the NBA, and NHL guarantee player contracts, while 
the NFL does not make this a league-wide policy (MLB CBA 2007, NFL CBA 
2006, NHL CBA 2005, NBA CBA 2005). Because of this, it is less likely that NFL 
players will lower effort after signing a long-term contract. There are however, 
some contracts in the NFL that are guaranteed. Depending on how many contracts 
are guaranteed, the impact of the presence of guaranteed contracts in the NFL 
compared with other sports may be ambiguous. 
3. Literature Review
 There is contradictory evidence regarding how player performance 
changes as a result of contract length and where players are in their contracts. 
Maxcy examines how long-term contracts influence performance in MLB. If 
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effort changes with contract status, performance is assumed to be highest during 
the last year of a contract. The author uses first differences to examine the change 
in performance as contract status changed. As expected, the author finds that age 
and experience are significant factors in performance variation. However, he finds 
no evidence that long-term contracts influence performance on average (Maxcy 
1997). Maxcy concludes that players and firms have similar goals, and therefore 
shirking does not occur.
 Another study completed by Maxcy, Fort, and Krautmann examines 
ex ante strategic behavior and ex post shirking in terms of the principal-agent 
problem. Ex ante strategic behavior is defined as increasing performance just 
before contract negotiations. Ex post shirking is defined as reducing effort after a 
contract is signed. The authors believe that in order to properly test for shirking, a 
comparison between players who are expected to behave strategically and players 
who are not at a point in their contracts where they would behave this way is 
needed. The way in which performance of a player is affected by proximity to 
contract negotiations is tested in this model to examine strategic behavior. To 
control for players’ expected performance, the authors use average performance 
over the three prior years. Skill is measured by SA for hitters and strikeout-to-
walk ratio for pitchers. Playing time and time spent on the disabled list are also 
variables included in the model. The authors find that time spent on the disabled 
list declines in the period immediately preceding contract negotiations. Playing 
time in this period is also higher. The authors find no evidence, however, that 
performance declines after a long-term contract is signed (Maxcy et al. 2002). 
This study indicates that players may avoid the disabled list more as contract 
renegotiations approach because they want to appear strong in hopes of getting a 
longer contract; however, long-term contracts do not promote shirking.
Krautmann uses a model of stochastic productivity to test if long-term 
contracts diminish work effort in MLB. Rather than simply seeing a drop in 
performance as a sign of shirking, Krautmann believes that the model should 
test whether a drop in performance lies outside a forecast interval. Performance 
varies over a players’ careers, so a drop in performance does not necessarily 
signal shirking. Performance is partially dependent on chance, and therefore 
low productivity could be due to the stochastic nature of productivity in sports. 
However, if performance lies significantly above or below players’ forecast 
intervals, which takes performance variations into consideration, players may be 
behaving strategically. The author concludes that there is no evidence of shirking, 
and that decreased performance is due to the stochastic nature of productivity 
rather than asymmetric information (Krautmann 1990).
Sommers studies the influence of salary arbitration on player performance 
using MLB. Evidence suggests that lower performance after arbitration may be 
due more to aging than shirking (Sommers 1993). Therefore, this could suggest 
that arbitration may be an effective mechanism in MLB collective bargaining. 
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 In contrast to the previous studies mentioned, Woolway finds statistically 
significant evidence that multi-year contracts have worker disincentives. Using a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, the author examines the marginal products 
of players who signed multi-year contracts to test for performance disincentives 
associated with long-term contracts. From the production function, Woolway 
derives players’ marginal products. A one-tailed significance test is then run to 
test the null hypothesis that shirking does not exist. Woolway finds that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. While individual reductions in productivity obtained 
by Woolway are not large, if several players have long-term contracts and shirk, 
the individual reductions are aggregated and team productivity can significantly 
be affected (Woolway 1997).
 A study conducted by Stiroh on pay and performance in the NBA finds 
that performance improves significantly in the year before a multi-year contract 
is signed, and declines after the contract is signed. Stiroh excludes players with 
one-year contracts from his analysis to avoid competing incentive effects because 
players with one-year contracts are typically marginal players or players near the 
end of the career. Using weighted-least squares, the study finds that players with 
better performance receive longer contracts with higher salaries. When examining 
individual performance and contract status, Stiroh finds that there is improvement 
in the contract year, however there is no evidence of a post-contract decline in 
performance. Age is negatively related to performance, implying that skills erode 
as players get older (Stiroh 2007).
 Asch conducts a study of the impact of contract incentives on worker 
productivity using Navy recruiters. Recruiters are rewarded for good performance 
as a part of an incentive program and also face quotas each month. Higher-quality 
recruits provide more points to recruiters, and points are accumulated over 
a 12-month period. Asch finds that recruiters vary effort in an attempt to win 
rewards. Output is greatest when recruiters are getting close to being eligible to 
winning a prize. Also, once recruiters are in a good position to win a reward, they 
seem to reduce effort (Asch 1990). This is similar to the idea that players put 
forth more effort as they are getting close to contract negotiation, in an attempt to 
receive a “prize” of a longer contract and higher pay. Once they have obtained the 
contract, however, they relax and reduce effort. 
 A study similar to Asch’s conducted by Oyer examines the effect of 
nonlinear contracts on employee performance. Nonlinear contracts refer to the 
nonlinear relationship between compensation and sales or compensation and 
profits. In an attempt to reach the annual quota, salespeople may alter effort level 
or manipulate the timing of sales. Oyer finds that the nonlinear contracts may 
provide incentives for sales employees to bunch sales at the end of the fiscal 
year and vary effort throughout the year. There is more incentive for salespeople 
to work harder at the end of the fiscal year than during any other time. As the 
incentive payment gets closer, employees are willing to exert more effort (Oyer 
1998). Put into the context of sports, as players get closer to the possibility of 
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higher pay in a new contract, they may be more willing to put forth more effort to 
improve performance. 
 Healy conducts a study on whether firms place too much importance on 
most recent performance rather than focusing on past performance. He analyzes 
this using MLB. To estimate his equations, a Prais-Winsten regression is used 
because there is significant first-order serial correlation in the salary data. The 
data shows that teams do not generally use players’ past performance to determine 
salary offers. More successful teams, as measured by achieving more wins 
than predicted by their payrolls, base salary offers on historical performance. 
Unsuccessful teams, however, tend to focus too much on most recent performance 
alone (Healy 2008). 
4. Data
The data used in this paper include historical performance statistics from 
players in MLB, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA from the years 1992 until 
2008. The data include 2,656 player/year observations, with 149 players from 
baseball, 103 players from football, 48 players from hockey, and 74 players from 
basketball. Summary statistics, divided by sport, are available upon request. The 
data on baseball players include pitchers, shortstops (SS), third basemen (3B), and 
right fielders (RF). Wide receivers (WR), running backs (RB), and quarterbacks 
(QB) are used in the NFL sample. Data for hockey players include only goalies. 
Basketball player data include centers, forwards, guards, center-forwards (CF), 
and guard-forwards (GF). Players are randomly selected from a list of the current 
players holding the previously mentioned positions. Some players are excluded 
from the study because historical contract data could not be found. 
Because players are randomly selected from players currently in the 
leagues, the sample suffers from truncation bias. The study uses point in time 
contract information and follows players’ careers backwards. Therefore, the 
database does not include players who left the league prior to 2008, excluding 
players who only lasted in the league for a couple years. This may affect the 
study’s results because these players may behave differently from those who are 
able to have long-term careers. Marginal players are less likely to increase effort 
in the final year of a contract if they are not expecting to receive a long-term 
contract the following year. Therefore, performance in the last year of a contract 
would be lower, thus making the coefficient of the variable measuring effort in 
the final year of a contract smaller if these players with subpar performance were 
included. To avoid this selection bias, future studies could pick a year as a base-
point and follow players’ careers forward, thus encompassing players who only 
play for a couple years as well as those with long-term careers. 
There are many statistics used to measure player performance, but they 
vary in relevance by position. For MLB pitchers, earned run average (ERA), as 
used by Maxcy, is used as the performance measure. ERA measures the average 
number of runs a pitcher would have given up if he were to pitch a full nine 
55
innings. Performance of shortstops, third basemen, and right fielders is measured 
by slugging average (SA), as used by Maxcy. SA, used to measure batting power, 
is calculated by dividing a player’s total number of bases reached on hits divided 
by the number of times at bat. For NFL wide receivers, yards per reception (YPR) 
is used. YPR is calculated by dividing the number of receiving yards by the number 
of receptions. Leeds and Kowalewski use receptions in their study, however yards 
per reception is deemed to be a better measure, as it measures whether players 
are able do something with the ball once a reception is made. Similarly, based 
on the performance measures used by Leeds and Kowalewski, running backs’ 
performance is measured by receiving yards per reception (YPRRB). This is 
calculated in the same manner as YPR. Quarterback performance is measured by 
yards per attempt (YPA), as used by Einolf. YPA is calculated by dividing passing 
yards by passing attempts. For NBA players, free throw percentage (FTP), as used 
by Bodvarsson and Brastow, measures player performance. FTP calculates the 
number of free throws made out of the number of free throws attempted. Finally, 
for NHL players, save percentage (saveper), as used by Richardson, is used to 
measure performance. This statistic measures the percentage of goals a goalie 
saves. 
For sports that span across two years, namely the NFL and NBA, year 
is classified by the year in which the season started. For each player used in the 
study, performance, contract information, team, position, and age for every year 
the player has been in the league is included. Age is normalized, by subtracting 
the mean age for that sport from the player’s age. This is done to control for age 
related variation between sports and in contracts due to seniority. For example, 
once players in the NFL reach thirty they are seen as old, whereas in the MLB, 
thirty year olds are likely to still be able to play for another ten years. 
As each sport has different rules and measures of performance, directly 
comparing performance statistics across sports is not possible. For example, one 
cannot look at ERA and YPR and determine which is the better player. However, 
by assigning z-scores to each performance statistic, comparisons between sports 
can be made, as the performance statistics are translated into relative performance 
in comparison to one’s peers. The frequencies of performance statistics for 
each sport are plotted to determine whether they are normally distributed. The 
distributions can be seen in Figures 1-7 below. These graphs indicate that the 
performance statistics chosen are approximately normally distributed. For MLB 
pitchers, a lower 
ERA is better than a higher one. A better ERA would have a negative z-score, while 
in other sports, better performance measures have positive z-scores; therefore, the 
signs of the z-scores for pitchers are reversed.
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Figure 1: ERA Normal Distribution Figure 2: SA Normal Distribution
           n = 492                   n = 93
Figure 3: YPR Normal Distribution   Figure 4: YPA Distribution
  
n = 100      n = 103
Figure 5: YPRRB Normal Distribution           Figure 6: Saveper Normal Distribution
         
 n = 308     n = 85
Figure 7: FTP Normal Distribution
 n = 593
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5. Methodology
 The hypothesis of this study is that the principal-agent problem is a large 
enough effect to overcome competing effects, such as the utility players receive 
from winning, the endorsement effect, and fame. While effort cannot be easily 
measured, performance is assumed to depend on the amount of effort athletes put 
forth. Assuming that players change effort based on contract status, the following 
regression is estimated:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t  + αs + αt + εi,t ,
where Pi,t is the performance measure, PREi,t is equal to 1 in the final year of a 
contract and 0 otherwise, POSTi,t is equal to 1 in the year after the contract year 
and 0 otherwise, and AGE is a player’s normalized age13. Controls for sport (αs) 
and year (αt) are also used. PRE and POST are thought to matter differently from 
one sport to another. As such, the sport variables are interacted with the PRE and 
POST variables and the following regression is estimated:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t  + αs + αt + 
PREi,t*αs +  POSTi,t*αs + εi,t .
Whereas plain dummy variables shift the intercept of a regression line for various 
groups, the interacted dummy variables shift the slope of a regression line (Greene 
1993).
A fixed effects model is used because it controls for the average 
differences across year and sport in any observable or unobservable predictors. 
When using ordinary least squares (OLS), the error terms are assumed to be 
normally distributed with constant variance. However, this is not typically true 
for panel data. In addition, OLS does not account for unobservable factors that 
may be correlated with the variables included in the regression. By using fixed 
effects, omitted variable bias is eliminated. When using a fixed effects model, 
the differences between units are viewed as parametric shifts of the regression 
function (Greene 1993). 
The variables of most interest are PRE and POST, as they measure the 
impact of contract status on players’ performance. It is expected that βPRE will be 
greater than 0, as players increase effort in the contract year, and βPOST will be less 
than zero, as players shirk once they obtain a long-term contract. AGE and AGE2 
control for the possibility that performance declines as players mature and act as a 
proxy for athletic ability, as this changes with over players’ lifetimes. 
 Regressions for individual sports are also estimated. While performance 
measures vary from sport to sport, the basic regression estimated is:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t + αt + αp + εI,t, 
where αp is a variable controlling for position. For each sport, several measures 
of performance are estimated. Including all players in the sample, regressions are 
13  To normalize age, the mean age for the sport was subtracted from a player’s age. 
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estimated using players’ performance z-score as well as absolute performance 
statistics. As with the regression including all sports, these regressions are 
estimated using fixed effects.
6. Results and Discussion
 The results of the regression analysis are mixed. These results are 
presented in Table 2. Analysis is primarily focused on PRE, POST, AGE, and 
AGE2, however year is controlled for in all of the regressions. In the regressions 
including all sports, the only years that are statistically significant are 2007 an 
2008. In the regressions of the individual sports, none of the year variables are 
significant. 
 When interaction terms are not included in the regression of all sports, 
PRE and POST are both negative and significant, indicating that players decrease 
effort in both the final year of a contract as well as in the first year of a long-term 
contract. While the result of POST is expected, the finding that PRE is negative is 
contrary to predictions. Theoretical findings do not provide an explanation of why 
players would decrease effort in the final year of a contract. As the sport variables 
are also significant, indicating that MLB, the NFL, and the NHL are statistically 
significantly different from the NBA, PRE and POST are interacted with the sport 
variables. This is intended to capture differences of PRE and POST in the varying 
sports.
 The only interaction term that is significant is mlbpre, which is negative. 
The negative sign indicates that baseball players do not perform as well in the 
final year of a contract compared to the NBA. This implies that baseball players 
may not be able to change effort to improve performance as much as athletes in 
the NBA can during the final year of a contract. After including the interaction 
terms, POST remains significantly negative, while PRE becomes positive and 
insignificant. While it is not significant, having a positive PRE is in agreement 
with the hypothesis. As including the interaction terms changes the sign of PRE, 
it appears as though some sports have more incentive to increase effort in the final 
year of a contract than others and  t the moral hazard problem is worse in some 
sport than others. 
           In all of the leagues, there is incentive for players to shirk early in their 
contracts and increase effort in the final year of a contract. Teams tend to focus 
mostly on most recent performance, rather than historical performance (Healy 
2008). As such, if players sign ten-year contracts and do poorly in the first year, 
but do well in the final year, they are still in good position to receive a long-term 
contract when they are up for renegotiation. The results of regression analysis 
are mixed in this hypothesis. While POST is negative in the instances where it is 
significant, indicating that players do take advantage of their ability to shirk, there 






















 Players are expected to reduce effort during the first year of a long-term 
contract with the existence of minimum salary because if players shirk, they are 
still guaranteed the league-wide minimum salary. POST is negative in most of 
the regressions, indicating that performance does decline in the first year of a 
long-term contract. POST is significantly positive in the regression using ERA as 
the dependent variable, however as a lower ERA is better than a higher one, the 
signs for this regression need to be reversed to account for this. Therefore, the 
regression indicates that MLB pitchers reduce effort following the signing of a 
long-term contract.
In MLB, players’ salary can only be reduced by a limited amount, 

































more likely to decrease effort in the first year of a long-term contract than NHL 
and NBA players. POST is not significant for the NHL or NBA, indicating that 
it is not significant in explaining changes in performance level. This supports 
the hypothesis that MLB players are more likely to shirk than NHL and NBA 
players. 
In MLB and the NFL, there is no salary maximum, which is expected 
to increase the likelihood that players will increase effort in the final year of a 
contract. In the NHL and NBA, players face salary maximums so once a player 
reaches the maximum salary, there is little incentive to continue putting forth 
more effort, as there is no reward of a higher salary if performance improves. 
Regression analysis, however, does not seem to support this prediction. In the 
cases where PRE is significant, the regressions suggest that players decrease 
effort in the final year of a contract. This does not agree with theory, as reducing 
effort and therefore lowering performance is not beneficial for players trying to 
obtain as big a contract as possible.
As MLB does not offer performance incentives for players during the 
regular season, it is predicted that MLB players are more likely to reduce effort 
after signing a long-term contract because post-season incentives are dependent 
on how the team as a whole performs and not individual performance. Regression 
analysis suggests that MLB players do in fact reduce effort after signing a long-
term contract. In all three MLB regressions, POST is significant, indicating 
that performance declines in the first year following the signing of a long-term 
contract.
The performance incentives offered by the NFL and NBA are expected to 
reduce the likelihood of POST being negative and significant. Regression analysis 
shows mixed results. In the NFL regressions, POST is negative and significant in 
the regressions using z-score and YPR as the dependent variable. However, the 
regressions using YPA and YPRRB are insignificant. This suggests that certain 
positions in the NFL may lend themselves to shirking more than others, or the 
PBP may provide different incentives for different positions. The NBA regressions 
indicate that POST is negative, however this is not significant. Players may be apt 
to reduce effort in the first year of a long-term contract, but the desire to shirk 
appears to be overcome by other factors since POST is not significant.
 The NBA CBA mandates that players’ contracts can only be renegotiated 
upward. This provides incentive for players to shirk early in their contracts because 
they know their current contracts will not be reduced. While it is expected that 
POST will be negative and significant, regression analysis shows that POST is 
negative and insignificant. While players may indeed reduce effort after signing 
a long-term contract, it does not appear to be significant, suggesting that other 
factors may outweigh the incentive to shirk.
 Free agency is expected in increase the likelihood that players will 
increase effort in the final year of a contract. Players want to obtain the most 
lucrative contract they can, and therefore want to appear to be valuable members 
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of a team. As such, they will not want to reduce effort in the final year of a contract 
because team owners prefer top performers to mediocre players. Regression 
analysis does not support this prediction, however, as PRE tends to be negative.
 The presence of guaranteed contracts is expected to increase the 
likelihood that players will lower effort in the first year of a long-term contract. 
A guaranteed contract ensures that players will receive their salary, regardless 
of whether they have poor performance. The only CBA in this study that does 
not provide guaranteed contracts is that of the NFL. As such, the likelihood of 
POST being negative and significant is expected to be lower compared to other 
leagues. Regression analysis does not support this hypothesis, however, as there 
are instances where POST is negative and significant in the NFL, while it is not 
in the NHL or NBA. As some NFL players are given guaranteed contracts while 
others are not, this result does not hold strong significance. Information regarding 
whether a contract is guaranteed is not generally made public, so the number of 
players in the NFL sample with guaranteed contracts is unknown. If this data were 
available, it would be possible to examine whether NFL players with guaranteed 
contracts behave differently from those without. 
While the signs of AGE and AGE2 vary between the regressions, there 
appears to be a common trend. Where AGE and AGE2 are significant, AGE is 
positive and AGE2 is negative. AGE captures the experience players gain as 
they get older, which will tend to improve performance, and AGE2 captures the 
deteriorating effects of age on performance. As players age, even if they are putting 
forth the same amount of effort, their performance will eventually start to decline. 
Skills begin to deteriorate with age, which leads to lower performance levels. 
 Looking at the individual sport regressions, it is apparent that both 
significance and sign change as the equations are estimated using the z-score 
version of performance statistics and various performance statistics, depending on 
sport and position. This indicates that certain positions or performance measures 
may be more sensitive to changing effort than others. 
 The models analyzed in this study use both z-scores, which measure 
relative performance, as the dependent variable and raw performance statistics, 
which measure absolute performance. Relative performance examines the change 
in performance over a contract in comparison with other players in the league. 
Therefore, if other players are performing poorly, a decrease in effort resulting in a 
decline in performance may not be seen as readily. However, absolute performance 
solely examines a player’s performance relative to his past performance. 
 A common pattern across all the regressions is that POST is mostly 
negative, especially when it is significant. While there are some deviations from 
this, the results generally imply that players reduce effort after signing a long-term 
contract. While none of the coefficients are particularly large, this result is still 
significant. One player reducing effort after signing a long-term contract may not 
have a sizeable impact on team performance overall, however if many players are 
lowering effort, team performance as a whole may begin to fall. 
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 An issue that the model may be facing is a small sample size. When 
all the sports are included, the model has a fairly large sample size, however 
when broken up by sport and position, the number of observations is significantly 
decreased. Also, using only one position for hockey may not allow the model to 
capture all the effects of a change in contract status.
 A potential reason for the lack of consistency in the sign and significance 
of PRE is that the variable may not be measured correctly. In this study, players are 
assumed to increase performance in the final year of a contract. However, players 
may operate in a different time frame and may increase performance before this 
point in hopes of securing a long-term contract.
As the models in this study are slightly different from Stiroh’s model, 
Stiroh’s model is replicated as closely as possible to determine if his results are 
repeatable. The model used is:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAgei,t + αa + αp + αl + αt + εi,t , 
where αa  controls for player and αl is controls for team. Weighted least squares 
is used to estimate the regression, using the percentage of games played for 
the season as weights. The results of this regression are shown in Table 3. The 
significance of the control variables is mixed; some are significant while others 
are not. While Stiroh finds PRE to be positive and significant, POST to be positive 
and insignificant, and age to be negative and significant, this study finds PRE to 
be positive and insignificant, POST to be negative and insignificant, and Age to 
be positive and significant.












Whereas Stiroh concludes that there is improvement in performance in the contract 
year, this study cannot do so. A smaller sample size may be part of the reason for 
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variations in the results, as Stiroh has a sample size of 2,646 while this study only 
has 486 observations. In addition, the weights used in the study may differ from 
Stiroh’s weights, as he does not clearly define how he calculates his weights. 
7. Conclusion
 The mixed results that are obtained in this study align with the 
contradictory evidence regarding player performance over the course of a contract 
seen in past studies. Various reasons for the contradictory evidence exist. Certain 
positions or performance measures may allow players to alter effort more than 
others. Therefore, using different performance statistics from the ones used in 
this study may change the significance of PRE and POST. In addition, players 
may reduce effort in the off-season rather than during games, which may not be 
reflected directly in the performance statistics chosen. If, for example, a basketball 
player does not practice his free throw during the off-season, his FTP may not be 
affected significantly in the subsequent season, as it is a skill that he has perfected 
over time and may be able pick up again without much practice. Increasing the 
sample size may also improve significance. 
 This study’s key finding is that players’ performance levels decline 
during the first year after signing a long-term contract, suggesting that the effects 
of the principal-agent problem may outweigh competing effects. This is of 
importance because if managers expect that players will shirk after singing long-
term contracts, they can implement incentive mechanisms in the contracts in order 
to prevent shirking. The study also has conclusive evidence that as players gain 
experience, performance increases, however as players age, skills begin to erode 
and performance eventually declines. 
 The finding that players reduce effort after signing a long-term contract 
should be of interest to other types of firms as well. In sports, it is relatively 
easy to measure individual performance through performance statistics. However, 
in other professions, such as teaching, it is much harder to measure individual 
performance. Employers are not able to monitor effort as effectively, and therefore 
face a moral hazard problem. Employees are paid to do a certain job, but since 
employers are not always able to monitor effort, they are often able to shirk. While 
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A LOOK AT WOMEN AND ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Denitsa Koleva, Kristina Marinova, Robyn Byrne
Abstract:
 The issue of abortion is defined by ethical questions and, often, 
controversial views. This paper argues the importance of a coherent and enhanced 
effort to study the quantitative relationship between women’s characteristics 
and the average number of abortions in the United States. It specifically looks at 
the average number of previous abortions and socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, as this relationship has not been explored before in the existing 
literature. We expect to establish a correlation between the average number of 
previous abortions and characteristics such as age, marital status, income and 
highest degree of education completed. An empirical model is developed, and 
then studied using regression analysis. Even though this study has limitations 
stemming from the nature of the data and the methodology employed, it illustrates 
that variables such as age, marital status, religion and education, employment 
status, income, and metropolitan status do influence the number of previous 
abortions a woman has had. The broader implications of this study suggest that 
the issue of abortion should be addressed with a clear focus on the most interested 
party, namely, women.   
I. Introduction
 This study examines the relationship between socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics in women who seek an abortion and the number of 
legal induced abortions14 in the United States. Furthermore, it attempts to quantify 
and estimate this relationship with the objective of identifying which characteristics 
exhibit the most significant influence on the number of abortions. The moral, 
ethical, and political aspects of abortion have polarized American society since the 
landmark 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, which established that most laws against 
abortion violate a woman’s constitutional right of privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Advances of various magnitudes, such as The Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act signed by President George W. Bush in 2003, have been made against a 
woman’s right to choose and to receive adequate abortion services. Thus, current 
public policy on abortion arguably strongly reflects partisan subjectivity on this 
issue. 
 This study reflects the authors’ concern about the lack of objectivity 
and sufficient scientific evidence in the public discourse on abortion relating 
the average number of previous abortions to the profiles of women who seek 
one. The specific question of interest - which demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics influence the average number of previous abortions in the United 
14  A legal induced abortion is defined as “a procedure, performed by a licensed physician or someone acting 
under the supervision of a licensed physician, that was intended to terminate a suspected or known intrauterine 
pregnancy and to produce a nonviable fetus at any gestational age” (Strauss, 2004)
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States, represents the authors’ conviction that a better understanding of the women 
who choose to terminate a pregnancy will promote less bias in the attitudes 
on this issue in American society. The approach of this paper differs from the 
models in the existing literature because it aims at estimating the relationship 
between socioeconomic characteristics and the average number of previous 
abortions as opposed to the average number of total abortion for a woman in the 
US. Furthermore, this question is particularly interesting in the context of the 
recent change in the political landscape with the election of President Barack 
Obama who has already expressed his readiness to alter the direction of public 
policy on the issue by signing an executive order that allows international health 
organizations who promote or perform abortions to resume receiving funding from 
the US (Baker, 01/24/2009)15. It is important to study the relationship between 
the characteristics of women who seek an abortion and the average number of 
abortions as the results are used by policymakers to provide adequate and timely 
programs that best address the needs of the most affected party - women. In 
addition, relevant scientific evidence on this question will allow the general public 
to objectively assess the issue of abortion in its entirety, rather than regard it only 
with moral judgment.         
 This article provides a quantitative examination of the relationship 
between specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and the average 
number of previous abortions of a sample of women in the United States during 
the second half of 2000 and the first half of 2001. The study strives to promote a 
better understanding of the women who seek an abortion. It also aims at providing 
valuable information to policymakers and family planning agencies with the 
objective of improving the access to contraceptive and support services of groups 
where a recurrent pattern of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
is observed. The existing literature on the subject (economic, sociological, 
anthropological, psychological) is scant, with more in-depth research studies on 
the political/legal aspects of abortion, public attitudes towards it, and the effect 
of provider availability and legislature on demand, instead of focusing on who 
actually obtains an abortion.
 The most contemporary and thorough analysis of the various 
characteristics of women who seek abortion is presented in Patterns in the 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001 
by Rachel K. Jones, Jacqueline E. Darroch and Stanley K Henshaw. However, 
further analysis on the topic should be made focusing on how external factors 
influence the average number of previous abortions in the US. Thus, this project 
provides a coherent and enhanced overview of the characteristics of women who 
seek an abortion and is justified as a response to the existing scarcity of recent 
and relevant scientific attention to the issue. In addition, there is an overarching 
bias in the contemporary discourse on abortion identified as the expression of 
subjective perceptions rather than the advancement of quantitative results derived 
15  This effectively repeals the Global Gag Rule on abortion, which was one of the first acts of the Bush 
Administration in 2001.
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with scientific methods. An underlying explanation for this is the nature of the 
questions surrounding abortion which are often distinctly ethical, moral and very 
personal. Nevertheless, this article expresses our determination to deepen the 
existing economic, sociological, and psychological understanding of the women 
who seek an abortion by presenting quantitative findings rather than promoting 
subjective and, often, extreme opinions. 
 Furthermore, there is a clear lack of continuous efforts on the state and 
national levels to compile extensive demographic and socioeconomic profiles 
of the women who obtain abortions. Such information is being collected on an 
individual basis by each state without an overarching regulatory body. In order to 
devise policy which is well-suited to the needs of those women, there should be 
extensive information on the characteristics that define them. The importance of 
such information can be demonstrated by establishing a relationship between the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and the number of abortions. The 
clear existence of such a relationship will persuade state and national governmental 
organizations to gather data on the characteristics of interest and devise more 
efficient policy to address the needs of women who seek abortions. Furthermore, 
since this study examines the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics 
and the average number of previous abortions, we would like to establish if there 
are significant inconsistencies between our results and the existing literature on 
the subject.
 In Section II, the objective and justification for research are discussed. 
Section III reviews the existing literature on the subject. Section IV describes and 
summarizes our data. Section V outlines the methodology employed. Section VI 
presents our results. Finally, Section VII provides some concluding remarks and 
suggestions for further research on the topic.  
III. Literature Review
 The scope of our literature review is limited. The literature on the 
interactions between the characteristics of women who seek a legal abortion and 
the actual number of abortion incidences in the United States generally studies 
demographic indicators such as age, race, education, income, and marital status. 
Other variables of interest include the number of previous births and the number 
of previous abortions. This is clearly observed in Strauss, 2004, Henshaw, 
1983, Henshaw, 1985, Henshaw, 1991, Henshaw 200116. Those studies provide 
detailed summary statistics for the variables corresponding to all of the discussed 
characteristics with a varying degree of accuracy. A common trait of these studies, 
and a possible limitation, is the methodology employed – the authors obtain their 
16  The three articles published by Stanley K. Henshaw and a number of other researchers for The Alan Guttmacher 
Institute in 1983, 1985 and 1991, are very similar in structure, methodology and findings. However, it is important 
to discuss them as they represent the continuous efforts of the Guttmacher Institute to observe any general trends 
in the patterns of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of women who obtain an induced abortion. 
Furthermore, organizational differences exist between those articles and the most recent study produced by the AGI. 
In addition, Henshaw, 2001 presents a more in-depth and timely analysis of the subject. Thus, Henshaw, 2001 is 
studied separately, while the three previous studies of the AGI are grouped together. 
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findings by studying frequency distributions or by cross tabulation. Recently, 
those studies have confirmed that white, unmarried, young (<25yrs.) women 
are most likely to obtain an induced abortion, but the actual interaction between 
those particular characteristics and the number of average number of previous 
abortions is not discussed. The articles also do not identify the characteristics 
which are the most influential on the number of abortions obtained. The findings 
are descriptive in nature. No relationship between the variables and the average 
number of abortions is established as none of these studies employ more complex 
methodology such as linear or multivariate regression analyses.  
  A relevant response to this is found in Trent and Powel-Griner, 1991. The 
data employed are not released by the traditional sources – Center For Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) or The Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), which 
study only aggregate data on abortion. Thus, the Trent study can be classified as 
independent from the mainstream literature on the subject (AGI or CDC), because 
its data is obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The 
individual-level data allowed for an increased analytical depth, as the authors 
were able to make detailed cross-classification, reclassify individual variables, 
and combine vital statistics on pregnancy outcomes. It presents a complex model 
that uses log-linear techniques with several interactions that focused on detailed 
characterization of variables and multivariate analysis. Each of the models 
constructed within the Trent study tested for fit-specified saturated relationship 
among the independent variables. The final model gives a complex seven-way 
or saturated relationships among the independent variables and, also, with seven 
three-way terms and two two-way terms. 
 This approach proved successful because Trent and Powel-Griner, 1991 
had access to individual-level data as opposed to aggregate data17. The individual-
level data obtained from the NCHS permitted for detailed reclassification and cross-
classification of the variables of interest. The findings of this study are important 
because they establish: (1) the relationship between race and abortion varies by 
marital status, parity18 and state of residence; (2) the relationship between marital 
status and abortion varies by education, parity and state residence; (3) the relationship 
between education and abortion varies by marital status and parity (Trent and Powel-
Griner, 1991). Thus, Trent and Powel-Griner, 1991 mathematically evaluate the net 
effects of selected variables on abortion. Despite the statistical significance of those 
findings, it is important to discuss two specific aspects of the article. First, it differs 
from those published by CDC and AGI as the authors assume pregnancy outcomes 
as the units of the study. The sample combines data on live births, fetal deaths, and 
induced abortions; this is a different approach within which the main goal is to 
facilitate the multivariate analysis. This differentiates Trent and Powel-Griner from 
the Strauss and Henshaw studies, as those do not provide significant manipulation 
of data on live births or fetal deaths.
17  Aggregate data is presented in and discussed by Strauss, 2004; Henshaw, 1983; Henshaw, 1985; Henshaw, 
1991; Henshaw 2002;
18  For a woman, the number of live births over the total number of pregnancies
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 A significant limitation is observed in Trent and Powel-Griner, 1991 as the 
NCHS sample they study provides only a basic list of demographic characteristics 
with important variables such as income, religion, and participation in the labor 
force not being included. In addition, two separate samples are used for adult 
and teenage women in order for the selected methodology to be employed. 
Such limitations render the significant findings by Trent and Powel-Griner, 
1991 not nationally representative. A similar problem is observed in the CDC’s 
annual Abortion Surveillance report from 2004 (See Strauss, 2004). In addition 
to the lack of complex mathematical methodology employed, the conclusions 
advanced by this report may not be representative of the population because the 
data obtained by CDC is released by the individual state health departments that 
gather some (but usually not comprehensive) information on the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of women who seek abortion with a varying degree 
of completeness. Our study offers an improvement over the discussed papers as 
we believe that it is nationally representative given the nature of our data.
 A further distinction can be drawn between Strauss, 2004 and Henshaw, 
2001. Even though both studies compare its data and findings, it can be observed 
that the results presented by Henshaw, 2001 are more relevant and meaningful 
than those of Strauss, 2004 as the sampling procedure is more accurate. The 
studies performed by the AGI (see Henshaw, 1983, Henshaw, 1985, Henshaw, 
1991, Henshaw 2002) rely on data gathered by directly contacting the abortion 
provider facilities and administering surveys to women prior to their having the 
medical procedure. Thus, the studies produced for the AGI are better suited to 
select a representative and thorough sample than the sample used by CDC. 
 In general, the quantitative research on the issue of abortion focuses on 
the demand for abortion and a woman’s choice to have an abortion, the impact 
of state/federal legislation and provider availability on the average number of 
abortions, or on attitudes towards abortion. The study of how demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics affect the average number of previous abortions is 
not in the focus of the academic literature. More comprehensive research on the 
subject of the relationship between characteristics such as age, race, education, 
income, marital status, number of previous abortions and the number of abortions 
would pose questions as to the possibility of quantifying such a relationship. There 
is also a need for further and more in-depth analysis of the factors that influence 
this relationship.     
IV. Data Description and Summary Statistics
 The study uses demographic, economic, and vital data that summarize the 
results obtained from 10,683 usable19 questionnaires administered at participating 
facilities in the United States by The Alan Guttmacher Institute (AIG) with the 
purpose of providing an overview of the characteristics of women who seek a 
legal abortion. The data is cross-sectional – 71% of the women in the sample 
19  A total of 13, 071 abortions were performed at the participating facilities for a usable-response rate of 82%. 
Such a response rate indicates that results of the survey are representative of the population.
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obtained abortions during the second half of 2000. The remaining 29% of the 
procedures were performed during the first half of 2001. In order to gain better 
understanding of the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics present in 
the sample, summary statistics of several 
variables of interest including, age, race, 
religion, household income, and marital 
status, employment and metropolitan 
status, are studied. It is important to 
discuss the limitations of the data used in 
this paper as the dataset does not contain 
any information on birth outcomes (ex. 
live births) except for abortion. This 
limits the scope of our study, as the 
data permits only for an analysis of the 
relationship between socioeconomic 
characteristics and the average number 
of previous abortions.   
 The dataset also has a number of limitations resulting from the sampling 
procedure. Cluster sampling, stratified by provider, was performed. A thorough 
sampling frame of all hospitals, clinics and physicians’ offices where a legal 
abortion can be obtained was used. However, due to a low response rate at the 
initial randomly chosen facilities, second- and third-choice facilities had to be 
designated. The low response rate can be attributed to refusal to participate, 
failure to properly distribute the questionnaires or not enough time for the patients 
to complete them. To account for this a three-stage weighting process is designed, 
with individual-, facility-, and stratum-level weights assigned respectively. This 
is represented by the weight variable in the dataset. In our analysis, proper sample 
weights were applied where relevant, in order to attain nationally representative 
results.
 The average age of the women surveyed is 25.4 years; however, it is more 
applicable to use the median age of 22 years as the distribution has a significant 
positive skew. On average, a woman between the ages of 20 and 24 is expected 
to have had almost 1 previous abortion. Women between the ages of 20 and 24 
constitute the category with the highest frequency. 
 Furthermore, White women constituted 40.8% of the sample, followed 
by women who identified themselves as Black (31.4%) and Hispanic (20.7%). 
Though White women represented the largest proportion of the sample studied, 
on average they had .94 previous abortions, which is less than the mean number of 
previous abortions for all other categories, though with a small deviation from the 
mean. On average, a Black woman has had the largest mean number of previous 
abortions – 1.26 with a substantial degree of variation as compared to the other 
ethnic groups within the sample. 
Age by Num. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Midpoints
14 6 0.19 0.43
16 128 0.75 0.79
18.5 587 0.69 0.74
22 2531 0.94 0.99
27 1996 1.21 1.29
32 1217 1.23 1.29
37 777 1.28 1.45
40 279 1.23 1.48
Total: 10,683
Proper sample weights used
Table 1: Average Number of Previous
Abortions by Age
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 A substantial proportion of the women (39%) described themselves as 
Protestant, while as much as 27% indicated Roman Catholicism as their religious 
affiliation. On average, women who identified themselves as Jewish had the largest 
mean number of previous abortions - 1.52, though the effect of several outliers 
is observed, as this group also had the highest standard deviation from the mean. 
This raises questions as to how the issue of abortion is viewed within the context 
of different religions and what their true influence over the public discourse on 
abortion is. 
 Also, women residing in 
what is identified as the Southern 
part of the United States, notably 
represent the largest portion of 
all women in the sample with a 
frequency of more than 38%, while 
women who reside in the Northeast 
had, on average, the highest number 
of previous abortions – 1.27. In 
addition, the number of women 
employed in the month when they 
became pregnant was significantly 
larger than that of the unemployed. Also, if a woman was employed she had an 
expected number of 1.11 previous abortions as opposed to a mean of 1 for the 
unemployed women. 
 The women studied, on average, had a previous birth and a previous 
abortion. This is interesting in the context of 67.2% of the women identifying 
their marital status in the survey as “never have been married”. Married women 
had on average almost one previous abortion, however, with a high degree of 
variation than women who have never been married. Furthermore, 97.5% have 
had four previous births or less, while the proportion of women who have had four 
induced abortions or less is slightly larger – 98.2%. When asked if they would 
like to have any children in the future, 51.4% of the women gave an affirmative 
answer. The mean income in the sample was $29,931; however, the median of 
$22,500 represents a better measure 
of the central tendency because 
the distribution has a significant 
positive skew. Last, nearly 89% of 
the women in the sample resided in 
a metropolitan area.
   The dependent variable in 
this study is the average number 
of previous abortions. The 
independent variables are age, 
employment status, highest degree 
Race Num. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
White 2,900 0.94 1.06
Black 2,594 1.26 1.31
Asian 392 1.13 1.24
Indian 78 1.17 1.48
Hispanic 1,557 1.03 1.18
Total: 7,521
Proper sample weights used
Table 2: Average Number of Previous 
Abortions by Race


















of completed education, income, marital status, metropolitan status, race, region 
and religion. This set of independent variables represents a synthesis of the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of women who obtain abortions 
in the United States based on our general knowledge of the existing literature. 
Those were specifically chosen since age, marital status, race and religion are 
considered core demographic variables, while education, employment status and 
income reveal information regarding the human capital of the subjects. In addition, 
the information on region and metropolitan status provides a spatial dimension to 
our study. Dummy variables were generated for the original categorical variables 
for marital status, metropolitan status, race, region, religion in order to examine 
individual bivariate interactions between the dependent and independent variables. 
We expect to establish a relationship between each of those variables and the 
outcome variable, average number of previous abortions.
 Our a priori expectations are that age, education and employment status 
are positively related to the number of previous abortions since a highly-educated 
woman in the labor force faces a higher opportunity cost to carrying a pregnancy to 
term. Based on the existing literature, we also expect that black women, regardless 
of marital status, on average have more abortions than white women. In addition, 
the literature indicates that religiously unaffiliated women and women who reside 
in a metropolitan area are expected to have the highest number of abortions. Thus, 
we expect to establish a positive relationship between metropolitan status, as well 
as between no religious affiliation indicated, and the average number of previous 
abortions.
V. Methodology
 If the dependent variable in this study was a continuous interval variable, 
the appropriate methodology would be regression analysis. This assumes that the 
regression coefficients are constant across observations, the selected socioeconomic 
characteristics are truly independent, and the error terms are independent across 
observations, normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a constant variance. 
  However, a better methodology for this study is logistic regression 
because the dependent variable (average number of previous abortions) is 
categorical. The similarities between OLS regression and logistic regression are 
that they are both employed to determine which of the independent predictor 
variables are statistically significant; a test-statistic is calculated to indicate 
whether the overall fit of the model is good, and a coefficient and standard error 
for each of the independent variables are calculated. However, the results they 
produce are different and should be interpreted separately. The difference between 
the two is that logistic regression is useful for testing binary (outcomes being 0 or 
1) dependent variables. Even though linear regression is not appropriate for this 
model, we employ it as an initial tool to examine the data while considering its 
limitations given that the dependent variable is not continuous. 
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 Since the outcome variable in this model is categorical with more than 
2 distinct categories, it is appropriate to use the multinomial logistic regression 
which is an extension of the binary logistic regression. This methodology will 
give an estimation of the probability of membership within specific groups over 
the probability of being within a designated base group (the default base group is 
the one with the largest frequency). In addition, our dependent categorical variable 
is countable and its outcomes can be ranked, thus, it is appropriate to use ordinal 
logistic regression. The advantage of choosing ordinal over multinomial logistic 
analysis is that the former recognizes the increasing nature of the dependent variable 
(outcomes can be ranked). It is also appropriate to run a Poisson regression. With 
this regression analysis we assume that the original distribution of the outcome 
variable is Poisson, and its mean is equal to the variance.
  The dependent variable in our model is number of previous abortions and 
the independent variables are grouped into 3 relevant categories. The literature 
did not reveal the existence of a theoretical model that explores the relationship 
between socioeconomic characteristics and the number of previous abortions. In 
general, such theoretical models describe the demand for abortion given existing 
legislature, cost of the service or abortion availability. Thus, our empirical model 
is:
This model assumes that the independent variables are not jointly correlated, 
though our knowledge dictates that a certain level of correlation exists. When 
we test for correlation, the independent variables are correlated according to our 
a priori expectations. However, the exhibited degree of correlation is not large 
enough to negatively impact the standard errors and the results of the study. 
 First, we run a linear regression with the original income variable and 
then with the natural logarithm of the income variable to account for the nonlinear 
relationship between the dependent variable and income. After testing the model, 
we establish that it has a problem of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity as well 
as omitted variable bias. We successfully solved for all but the omitted variable 
bias. Then, we run a multinomial logistic regression with the dependent variable, 
number of previous abortions, collapsed into a new variable with three categories. 
The original dependent variable has 10 categories that increase in frequency 
from 0 to 9 (positively-skewed distribution). We recode the dependent variable, 
and group the original categories into three new categories by frequency. For 
our model, it is convenient to choose only three categories, since this results in 
exhaustive and non-overlapping categories. The base category includes women 
who have had one or less previous abortions on average. This analysis gives for 
each independent variable the probability of a woman being in the second or third 
Human Capital (HC)=Highest Degree of Education+Employment Status+Income
Location (L)=Region+Metropolitan Status
Y=β0 +β1D+β2HC+β3L+E
Demographic Characteristics (D)=Age+Marital Status+Race+Religion
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category as opposed to being in the base 
category. Next, we run an ordinal logistic 
regression in order to account for the 
increasing nature of the original dependent 
variable where the outcomes vary from 0 
to 9. Last, we run a Poisson regression 
which is appropriate for nonnegative count 
variables. 
Each model has advantages and 
disadvantages. The multinomial and 
ordinal regressions are similar, though 
when multinomial logistic regression is 
used, the significance of the ordering is 
lost. Thus, when comparing the results of 
the multinomial and ordinal regression, we 
expect those of the ordinal regression to 
give a more accurate representation of the 
relationship between the outcome variable 
and the predictors. However, we also 
expect the Poisson regression to give the 
most accurate results of the three models 
despite its inherent heteroskedasticity, as it 
is specifically designed for count outcome 
variables. When the results are presented, 
only the statistically significant variables 
in the model will be discussed.
 VI. Results
OLS Regression Analysiso 
When a robust regression is run the 
independent variable for age and the dummy 
variables for black women, completing 
college, no religion indicated, northeast 
and west regions, nonmetropolitan status 
and all dummy variables for marital status 
are statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. The only variable that is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% 
significance level is the dummy variable 
for other religion specified.
 We establish that if a woman is 
employed or black relative to white, and 
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of previous abortions is higher. Even 
though, this is expected, it is also 
interesting because it establishes that 
abortion is not only a “single teenager” 
issue. This is also true if the woman has 
other or no religious beliefs relative to 
being Protestant, or is from the northeast 
or west parts of the US relative to 
residing in the south. The results 
also show that as a woman’s income 
increases, or she is married, divorced, 
widowed or separated relative to 
never married, the number of previous 
abortions decreases. In addition, there 
is a negative relationship between 
the number of previous abortions 
and competition of high school or 
college relative to having completed 
some years of college. The number of 
previous abortions also decreases if a 
woman identifies herself as Catholic 
relative to being Protestant, and if she 
lives in a nonmetropolitan area relative 
to residing in a metropolitan area. If the 
same robust OLS regression is run using 
the natural log of the income variable, 
there is only a small difference between 
the coefficients of the predictors for the 
two OLS regressions. However, the 
logged income variable and the dummy 
variable for completing high school are 
no longer statistically significant. 
Multinomial Logistic o 
Regression Analysis
Next, we study the results obtained 
from a multinomial logistic regression. 
The variables for employment and 
age are statistically significant at the 
1% level when comparing both the 
second and third categories to the base 
category. The logged odds of having 
had between two and four previous 
abortions over having had less than 
Characteristics Coef. (2-4) Coef. (5-9)
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one previous abortions increases with 
age. Also, the logged odds of having 
had between two and four previous 
abortions as opposed to one or less is 
higher for employed women than for 
unemployed, for black and Hispanic 
women relative to white women, for 
women who reside in the rest of the 
U.S. relative to the south part of the 
country. In addition, being married, 
separated or divorced decreases the 
logged odds of having had between two 
and four previous abortions over having 
less than one previous abortion.
Furthermore, the logged odds 
of having more than four previous 
abortions over the probability of having 
less or equal to one previous abortions 
increases by 0.14 for an increase in age 
and decreases for an increase in income. 
Also, black women have higher logged 
odds of having more than four previous 
abortions as opposed to less or equal 
than one relative to white women. The 
logged odds ratios of having more 
than four previous abortions increases 
for women of Jewish or no religious 
denomination relative to women who 
identify themselves as Protestant. In 
addition, the women who live in a 
nonmetropolitan area have smaller 
logged odds of having had more than 
four previous abortions over having 
had less or equal to one previous 
abortion relative to women who live in 
metropolitan areas.   
Ordinal Logistic Regression o 
Analysis
The third model presents an ordered 
logistic regression for the dependent 
variable. Age is statistically significant 
at the 1% confidence level, while the 
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is statistically different from zero at 
the 5% confidence level. Furthermore, 
the dummy variables for married, 
separated, and divorced are statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level, 
while widowed is statistically significant 
in difference from zero at the 10% 
confidence level. The dummy variables 
for nonmetropolitan status and no 
religious affiliation are also statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence 
level. All of the dummy variables for 
education are statistically different from 
zero at the 1% confidence level, except 
the dummy for having completed 8th 
grade which is significant at the 5% 
confidence level. We establish that for 
an increase in age, ceteris paribus, 
the ordered log-odds of the number of 
previous abortion a woman has had, 
is expected to increase by 0.006 units. 
Thus, a woman is more likely to have had 
a higher number of previous abortions 
as age increases holding everything 
else constant. In addition, the ordered 
logit for employed women having had 
more previous abortions is 0.13 higher 
than for unemployed women, if the 
other variables in the model are held 
constant. The ordered log-odds for 
black women of having had a higher 
number of previous abortions are 0.36 
units higher for non-blacks relative to 
white women.  Furthermore, there is a 
positive relationship between a woman 
having had a higher number of previous 
abortions and being of Jewish, other or 
no religious denomination as opposed 
to being Protestant, ceteris paribus. 
Residing in the west part of the U.S. 
increases the ordered log-odds estimate 
of having had more previous abortions 
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 Furthermore, the ordered logistic regression model establishes a 
negative relationship between all of the dummy variables for marital status and 
the outcome variable. In other words being married, separated, divorced, or 
widowed decreases a woman’s ordered log-odds estimate of having had more 
previous abortions relative to a woman who has never been married. In addition, 
the ordered log-odds for having had multiple abortions are negative for a woman 
who has completed her education through 8th grade, through 11th grade, through 
high school and through college relative to having completed only some years in 
college. The ordered logit of having had more previous abortions is also .51 units 
lower for women in nonmetropolitan areas relative to women in metropolitan 
areas.     
Poisson Regression Analysiso 
The fourth model we study is a Poisson regression. The variables for 
employment status and age are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels 
respectively. The dummy variable for black is also statistically significant at the 
1% level. All of the dummy variables for marital status and the dummy variables 
for other or no declared religious affiliation are statistically significant in difference 
from zero at the 1% level. So is the dummy variable for metropolitan status.
The results of the Poisson regression indicate that an increase in age 
would lead to 0.04 units increase in the logs of expected counts, ceteris paribus. 
The difference in the logs of expected counts is 0.06 units for employed compared 
to unemployed women holding all other predictor variables constant. In addition, 
the differences in the logs of expected counts will on average be 0.23 units for 
black women compared to non-blacks relative to white women. Furthermore, there 
is a negative relationship between all of the marital status dummies relative to the 
dummy variable for never been married and the number of previous abortions – the 
difference in the logs of expected counts of the number of previous abortions will 
decrease. There is also a negative relationship between the dummy variables for 
education and the number of previous abortions – if a woman has graduated from 
high school or from college relative to having some years of college education, the 
logs of expected counts of the number of previous abortions decrease respectively 
by 0.06 and 0.16 units. If a woman lives in a metropolitan area, the difference in 
the logs of expected counts will be 0.98 units lower relative to women who live 
in a metropolitan area. 
VII. Discussion 
 When comparing the results of the regressions, they confirm our a priori 
expectations based on our knowledge and the conclusions presented in the existing 
literature. The number of previous abortions increases with age. On average, black 
women are more likely to have had more previous abortions relative to whites. 
Also, the number of previous abortions decreases as women attain higher levels 
of education relative to completing some years of college. This may be caused 
by women who want to receive a higher return on their investment in education 
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(college). Furthermore, the number of previous abortions is expected to be lower 
for women who are or have been married, are widowed or separated relative to 
women who, on average, have never been married. This can be explained by 
the relatively higher opportunity cost of a pregnancy carried to term for a single 
woman. In addition, women from nonmetropolitan areas on average have a lower 
number of previous abortions relative to women who reside in metropolitan areas. 
In addition, the less strongly a woman is religious affiliated, the more she is likely 
to have had a higher number of previous abortions. 
 None of the models in our study perfectly describes the relationship 
between the number of previous abortions a woman has had and the socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics that define her because of various shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the Poisson regression model used gives the best 
representation of this relationship because it is specifically designed to examine 
models in which the response variable is a count variable. The shortcomings of 
the Poisson regression in this study are the result of the over dispersion of the 
data due to the 25% difference between the mean and the variance of the number 
of previous abortions. In spite of this, the Poisson regression is superior to OLS, 
as the latter is not applicable for non-continuous outcome variables, which is 
evident in the low R-squared value (0.07). The Poisson regression is also preferred 
to the multinomial logistic regression because it gives a good representation of 
the constantly increasing nature of the dependent variable. The multinomial and 
ordinal regressions do represent the relationship between our dependent variable 
and the predictors in the model with a varying degree of success. However, the 
multinomial logistic regression does not account for the increasing nature of our 
dependent variable. The ordinal logistic regression does account for the change 
in the outcome variable, but it assumes that the distances between the individual 
levels are unknown. Since in our model the dependent variable changes at a rate of 
one, we believe that the Poisson regression provides the best model for our study.  
 The ideal data for a study on female reproductive behavior by focusing 
on past abortion instances is panel data that observes the behavior of a randomly 
selected sample of women throughout their reproductive lifespan, as opposed 
to cross-sectional data. This would allow for a better understanding of how 
women’s characteristics influence the average number of previous abortions. A 
further expansion can be achieved if the sample has pregnancy outcomes as its 
units of analysis – it should include the number of live births, number of induced 
abortions and number of spontaneous abortions. In other words, the sample would 
consist of women who are not pregnant; in the case of a pregnancy there are three 
possible outcomes: live birth, spontaneous abortion or induced abortion. This will 
increase the depth of the study of women’s reproductive behavior by introducing 
the concept of choice and provide a better understanding of why women seek an 
abortion and what had influenced their decision to have had a previous abortion. 
This would also allow us to make better predictions about future reproductive 
patterns in women who have had a previous abortion. 
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 Thus, given that the dataset is expanded, further research should focus 
on exploring the relationship between the number of past and possible future 
instances of abortion. Furthermore, the response rate on what are considered 
“sensitive” questions, such as those regarding income, race, and even the number 
of previous abortions, is relatively low. So, it is important both for providers 
and legislators to study the factors behind these phenomena in order to ensure 
more accurate and comprehensive responses. This would eliminate bias in and 
enhance the accuracy of studies that focus on women who abort. Further research 
can also investigate the relationship between the choice to have an abortion and 
possible lack of provider availability in nonmetropolitan areas which can lead to 
overreporting in metropolitan areas.     
 The results presented in this study describe the relationship between 
the average number of abortions a woman has had and the socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics that describe her best. In order to reduce the number 
of abortion, policy-makers need to be informed on what characterizes the women 
who have had a higher number of previous abortions. Furthermore, there needs 
to be a continuous and coherent effort on the state and national level to collect 
individual-level data on the specific characteristics of women who seek legal 
abortions. This study illustrates through quantitative methods the relationship 
between those characteristics and the number of previous abortions a woman has 
had in order to emphasize the importance of targeting those women specifically 
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READING ADAM SMITH:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
MISINTERPRETATIONS & THE FALLACY OF 
THE “ADAM SMITH PROBLEM”
Ross Witte
ABSTRACT
 This paper investigates Adam Smith’s intricate vision of human motivation 
and seeks to expose the fallacy of the “Adam Smith Problem”.  Through an 
expansive study of the famed economist’s two most prominent works, An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) and The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (TMS), I will show that the two are perfect complements of one 
other and that Adam Smith did not set down in one place his views on the nature 
of man (Coase, 1).  Adam Smith saw man for what he truly is, dominated by self-
interest but not without concern for others, able to reason but not necessarily able 
to reach the best or right conclusion while all the time seeing one’s own actions 
through a veil of self-delusion.  WN and TMS are equally important books, and in 
order to understand the economics and philosophy of Adam Smith, both must be 
read and studied.
INTRODUCTION
 Adam Smith’s two most prominent works, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), 
are to many economists and philosophers, very different, and even contradictory 
in the way each defines and advances the concept of human motivation.  This 
notion of contradiction has led to the creation of what is referred to as the “Adam 
Smith Problem.” Many economists and philosophers alike have used these so-
called contradictions and inconsistencies to attack the authorial integrity of Adam 
Smith’s work, their main argument being that WN is built on self-interest and TMS 
is built on altruism and sympathy.  This argument presumes a single motivation, 
one of either self-interest or altruism.  This idea that human behavior rests upon 
a single motivating factor, regardless of which you believe, seems incredibly 
simplistic and naïve.  This paper will explain Smith’s intricate vision of human 
motivation through an expansive study of his two most prominent works.  It will 
argue that WN and TMS are perfect complements of one another and that Adam 
Smith did not set down in one place his views on the nature of man (Coase, 1).  
Section one of this paper will be a detailed discussion of why it is difficult 
to know exactly what Smith meant in his writings, particularly in today’s modern 
context, and why the concept of the “Adam Smith Problem” ever came to be. 
Section two will briefly discuss the book, Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic 
Theology, and will develop the book as a reference point for the later sections 
when discussing the frequent misinterpretations and misrepresentations of Adam 
Smith’s writing.  Section three will begin to unravel the complex relationship 
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between altruism, or benevolence, and self-interest.  Section four will investigate 
Adam Smith’s view of man.  Section five will specifically scrutinize the concept 
of the “impartial spectator.”  Section six will discuss the importance of both 
benevolence and self-interest in the capitalist economic system, and the final 
section, section seven, will be the conclusion and summation of the findings.
READING ADAM SMITH
 The meaning of a word lies in its use (Tribe, 617).  Words, more than 
anything else, tell us a person’s opinions, feelings, and intentions.  However, when 
it comes to understanding the writings of a person who is deceased, and who has 
left little behind besides their works to let us know who they were, there lies an 
inherent risk of interpreting the person’s writings incorrectly.  Without the person 
being there to explain his/her meaning, misinterpretation is bound to happen on 
a variety of scales.  This problem is compounded if you are trying to understand 
and interpret the writings of someone who died over 200 years ago.  Without the 
right historical context, it is extremely hard to understand the writer’s motivations 
and the circumstances that shape his/her opinion.
Adam Smith is one of the greatest victims of this misinterpretation and 
misrepresentation.  Smith’s reputation as the father of modern economics will 
most likely endure the test of time, and that is a title with which many would 
agree.  The problem is not the title however, but the concepts that are associated 
with the name Adam Smith.
 The canonical status of WN has survived successive revisions, with 
associated adjustments in emphasis and interpretation to what the name “Smith” 
stands for along the way (Tribe, 609).  Economic and historical journals continue 
to publish articles dealing with particular aspects of Smith’s contributions, with 
Smith’s concepts broached by the understanding of Smith as an “economic 
liberal.”  Famed economist George Stigler once noted that WN is a “stupendous 
palace erected upon the granite of self-interest” (Tribe, 622).  This common 
understanding of Smith offers vindication of his arguments for natural liberty, 
self-interest, and laissez-faire.  However, this understanding of Smith is incorrect 
due to how the term “self-interest” was used by Smith in his time versus how the 
term is understood today.  
Adam Smith understood self-interest as the awareness and care of one’s 
own well-being.  Today’s understanding of the term “self-interest” implies an 
inherent selfishness that goes beyond one’s care for their personal well-being and 
enters the realm of greed.  Therefore, the perception of Smith, which is largely 
based on the misinterpretation on what Smith meant by self-interest, set forth by 
economists such as Stigler, is extremely simplistic and naïve, something that has 
been recognized by economists, historians, philosophers, and psychologists over 
the past fifty or so years.
The understanding of WN has been expanded, and a more sophisticated 
image has emerged.  Four broad trends can be distinguished in recent studies. 
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First, there is the conventional appraisal of Smithian analysis by historians of 
economics.  The second tendency is for historians to locate Smith’s writing in a 
wider cultural and political context.  The third trend reconstructs the eighteenth-
century Smith as a critic of twentieth-century economies.  And lastly, the fourth 
trend emphasizes a “cultural-historical” Smith, which makes him more accessible 
to analysis to those whose domain of work has recently shifted away from 
“literature” towards a general study of textual politics (Tribe, 610).
Recent interpretations of Smith have drawn upon some of his other 
writings besides WN and TMS.  Until recently, the world’s understanding of 
Smith’s contributions had been shaped by two centuries of commentary, based 
almost exclusively on WN and TMS, where the textual foundation for this 
commentary had been altered through misinterpretation.  To appreciate how recent 
interpretation differs from older understanding, one needs to know something of 
the biography of Smith’s work (Tribe, 610).
In 1752, Smith was appointed Chief of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. 
His Glasgow lectures were the origins of both WN and TMS.  As stated earlier, 
however, Smith’s reputation is primarily based on WN - a reputation that links him 
directly to classical economics.  In accordance, the book was read as a series of 
propositions about employment, the benefits of freedom of commerce, the nature 
of capital accumulation, and a rebuttal of Physiocratic and Mercantilist systems 
of economic thought (Tribe, 613).
German scholars sought to broaden their understanding of Smith by 
comparing the psychological assumptions of WN and TMS.  These scholars 
found the assumptions of the two works contradictory, and thus the “Adam Smith 
Problem” was born.  Smith’s moral philosophy and economics were labeled 
incompatible by these German scholars, bringing into question whether Smith 
had held a unifying vision of civil society.  Whether or not this argument ever had 
merit will be discussed in depth later, but for now it is irrelevant.  What is relevant 
here is that there was a renewed interest in Smith’s work.  There was a broadening 
of understanding of Smith as an author and this led to the rediscovery of WN as a 
“history and a criticism of all European civilization” (Morrow, 157).
As stated earlier, recent works have used other writings by Smith to help 
understand the concepts of WN and TMS.  These lectures, notes, and correspondence 
however, have revealed little on his private thoughts and beliefs.  As a consequence, 
his published works remain the only chief resource to understanding his motives 
and intentions.  Nevertheless, the limited correspondence, lectures, and essays that 
have been discovered have been able to provide a new context for the rereading 
of WN (Tribe, 615).  The question is, how should one go about rereading Smith? 
This will be discussed in the following sections.
A common argument used by economists when it comes to reading 
Adam Smith is that Smith’s relevance to us is a function of the degree to which 
his arguments retain their validity, propositions advanced by Smith being directly 
applicable to, and testable against, modern issues (Friedman, 7-8).  This is a very 
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ahistorical approach.  It should be noted however, that when most economists 
decide to write on a given subject, histories of economics are generally written 
by economists for other economists (Tribe, 615).  Here, economists use language 
and other familiar economic tools, which then leads to groups of writings that are 
all addressing the same issue and reviewing the same information.  The approach 
of the historian, as mentioned earlier, is a new way to look at economics, because 
the historians’ reconstruction of past events and arguments presumes that their 
significance and meaning is not immediately accessible to us, therefore eliminating 
an easy, generic answer.  This allows people to learn to think about Adam Smith 
as something other than a proto-neoclassical economist, and allows us to discover 
new and more meaningful ways of making use of our knowledge of markets, 
politics, and wealth (Tribe, 616).
The problem with this historical approach is that it is limited in its 
ability to understand Smith.  This approach attempts to establish a connection 
between modern economics and past writings, which creates problems because 
what Adam Smith was writing about in the eighteenth century has a completely 
different context if it is applied to today’s economy.  We learn more from Smith 
by not converting him into a twentieth-century critic, but by understanding him 
rather as an eighteenth-century moralist (Tribe, 629).  In addition, not all of his 
writings are given equal status, as mentioned earlier (WN being the dominant 
work studied and quoted).  His lectures and correspondence are widely ignored, 
and only those sections of TMS that can be directly brought into relation with 
the economic themes of WN tend to be mentioned (Tribe, 616).  If we are to 
understand what Smith is saying properly, then one cannot impose upon his works 
our modern understanding of economics, language, and politics.  This historical 
approach to writing intellectual history however, does allow for a more in depth 
study of economic and political language during Smith’s time.
Another important development in the focus on language in economics is 
associated with the “linguistic turn” in humanities.  This method subjects economic 
arguments to analysis with instruments that are usually found in the hands of 
literary theorists, instruments such as style, metaphor, and narrative (Tribe, 618). 
The purpose is to emphasize that all discourse deploys strategies of persuasion. 
Smith treated the domain of rhetoric as equivalent to human communication, and 
therefore a pathway to an understanding of human motivation (Tribe, 618).  This 
focus directs our attention to the manner in which use of language uses “facts” as 
devices to make an argument legitimate.
New historical and linguistic avenues have opened the possibility of the 
reconstruction of the world’s understanding of Adam Smith.  These are derived 
from the study of modern political theory, which concluded that Smith was not 
just an economist, but a theorist of civilization and human conduct.  Smith is 
an analyst of commercial society, ethics, and social progress, something that 
conventional histories of economics has neglected (Tribe, 619).
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A NON-CAPITALIST MISINTERPRETATION OF SMITH
 There are many misinterpretations of Adam Smith and his overwhelming 
contributions to the study of economics and philosophy.  Much of this paper will 
criticize the misinterpretations of capitalist/free market economists; however, 
these economists are not the only ones doing the misinterpreting.  In this section, 
I examine a recent misrepresentation.  The work in question is titled Adam’s 
Fallacy:  a Guide to Economic Theology and it is written by institutionalist 
economist Duncan K. Foley.
According to the author, Adam’s fallacy “lies in the idea that it is possible 
to separate an economic sphere of life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is guided 
by objective laws to a socially beneficent outcome, from the rest of social life, in 
which the pursuit of self-interest is morally problematic and has to be weighed 
against other ends” (Foley, xiii).  The author notes that Smith is alleged to have 
argued that the consistent pursuit of self-interest would lead to beneficial social 
outcomes, and Foley suggests that this perspective has become the dominating 
principle of modern economics, which sees Smith as its founder (Foley, xiii).
 There are many fundamental problems with the author’s claim and the 
only fallacy here is Foley’s.  First, at no point does Adam Smith ever suggest that 
there are two separate spheres of life, one being economic and one being social. 
Although the concept of self-interested behavior equaling increased social wealth 
and well-being is all too commonly associated with Smith, it was not Smith who 
created this idea.  Adam Smith at no point states that the pursuit of self-interest 
will always lead to the betterment of society.  This was first argued by Bernard 
Mandeville in his work Fable of the Bees, which was strongly criticized by Smith. 
Mandeville believed benevolence did absolutely no social good.  In response, 
Smith’s opening sentence for TMS was this:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. 
(Smith, 1790; par.1, pt.1, sec.1, ch.1)
As we can see from the opening passage of TMS, Smith was certainly not a 
believer in the strict and narrow concept that only self-interest served in generating 
social wealth, but that he believed benevolence played a vital role in human 
motivation.
In addition, Foley makes the following claim that what made Smith’s 
book unique was its ability to “put forward a clear vision of how capitalist society 
might develop” and to address:
more directly than anyone else the central anxiety that besets 
capitalism - the question of how to be a good person and live 
a good and moral life within the antagonistic, impersonal, and 
self-regarding social relations that capitalism imposes...By 
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being selfish within the rules of capitalist property relations, 
Smith promises, we are actually being good to our fellow 
human beings. (Foley, 2)
This is the crux of Adam’s fallacy and “neither Smith nor any of his successors 
has been able to demonstrate rigorously and robustly how private selfishness turns 
into public altruism” (Foley, 3).  This again is a severe misinterpretation that is 
solely based on the common misconceptions of WN , and holds no reference to 
TMS, which, makes this claim uninformed and more importantly irresponsible.
The third problem with Foley’s argument is that he insists that Smith is 
to blame for the savagery and competitiveness of today’s capitalistic economies. 
Whether or not one believes in capitalism as the best economic model is another 
debate in and of itself and is not an important question for this paper.  What 
is important to think about is whether it is correct to blame someone for the 
misinterpretations of their work or does the blame lie on the shoulders of those 
scholars who are doing the misinterpreting.  What we are seeing here is the classic 
mistake of reading Smith is if he were a modern day economist.  Due to this 
critical mistake, Foley, an institutionalist, arrives at many of the same erroneous 
conclusions free market capitalists have traditionally arrived at when reading 
Smith.
Foley’s Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic Theology is an important 
example because it demonstrates the depth of the misinterpretation of Adam Smith. 
The majority of this paper is dedicated to criticizing the misinterpretations of free 
market capitalists, who in all respects view Smith as the godfather of economics. 
Foley is an institutionalist, who is very critical of Smith and his assumed role in 
the current state of capitalism.  However, as I have noted here, Foley trips over the 
same misinterpretations that the capitalists do, demonstrating just how critical it is 
to address this issue of the “Adam Smith Problem.”
THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALTRUISM & 
SELF-INTEREST
 The first step in dissecting Smith’s complex relationship between altruism 
and self-interest is to understand his system of natural liberty.  Smith’s system of 
natural liberty is built on two key assumptions - one at the individual level and one 
at the social level.  At the individual level, Smith said that society is composed of 
individuals who are all similar and are guided by an innate human propensity to 
trade and pursue self-interest.  On the social level, Smith said that this system, to 
the extent that it accommodates human nature and to the extent that it establishes 
social harmony through economic growth, is an ideal social order: 
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being 
thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of 
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, 
as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly 
free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both 
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his industry and capital into competition with those of any other 
man, or order of men.  (Smith, 1776: 51)
These two assumptions are the pillars that hold together Smith’s beliefs and 
theories, and are particularly important in understanding how WN was written.  
WN was written as an analysis of the social phenomena he saw during the 
Industrial Revolution that arose due to self-interest.  At no point in WN, however, 
does Smith suggest that self-interest is the single motivating factor of all human 
beings.  WN was an attempt to find a basis on which people could live together 
when the Church no longer provided an unquestioned set of answers to inquiries 
about how society should be organized (Backhouse, 132).  In addition, Smith was 
exploring how commercial society could prosper as a whole, even when men 
were pursuing their own self-interest (Backhouse, 123).  By doing this, Smith 
could suspend morality when answering economic questions and create a model 
where economic growth was possible.
Some economists, including Jacob Viner, believe that the most important 
inconsistency between TMS and WN is that in TMS, Smith assumes that there 
exists a natural harmony, and in WN, Smith abandons this belief.  I believe this 
is due to a gross misunderstanding of the two works.  First, it should be noted 
that TMS is not an abstract treatise upon virtuous conduct, but a study of human 
psychology.  It was written to show how self-interest, mitigated by sympathy and 
self-command, can result in prudent and sometimes beneficent actions (Tribe, 622). 
In comparison, WN’s purpose was to explain how commercial societies originate 
and create wealth.  Put simply, WN is a study of the organization of economic 
life.  It should be understood however, that Smith does not analyze how they are 
governed (Tribe, 623).  As we can now see, TMS and WN are composed according 
to two very distinct forms of rhetorical strategy and the claim of inconsistency 
between the two books in regards to natural harmony is a weak claim at best.
Of course, there are other so-called inconsistencies other economists 
have pointed to over the years.  One important claim is that in TMS, human action 
is influenced by benevolence and in WN this is absent.  As mentioned before, this 
is the most common reason given for the creation of the “Adam Smith Problem.” 
Economists who believe this claim commonly cite the following passage:  “It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our own dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, 
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantages” (Smith, 1776: 14).  What these economists 
forget is what Smith says earlier in the same paragraph, that in a civilized society, 
man needs cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, because in his whole 
life he is going to only find a few friends (Smith, 1776: 14).  Here, the intertwined 
nature of altruism and self-interest can be seen, and in order to understand it, 
Smith’s view of man needs to be understood.
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SMITH’S VIEW OF MAN
Adam Smith’s view of man and human nature are important in helping 
us to understand his economics.  For better or for worse, Smith is most famous 
for his development of the case for laissez-faire, the concept that government 
should not control economic activity.  According to Smith, an economic system is 
governed by natural laws and is driven by prudence and the pursuit of self-interest. 
As stated earlier however, Smith never says self-interest is the sole motivating 
factor behind human behavior.  This points out the main flaw in the creation of the 
Adam Smith Problem, because this problem presumes a single motivation, one of 
self-interest or altruism, a concept that relies on two extremes and does not give 
room for multiple motivations.
Smith’s writings actually point out that there are multiple motivating 
factors in human behavior.  Smith asserts that people do not only rely on the 
benevolence of others and that it is quite possible to be self-interested and have 
other concerns as well. Self-interest and benevolence have a multifaceted and 
complementary relationship with one another, something of which Smith is well 
aware and fully expects the reader to understand.
According to the writings of Adam Smith, sympathy is the basis for 
people’s concerns for others.  We form our idea of how others feel by considering 
how we would feel in like circumstances (Coase, 2).  This concept refers back to 
the earlier section of the paper which discusses the vast differences between the 
writings of Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith and how Smith believed that 
both self-interest and benevolence play a vital role in human motivation.  Put 
simply, if one realizes that something is making another person unhappy, that 
realization makes oneself unhappy and vice versa.  These feelings of sympathy 
are strengthened by the fact the mutual sympathy is in itself a pleasure.  “Nothing 
pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions 
of our own breast” (Smith, 1790; par.1, pt.1, sec.1, ch. 2).  Because of this, humans 
are led to see ourselves as others see us.
Next, Smith investigates human nature when it comes to one’s own well-
being, whether it be financially or dealing with one’s health, when compared to 
that of a complete stranger.  Smith states that the loss or gain of a small interest of 
one’s own appears vastly more important than the greatest concerns of a complete 
stranger.  Smith provides a great hypothetical example of this conundrum in TMS, 
where he points out that if a man from Europe were to hear of a great disaster in 
China, where a hundred million people lost their lives, he would feel an initial 
sorrow for the people and might stay in a melancholy state for a time, but would 
sooner than later go back to his normal business:
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads 
of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, 
and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who 
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had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be 
affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. 
He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his 
sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would 
make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness 
of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which 
could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, 
if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings 
concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon 
the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world 
in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when 
all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, 
he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose 
or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no 
such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which 
could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. 
(Smith, 1790; par.4, pt.3, ch.3)
Smith goes on to say that if that same person were to know that he would 
lose his little finger the following day, the man would not be able to sleep 
all night.  As stated earlier, the man knowing of the tremendous loss in 
China would snore throughout the night, and in all likelihood would not 
give the disaster a second thought.
Smith suggests two reasons for this.  The first is one of self-interest, 
which is discussed within the context of the story.  The second reason is that 
every individual is naturally more attached to his own society than to any other. 
Smith’s argument here is that benevolence is strongest within the family, and 
as one moves further and further down the line, away from family and friends, 
we do not only see an absence of benevolence but the presence of malevolence. 
Smith believes benevolence operates weakly when dealing with strangers and I 
am strongly inclined to believe him.
Nevertheless, many economists would view Smith’s example as a clear 
indicator that self-interest is the sole motivator in human decision making.  This 
statement however, completely ignores the subtlety of Adam Smith’s mind.  Smith 
follows up on his explanation of his previous example by asking the following 
question:  suppose that it were possible to prevent the loss of those hundred 
million lives by sacrificing his little finger, would a man of humanity be unwilling 
to make the sacrifice (Coase, 5)?  Smith answers this question by stating that 
while our passive feelings are almost always so selfish, our active principles often 
are generous.  He believes that it is not the soft power of humanity or a spark of 
benevolence in the heart that counteracts the strongest impulses of self-love, but 
it is a stronger, more powerful love of what is honorable and noble and the feeling 
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of superiority of our own characters (Smith, 1790; par.4, pt.3, ch.3).  Therefore, it 
is not the love of mankind that makes one willing to sacrifice, but it is because he/
she sees himself/herself through the eyes of an impartial spectator.
THE “IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR” & BOURGEOIS VIRTUE
 The concept of the “impartial spectator” is rooted in the writings of 
esteemed philosopher and political economist Bernard Mandeville.  According to 
Mandeville, an individual must take account of the desires of others in seeking to 
attain his or her own ends because these desires represent potential obstacles to the 
attainment of satisfaction (Tribe, 621).  Smith took this concept from Mandeville 
and expanded and modified it into his own idea of the “impartial spectator.”  Smith’s 
model illustrated a system of social reciprocity, where each person judges others 
as a spectator.  According to Smith, society acts like a mirror where all actions 
are rehearsed and conduct is governed by an internalized construct, the impartial 
spectator.  Therefore with this understanding of Smith’s impartial spectator, we 
can deduce that the Smithian conception of self-interest is not an injunction to act 
without moral scruple.  Instead, it is embedded within the framework of social 
reciprocity, which allows for the formation of moral judgment (Tribe, 621).
 Smith, however, was not oblivious to the fact that some individuals would 
be less responsive to the promptings of the impartial spectator.  Smith argued that 
individuals tend to think more highly of themselves than what is really warranted. 
“We are all naturally disposed to overrate the excellencies of our own character” 
(Smith, 1790; par.34, pt.3, ch.2).  Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, Smith did 
not believe that these introverted feelings left people unable to act sensibly or 
morally, and this desire to act morally is reflected in the codes of conduct seen 
throughout society.  The “impartial spectator” is then embodied in the codes of 
conduct that individuals and societies create.  We conform to the codes of conduct 
because we wish to be admired by others.  According to Smith, we not only have a 
desire to be approved of, we also wish to be what is approved of in others (Smith, 
1790; par.7, pt.3, ch.2).  The liberty on which commercial society is based implies 
a moral order that links the individual to sociability.
The notion of the “impartial spectator” is seen in both WN and TMS.  The 
problem, however, is that this concept is seen by many as the foundation of TMS 
but not WN.  The reason for this problem lies with their misinterpretation of the 
“impartial spectator” as an all-knowing guide instead of seeing it as an evaluation 
tool for judgment.  Put simply, the concept of the “impartial spectator” is not an 
effective way to analyze economic decision-making by itself.  This is not to say 
that morality does not play a role in economic deliberation, but there are many 
other factors, such as the effect it has on your family, the repercussions it will have 
on the local, state, or global market, and how it will affect your relationships, that 
go into making a sound and beneficial economic decision.  TMS argues in favor 
of this as well, arguing that the greatest cause of corruption of moral sentiments 
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is admiration for the rich.  The concept of “impartial spectator” by its very nature 
counters the economic desires of people.
There is a link, however, between the “impartial spectator” and economics. 
It is a link between culture and economy; this is known as a “bourgeois virtue.” 
What is meant by bourgeois virtue is not an apology for every mistake; Smith 
was opposed to the reduction of ethics to greedy interest.  Adam Smith’s intention 
was to create an ethical system for the bourgeoisie (McCloskey, 301).  Smith, of 
course, did not approve of all the activities of the bourgeoisie, and he noted that 
the interests of the bourgeoisie are “always in some respects different from, and 
even opposite to, that of the public” (Smith, 1776: 267).  Therefore, prudence and 
solidarity are needed for a commercial society to work.  It should be easy to see 
how prudence depends on solidarity, but it should also be noted that solidarity 
depends just as much on prudence.  Who we are depends on what we do and 
our ethics depend on our business (McCloskey, 310).  What this means is that 
commerce is capable of teaching ethics.  Most economists would disagree with 
this statement, believing that the ethics of the bourgeoisie erode virtue.
I believe Adam Smith would disagree with these economists, because 
overall the virtues of the bourgeois are the virtues that are necessary for commerce 
and government.  The uncertainty and skepticism of trade is common in the 
market.  Therefore, the “dogma of doubt” is an important bourgeois virtue and an 
attitude that is perfectly suited for the vagaries of the marketplace (McCloskey, 
311).  Charity is another bourgeois virtue and is founded in the bourgeois norm of 
reciprocity.  Bourgeois virtue is capable of keeping bourgeois vice in check.  This 
process is what creates transactions between people.  Nowadays, in rich countries, 
about a quarter of national income is earned from merely bourgeois and feminine 
persuasion (McCloskey, 312).  In addition, division of labor is the consequence of 
propensity and it is the necessary consequence of reason of speech (Smith, 1776: 
25).  Smith also referred to speech as the characteristic faculty of human nature 
(Smith, 1790; par.25, pt.7, sec.4).  The bourgeoisie work with their mouths and 
are proof of the importance of communication.  Therefore, according to Smith, 
there are many characteristics of the bourgeoisie that are, in fact, good.
BENEVOLENCE, SELF-INTEREST & THEIR ROLE IN CAPITALISM
 Adam Smith was not a strict advocate of laissez faire as so many believe 
him to be.  Smith saw that self-interest and competition were sometimes treacherous 
to the public interest they were supposed to serve, and he was prepared to have 
government exercise some measure of control over them where the need could be 
shown and the competence of government for the task demonstrated (Viner, 231-
232).  He knew that laissez-faire could be both good and bad.
 It is in my opinion that capitalism is the hope of the poor of the world; 
therefore capitalism cannot be unethical or bad in nature.  Capitalism needs to take 
the bourgeois virtues seriously and nurture society.  The world market is run by 
the bourgeoisie; therefore bourgeois virtue cannot be ignored.  This is the Adam 
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Smith that emerges when careful attention is paid to his readings.  Commonly 
believed metaphors, such as the treatment of the “invisible hand” as a metaphor 
for the price mechanism, need to be seen in a new light.  The invisible hand 
should now also be viewed as an allusion to the manner in which self-interest 
and sociability combine to render commercial society virtuous and prosperous 
(Tribe, 627).  The connection between commerce and liberty can be seen in the 
interaction of free individuals in the pursuit of their own interests and how that 
brings an increase in the wealth of all.
Seen in this light, Smith’s argument for the use of the market for the 
organization of economic activity is very strong.  The greatest advantage of the 
market is that it is able to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness 
and partiality of benevolence (Coase, 28).  One should not forget however, the 
role that benevolence and moral sentiments play in making the market system 
possible.  As Smith notes, society cannot exist among those who are ready to hurt 
and injure one another at all times (Smith, 1776: 325).
CONCLUSION
 More so than anything else, after reading this paper one should see that 
the relationship between benevolence and self-interest is a complex one.  Section 
one of this paper explained the reasons behind the misrepresentations of Smith 
and why the concept of the “Adam Smith Problem” was ever conceived.  We 
saw that the canonical status of WN has distorted the world’s perception of Smith 
and his ideas on human motivation and that in order to read Smith correctly, one 
must take into account all of his writings.  Section two used Duncan K. Foley’s 
book Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic Theology to point out the depth of 
the misinterpretations of Adam Smith’s work.  We saw here that it is not only 
capitalists who have misread and misused Smith’s writings, but even economists 
who believe in other economic systems, like Foley, are fumbling over the same 
passages and making the same mistakes.  In section three we delved deeper 
into the multifaceted relationship of benevolence and self-interest, pulling apart 
passages in both works in order to understand how the two books do not counter, 
but complement each other.  Section four took a look at Adam Smith’s view of 
human nature and shows that there is a balance and connection between self-
love and benevolence and that people are capable of a wide range of emotions 
depending upon how it affects them and the people they are close to.  Section five 
put specific emphasis on Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator” and how 
this model is used to understand human motivation and action better.  Section six 
attempted to show how benevolence and self-interest work in capitalism and how 
the two affect the marketplace.  Here, we saw that both benevolence and self-
interest have dynamic roles in the creation and running of the marketplace.
 There is nothing in Smith’s writings to suggest that the Adam Smith 
Problem is legitimate.  I believe any person can see the fallacies of the Adam 
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Smith Problem if they read WN and TMS thoughtfully and carefully.  Of course 
we all hold biases, but if we look only at the words of Adam Smith and fight the 
tendency to generalize him as a pure economic liberal who paved the way for 
laissez-faire economics and self-interest (in today’s language), we can see Smith 
and the message of his writings in the right light.
 Adam Smith saw man for what he truly is, dominated by self-interest 
but not without concern for others, able to reason but not necessarily able to 
reach the best or right conclusion while all the time seeing one’s own actions 
through a veil of self-delusion.  According to Smith, a person can have both self-
interested and altruistic motivations for his/her actions.  At no point does Smith 
suggest that there is a clear and single reason for mankind’s motives, and the only 
reason the “Adam Smith Problem” was conceived is due to a class of radicals, 
many of whom wanted to explain social phenomena without reference to a deity, 
who separated WN from moral philosophy because it acquired a more scientific 
character (Backhouse, 132).  WN and TMS are equally important books, and in 
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 More than one hundred years ago, Thorstein Veblen wrote a powerful 
critique of neoclassical economics that castigated the discipline for turning the 
individual into a “lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like 
a homogeneous globule”, or equivalently, for the individual’s static maximization 
of utility based on exogenous preferences. His critique is relevant even today, 
since there are economists who still continue to criticize the assumptions of homo 
economicus and exogenous preferences, and insist on introducing more realism 
to economic theory (Tsakalotos 2005, 894). Furthermore, recent developments 
in game theory and experimental economics, which stand at the cutting-edge of 
economics today, are far more accommodating to the ideas of institutions that were 
central to Veblen’s theory than neoclassical economics (Hodgson 2007, 328).
 The goal of this paper is to examine the strengths of the Veblenian 
critique of neoclassical economics. In particular, it investigates whether or not 
Veblen’s rejection of the axiomatic approaches to economics is merely an attack on 
neoclassical economics which fails to provide an alternative positive theory (Hunt 
2002, 343). Starting with their conception of the individual, going through their 
theoretical frameworks, and ending with an investigation of how they approach 
a concrete issue, this paper offers a comparative exposition of the Veblenian and 
neoclassical approaches to economic theory.
 Seven sections follow. The first describes the notion of the individual 
in orthodox and heterodox economics. The second focuses on the different 
methodologies of these two strains of economics as developed out of their 
conceptualization of the individual. The third section presents the mainstream 
theory of consumption. The theory of Thorstein Veblen is used as a representative 
of heterodox economics and, consequently, the fourth section describes Veblen’s 
theory of conspicuous consumption. The fifth outlines a specific case – credit card 
debt – to which the two theories of consumption are applied. The sixth provides 
an accommodating picture of Veblenian thinking in the face of mainstream 
economics. The last section assesses the ideas presented and offers a conclusion. 
II. Origins of the concept of the individual in economics 
 A theory is defined by the way in which it conceptualizes the individual 
(Davis 2003, 16). Orthodox economics places a greater emphasis on the individual 
and conceptualizes it as a relatively autonomous and atomistic being. In contrast, 
heterodox economics  regards the individual as a being embedded in social and 
economic relationships. 
 The orthodox notion of the individual originates with John Locke and 
his idea that there must always be something about the individual that remains 
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unchanged (Davis, 24). The individual’s consciousness is disengaged from the 
world. There is a dualistic separation of the individual from the world. However, 
this presents the dilemma of how the inner subjective worlds of individuals link 
with the outer objective world. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (Davis, 
24) only superficially resolved the dilemma by using the concept of unintended 
consequences and the idea that the market worked as if governed by an invisible 
hand. Yet Smith did not explain the precise mechanisms with which human 
psychology produced its effects on the market.  
 At the end of the nineteenth century a new strategy for linking Locke’s 
two worlds emerged – the theory of choice used by the early neoclassicals (Davis, 
25). They understood individual human behavior specifically as choice behavior. 
In contrast to Smith’s metaphorical treatment of how subjective interest is at work 
in the market, neoclassicals explained how subjective interest became material. 
That was achieved, for example, by using the concept of marginal utility to derive 
an individual’s demand for goods. 
 Contemporary mainstream economics took the neoclassical approach a 
step further towards the total elimination of subjectivity. Locke’s dilemma was 
resolved not by making a better connection between subjective and objective but 
by totally dispensing with the former. Consequently, all psychological content of 
the concept of the individual was emptied out (Davis, 26). His preferences came 
to be taken as given, rendering their character irrelevant to the analysis of rational 
choice. 
 The heterodox version of the individual originates in the thinking of mid-
nineteenth century authors such as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. Marx’s view 
of the individual is rooted in the theory of historical materialism (Davis, 109). 
There are two main components to this theory. The first is that the character of a 
society’s production and associated economic relations explain how its political 
and cultural relationships develop. The second is that all societies possess two 
main classes: one which supports the other through its work, and a second to 
direct the labor of the first. There is not much space for an important role of the 
individual. The individual is seen as a bearer of class identity and, consequently, 
not an independent agent. To put it differently, Marx is seen as the principle source 
of a tradition of economic thinking that treats the individual as being determined 
by social relationships. 
 The work of Durkheim further continues this tradition (Davis, 110). He 
criticizes neoclassical economics for its individualist orientation and contends that 
human nature is shaped by society. Society is an independent entity and needs to 
be examined on its own. Furthermore, the group thinks and acts quite differently 
from the individuals comprising it. As a result, if economic analysis falls on the 
individual it may fail to explain what takes place at the level of the group. 
 The framework for thinking about the individual established by Marx 
and Durkheim is used to various degrees in heterodox economics ever since. 
Original institutional economics, Marxism, Post-Keynesian, New Institutional and 
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Austrian economics provide a descriptively richer, contextually subjective, and 
fuller illustration of the individual than the concept of rational and economic man 
found in orthodox economics (Wrenn 2006, 489). Through discussions of mental 
models, structure, and agency, they are able to address the actual range of human 
behavior and reach beyond simple utility maximizing motivations. This does not 
suggest that these diverse groups of thought share a common method, but, rather, 
that, they possess common theoretical ground with respect to the conceptualization 
of the individual. A major common thread is the interdependence of agent and 
structure - in other words, interactive agency, where the individuals are affected 
by each other and by the institutional setting (Wrenn, 489). Clearly, this has its 
roots in the Marx-Durkheim framework of thought. 
III. Methodology
 Using this rather simplistic dichotomy between orthodox and heterodox 
economics, Thorstein Veblen’s work could be easily classified as heterodox. 
Veblen proposed that economics should be reconstructed as a “post-Darwinian” 
science. Basing his arguments  on the core ideas of Darwinism, Veblen insisted 
on developing causal explanations, where a cause is understood as necessarily 
involving transfers of matter or energy (Hodgson 2003, 86). Divine, spiritual or 
uncaused causes are ruled out. When Veblen’s understanding of Darwinism - in 
terms of a commitment to a detailed and sequential causal analysis – is transferred 
to the realm of economics, it meant that human intentionality and values also have 
to be explained.     
 The central tenets of orthodox economics are in stark contrast to those of 
heterodox economics. The ongoing debate between the two is multi-layered.  One 
of the dimensions of that debate positions the “positive” realm of facts and theory 
against the “normative” realm of values. In heterodox economics, as observed in 
Veblen’s understanding of Darwinism, the entanglement of values and economic 
theory is essential, for economics is concerned with reality and values are an 
integral part of it (Tsakalatos, 894). In contrast, orthodox economics bases its 
assumptions on homo Economicus and exogenous preferences (Tsakalotos 2005, 
894). Its proponents claim that it should be devoid of values and based solely on 
facts. They refuse to consider values as open to rational scrutiny. In other words, 
they do not require inquiry into their genesis but understand them as “revealed 
preferences” in the market with a price tag attached to them (Tilman 2006, 103). 
Furthermore, if their origin is at issue at all, it is for philosophers, sociologists and 
cultural anthropologists to further inquire.
 As already suggested in the preceding section, an important dimension 
of the debate between orthodox and heterodox economics is based on their 
conceptualization of the individual. In orthodox economics, the individual and 
his rationality are viewed as separate or isolated from the rest of society and 
social relations. This is the so–called “undersocialized conception of human 
action” (Yilmaz 2007, 842). The individual is seen as having an internalist view 
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of rationality – he is formed from the inside out (Wunder 2007, 833). Tastes, 
preferences, and beliefs also come from inside the person and are thus exogenous. 
The claim here is analogous to the case of values – the field of economics is 
restricted to internalist rational action, whereas the study of irrational action is 
relegated to sociology. 
 In contrast, heterodox economics, as suggested by Veblen’s insistence on a 
full explanation of human intentionality, employs an externalist view of rationality 
– tastes preferences and beliefs are socially constructed. Veblen’s concept of the 
individual is one in which the primary aspects of its beliefs are the result of the 
groups to which the individual belongs and the social norms and institutions to 
which the individual adheres (Wunder, 833). As explained later, Veblen’s depiction 
of “invidious distinction” and “emulation” as powerful forces, illustrates the case of 
the individual following the group. To put it differently, economic analysis, because 
of its ability to impact the institutional framework, should be more sensitive to the 
endogeneity of preferences and values (Tsakalotos, 899).
 Another facet of the debate between orthodox and heterodox economics 
is the clash between the realism and the predictive capacity of economic theories. 
In “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” Milton Friedman argues that the 
ultimate goal of positive economics is the development of a theory or hypothesis 
that yields valid and meaningful predictions about phenomena not yet observed 
(Friedman 1966, 7). Such a theory should be a complex mixture of two elements 
– it should construct a “language” designed to promote systematic methods of 
reasoning and it should contain substantive hypotheses that abstract essential 
features of the complex reality. 
 He goes on to contend that truly important and significant hypotheses are 
found to have assumptions that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations 
of reality - the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions 
(Friedman, 14). The reason is that a theory cannot possibly be thoroughly realistic 
in the immediate descriptive sense so often assigned. Any attempt to achieve this 
kind of realism renders a theory useless. To put it differently, according to Milton 
Friedman, any criticism of the axiomatic approaches of orthodox economics is 
largely beside the point unless supplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing 
in its assumptions from the theory being criticized yields better predictions for a 
wide range of phenomena. The ultimate test of the assumptions of a theory is the 
validity of its predictions. 
 Consistent with Milton Friedman’s critique of unorthodox approaches 
as presenting merely criticism without yielding better predictions than the 
theory being criticized, Peukert argues that what Veblen offers instead of Homo 
economicus is Homo absurdus (2001, 544). Veblen’s intention was not to advance 
a theory in any positive sense. According to Peukert,
He [Veblen] had only one scientific aim, which he pursued by three 
different means. This aim was a radical and deconstructive critique of 
what he called prevailing habits of thought. He did not, and did not 
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want to, unfold a positive, new, and evolutionary approach which could 
practically be applied to the analysis of economic processes. He did 
not pretend to uncover any developmental logic of economic history or 
institutions. Instead, his destruction of deterministic theories and implicit 
teleological tendencies should be interpreted as his attempts to uncover 
the implications of the basic freedom of human choice and valuation. 
(2001, 544)
As already suggested, the heterodox approach to economic theory, as represented 
by the work of Thorstein Veblen, differs radically from the orthodoxy.  Veblen’s 
insistence on causal analysis emphasizes an inquiry into the genesis of values 
and rationality in a push toward more realism, whereas orthodox economics 
adheres to the importance of the predictive capacity and facts, associated with 
a theory. Undoubtedly, one of the most powerful attacks on Veblen is Peukert’s 
assertion that the former is merely constructing homo absurdus. The comparison 
between Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption and the mainstream theory 
of consumption that follows, suggests that this might not be the case. 
IV. The mainstream theory of consumption
 A huge break in orthodox economics that had implications for consumption 
theory is to be found in Irving Fisher’s work on interest (1930). Fisher objected to 
the classification of incomes as wages, rent, profits and interest in classical theory 
(Landreth, 267). He saw interest not as a share of income received by capital but 
as a manner of examining income flows of every kind. Fisher used the concept of 
intertemporal choices that he traced back to John Rae and Eugene Böhm-Bawerk 
(Chao 2007, 231). He argued that people prefer present over future consumption. 
This “human impatience” in its marginal form determines the rate of interest as 
the premium between the exchange of present and future goods (Chao, 231). 
Moreover, individuals can alter their income flows, and accordingly, consumption, 
by saving or borrowing (Landreth, 269). Consequently, the consumption level is a 
function of interest rates: at higher levels of interest, the quantity of consumption 
will decrease. 
 The starting point of the modern macroeconomic theory of consumer 
behavior are two theories developed in the 1950s by Milton Friedman and 
Franco Modigliani – the permanent-income hypothesis and the life-cycle 
model of consumption respectively (Jones 2008, 250). They were based on 
Fisher’s intertemporal choice model. Both of them stem from the observation 
that people prefer to smooth their consumption over time. This is nothing more 
than an application of the standard theory of diminishing marginal utility. The 
permanent-income hypothesis then says that people will base their consumption 
on the constant income stream that has the same present discounted value as the 
actual income stream rather than on their current income. The life-cycle model of 
consumption applies the same reasoning to a person’s lifetime. Consumption is 
based on “average” lifetime income rather than on income at any given age.
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 One crucial element of the framework of intertemporal choices is the 
expectations of future income when consumers face uncertainty. Friedman adopts 
the framework of adaptive expectations in forming expected income as a proxy 
for permanent income. However, this was challenged by Robert Hall’s rational 
expectations revolution in the 1960s as the latter was seen as a more realistic 
account of how consumers form their expectations (Chao, 232). Hall’s theory 
suggests that the consumer uses today’s consumption as the best predictor of 
future consumption because any available information was included in today’s 
consumption. In other words, Hall proved that consumption is a “random walk” 
– its future value is only a function of its present value. Hence, other variables, 
particularly, current and past incomes, can be excluded from the consumption 
function. 
 Although this is in clear contradiction with the conclusions of the 
theories of Friedman and Modigliani, economists usually see Hall’s theory as 
a continuation of the life-cycle-permanent income hypothesis. The reason is 
that Hall’s consumption theory contains a Fisherian framework in which the 
representative consumer intertemporally allocates his/her wealth on consumption 
(Chao, 232). 
 Chao argues that even if a model is not supported by empirical data 
when the model is considered as containing the true structure, it is not rejected, 
but instead a new model is constructed with the same true structure and  certain 
modifications (240).  Furthermore, economists hold a strong prior belief in 
economic theories that are based on well-specified optimization-based behavioral 
assumptions. All of this means that while anomalies may reject the permanent 
income hypothesis or the life-cycle hypothesis, this will only make economists 
modify the “true structure”, the Fisherian framework, instead of abandoning it 
(Chao, 243). In other words, the Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory could be 
seen as the core of the mainstream theory of consumption. 
V. Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption
 Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption is an extension of his concept 
of the “social” individual. In contrast to the orthodoxy’s static maximization 
of utility in an intertemporal framework, Veblen develops a model in which 
preferences are determined socially according to the position of an individual in the 
social hierarchy (Trigg 2001, 100). Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption 
starts with the development of a leisure class whose members are not required to 
work, but appropriate a surplus20 produced by the working class. Once societies 
start to produce that surplus, the relationship between private property and status 
grows in importance. To own property is to have a status in the hierarchy that 
emerges; to have no property is to have no status. 
20  Surplus here denotes the excess output above and beyond what is necessary to produce the means of liveli-
hood of the worker.
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 The accumulation of wealth could, of course, indicate that a person is 
efficient and productive, but Veblen contends that inherited wealth confers even 
more status. The money provides the most prestige, since it establishes the most 
distance from the work required for its accumulation. Key to the transformation of 
wealth into status is the social performance of the individual. Status stems from the 
opinion of the other members of the society regarding the position of an individual 
in that particular society. In order for this position to be established there must be a 
display of wealth. Veblen delineates two main ways for this to be done – through 
extensive leisure activities and through lavish expenditures on consumption. Their 
common feature is that they must entail a wasteful component. 
 In principle, both methods are equally effective in displaying wealth – all 
that is required is an effective network for the word to get around about a person’s 
degree of leisure and the objects he or she possesses. Veblen argues, however, 
that as societies become more mobile, the display of wealth through consumption 
becomes more important than the display of leisure, since people will be less 
informed about the leisure activities of others. Such consumption has a separate 
label in Veblen’s analysis – conspicuous consumption. It denotes spending on 
artifacts of consumption that would enhance the social position of the individual. 
 Conspicuous consumption is viewed by Veblen as one of the paramount 
factors in determining consumer behavior. This applies not just to the rich, 
but also to all social classes. The result of this theory is that members of each 
stratum in the society will emulate those above them and try to rank as high as 
possible in comparison to the rest of the community (Hunt 2002, 338). Another 
important facet of the theory is that the process is never ending; what at one time 
may confer status may later be acquired by all and confer no status, leading to a 
chronic dissatisfaction. In other words, the core of Veblen’s theory of conspicuous 
consumption is that consumption is socially determined and does not come from 
within the individual (Trigg, 100).
VI. Credit Card Use and Abuse: A Veblenian Analysis21
 There is an enormous amount of consumer credit card debt in the United 
States. Revolving credit card debt is about $900 billion and has increased at 9 
percent over the past decade (Scott 2007, 567). This became possible through an 
institutional change that lead to reduced regulation on credit card lending. The 
U.S Supreme Court’s 1978 Marquette Decision was primarily responsible for 
that. The ruling stated that only the usury ceiling of the state in which the bank is 
located and not that of the state in which the consumer is located, will restrict the 
interest rates (Scott, 568). Thus, it enabled banks to charge whatever interest rates 
they want on their credit cards loans by moving their credit card operations to 
states where there were limited usury laws. Consequently, credit cards exploded 
in use (Scott, 568).
21  This section is heavily borrowed from Scott, Robert H. 
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 The Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory of consumption, which as 
already explained is the building block of mainstream theories of consumption, 
does not account for why consumers took advantage of the available credit cards 
and began steadily accumulating debt at exorbitant interest rates, in most cases 
unable to repay that debt later (Scott, 568).  In order to construct the theory, which 
was already explained, Friedman and Modigliani had to make broad assumptions 
(Scott, 569). These included – individuals are rational, they have access to perfect 
information, possess foresight and stable and well-defined exogenous preferences. 
Furthermore, the life-cycle-permanent income hypothesis assumes away any 
role institutions may play in consumer spending/borrowing decisions. It makes 
individuals solely responsible for their credit card debt. Consequently, any public 
policy attempt to decrease it is doomed as the impetus comes solely from within 
the individual. 
 Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption could be used to treat the 
credit card issue in an entirely different way (Scott, 570). As already mentioned, 
Veblen’s theory stated that the propensity for emulation and conspicuous 
consumption are pervading traits of human nature. It is not standard items that 
guide our consumption, but rather those items that are just beyond our reach. 
Furthermore, most people want to be living in one class above what they presently 
live in. 
 Applying this to the issue of credit cards means that a large portion of 
borrowers will over-spend, first, because of the ever-rising income inequality in 
the U.S. that pushes people toward emulation, and, second, because of the easy 
access to credit, given without the necessary consideration of whether it could 
be repaid (Scott, 570). By borrowing people will have the ability to reach to a 
higher class level. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that, today, the 
variety of goods and services offered is unparalleled to any other time in history. 
Expensive clothes, vacations, restaurants – all that is easily available because of 
credit cards.
 Besides the emulative human nature, a Veblenian analysis identifies 
another cause for the credit card debt problem – the companies (Scott, 570). Veblen 
sees companies, such as the credit card ones, that are trying to produce nothing of 
substance and still get a profit as predatory lenders. Credit card companies extend 
credit to people arbitrarily, and when people fail to pay, they raise interest rates to 
absurd levels. 
 They also charge penalties and fees, which further aggravate the problem. 
Using Veblen’s metaphor, a parasite/host relationship emerges between debtors 
and credit card companies. Credit card companies drain their hosts, making a 
yearly profit of $90 billion dollars, 30 percent of which is generated from penalty 
fees (Scott, 571). The most profits are made from people who accumulate a 
considerable debt. Therefore, there is a clear incentive for credit card companies 
to maximize the financial indiscretion of individuals, luring them into borrowing 
that could not be repaid. 
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 As already mentioned, the neoclassical theory of consumption attempts to 
explain the enormous levels of credit card indebtedness as stemming from within 
the individual and thus gives no prescription for how to address the problem. In 
contrast, a Veblenian approach to the issue provides clear policy options (Scott, 
571). The driving force behind the credit card problem is the social influence on 
consumers to spend and the institutional setting that puts no reins on that. The first 
solution may be curbing the increasing income inequality in the United States, 
which is one of the factors, that spurs the never-ending process of emulation 
described by Veblen. People are quick to increase their consumption as income 
rises but they are slow in decreasing it after a relative fall in income. Thus, the 
widening income gap should be addressed as it reduces the relative income of a 
huge portion of the population. 
 The second solution is to directly address the institutional setting. As 
already mentioned, households are not able to handle the level of credit that the 
credit companies seek to provide them. Thus, a reasonable measure is to regulate 
credit card lending operations. In particular, a maximum limit should be put on 
credit card interest rates, fees and penalties. This would ensure that borrowers are 
given an amount of credit they can handle (Scott, 572). 
 In summary, a Veblenian analysis of the credit card over-borrowing 
problem provides clear-cut policy options. In contrast, the neoclassical approach 
gives no prescriptions whatsoever. The reason is that it disregards the role of 
institutions and assumes a rational individual that could not be experiencing an 
irrational problem of over-borrowing. 
VII. Changing face of mainstream economics
 The revival of Veblenian thinking is not limited to the particular example 
of credit card use. The face of modern economics is much more accommodating 
to Veblen’s ideas than the core neoclassical economic theory ever was (Hodgson 
2007, 328). During the 1980s, game theory established itself at the cutting-edge 
of mainstream economics, in part because of theoretical problems in general 
equilibrium analysis. The results of it depend on particular rules and modes of 
play of the game. Instead of everything being in contact with everything else as 
in general equilibrium analysis, game theory assumes limited interconnectedness. 
Thus, it is more accommodating to the ideas of institutions and rules. 
 Experimental economics also examines human interaction under 
designed system of rules (Hodgson 2007, 328). In simulating markets in the 
laboratory, experimental economists must set up a specific institutional structure. 
This, of course, challenges the neoclassical notion of the abstract market as a 
universal form of human interaction, free from any specific rules (Hodgson, 328). 
Experimental economics also makes the case for a situated rather than context-
independent concept of rationality. It claims that generalized rational preferences 
should be replaced by rules of thumb specific to the particular situation. It rejects 
the idea that people come to problems equipped with a complete set of preferences 
and clear decisions. 
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 Recent work in psychology has also undermined the rational deliberative 
thinking model of neoclassical economics (Hodgson, 329). It has been argued that 
this model downplays both the temporal and situated aspects of human reasoning. 
Instead of considering individuals as having representative models of the world in 
their brains, psychologists claim that human cognition depends on the social and 
material environment and on the interactions with other people. This is definitely 
a move away from the mind seen as an independent rational deliberator. 
 In summary, the core of neoclassical economics – the individual as a 
primary and given self – has been undermined by all these recent developments. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a context-dependent rationality as that is found in 
experimental economics and psychology is consistent with Veblen’s institutional 
economics in which agency and structure are mutually dependent. 
VIII. Assessment of ideas and conclusion
 In orthodox economics the individual is emptied out of all psychological 
content. His preferences are takes as given and his character is treated as irrelevant 
to any economic analysis. In contrast, the heterodox strand of economics views 
the individual as determined by social relationships. Veblen’s individual, being a 
social creature, falls squarely in that category. 
 As a corollary of its way of conceptualizing the individual, orthodox 
economics takes an axiomatic approach to economic theory. It claims that any 
criticism of that approach is ineffective unless it constructs a theory that yields 
better predictions than the one being criticized. On the contrary, heterodox 
economics, as represented by Thorstein Veblen’s theory, insists on a causal 
explanation of any characteristics attributed to the individual. 
 Two completely different theories of consumption stem from the two 
approaches – Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption and the mainstream 
theory of consumption. The first one stresses the social determination of 
consumption – individuals are always trying to emulate the spending habits of 
those that live one class above them. The second one treats the consumer as a 
rational being using an intertemporal framework to calculate his or her choice 
between present and future consumption. 
 Following Peukert’s assertion that Veblen creates no theory in any 
positive sense and Friedman’s defense of the superiority of the axiomatic approach 
to economic theory as capable of yielding better outcomes, it would be expected 
that the mainstream consumption theory is omnipotent, while Veblen’s theory of 
conspicuous consumption – totally ineffective. However, the case of credit card 
“use and abuse” suggests the opposite. 
 The Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory attributes the enormous amount 
of credit card debt in the United States to the choices of the individual; that is a 
tautology is employed – the aberrant behavior of the individual is explained as 
coming from within the individual. In contrast, Veblen’s theory of conspicuous 
consumption provides clear-cut policies that can address the issue (Scott, 571). 
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These include curbing the increasing income inequality in the United States and 
changing the current institutional setting – regulating credit card companies.
 In summary, the particular case of credit card use and abuse shows 
that Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption, while avoiding the axiomatic 
approach of orthodox economics is still capable of providing solutions to concrete 
problems. Furthermore, it suggests that it may not be the case that the more 
unrealistic the assumptions of a theory, the more powerful it will be, as Milton 
Friedman contends. By being a more accurate description of reality, Veblen’s 
theory does not render itself useless. On the contrary, it makes a better policy 
proposal than its mainstream counterpart. Moreover, the strength of Veblen’s 
analysis is not limited to a particular case or to a single theory. Some recent 
developments in the mainstream of economics – game theory and experimental 
economics – are rather accommodating to institutions and rules. This calls for a 
revival of Veblenian Institutional Economics (Hodgson, 325). 
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THE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF ZIMBABWE
Chido Munangagwa
ABSTRACT
 For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline 
that has resulted in an inflation rate of 231 million percent and an unemployment 
rate of over 90 percent. Past research has concluded that the economic decline of 
Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and failure of fiscal 
policies to control the budget deficit. This research aimed to closely examine 
some of these policies that the Zimbabwean government implemented, the effects 
of these policies on economic activity, employment and inflation levels in the 
country. By interviewing many economic analysts in Zimbabwe, I managed to 
gather the main causes of the country’s decline. In an effort to understand the 
effects of inflation on a country, I looked at other developing countries that have 
survived similar economic challenges and assessed some of the steps they took to 
overcome the challenges. From the research, I managed to conclude that although 
government policies on agriculture, participation in armed conflicts, government 
spending and investment have been weak, structural reforms can be successfully 
implemented to get the economy functioning again.
INTRODUCTION
 This paper evaluates the economic decline of the Zimbabwean economy 
by a close examination of the country’s macro-economic policies and their 
subsequent effects on the economy, the country’s GDP and output in the different 
sectors of society. Zimbabwe’s economic decline since 1997, has seen the country’s 
macro-economic condition deteriorate progressively into a hyperinflationary 
environment. This has resulted in a unsustainable socio-economic conditions that 
have forced 37.8 % of the population to migrate internationally (International 
Organization for Migration 2008). I will analyze government policies that 
were the main driving forces in the decline of the Zimbabwean economy while 
simultaneously assessing the government’s argument that sanctions and drought 
are the main contributors to the current state of the Zimbabwean economy.  
 The country’s economic problems go beyond macroeconomic policies, 
but are reflective of a political impasse that has challenged the current government 
of President Robert Mugabe. Since Independence, the Mugabe regime has tried 
maintaining a one-party state, and has gained significant control of the country’s 
main governing bodies, including the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. It is therefore 
imperative to consider the political economy when looking at Zimbabwe as the 
entanglement makes the Zimbabwean crisis solution even more complex. The 
current economic crisis is above all a political problem, that is exacerbated by failed 
policies. Currently, the Mugabe regime, is facing international condemnation and 
pressure to relinquish their 30 year reign in power. 
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 Between now and Zimbabwe’s political solution, many short term 
solutions can be put in place to transition into a new political and economic 
leadership team. In this paper, I analyze the conditions that led Zimbabwe into 
this state, and various solutions that a stable leadership body can implement. 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE
 During the pre-independence period, much of the country’s wealth was 
in the hands of the white minority under the rule of Ian Smith who served as 
Prime Minister of the British colony known as Rhodesia. The colonial period was 
characterized by the following occurrences:
The occupation of land owned by local inhabitants and the relocation 1. 
of the black people to outlying communal lands. Land was taken from 
black people without compensation and given to white veterans, many 
of who were retired World War I soldiers. Blacks were forbidden to 
own land in these fertile areas.   
Blacks were excluded from the political process.2. 
Black Zimbabweans were forbidden from the best schools and 3. 
residential areas in Rhodesia. 
After 1965, the United Kingdom adopted a different policy towards 
colonies.  A few colonies such as Kenya had now gained independence, and 
the British government adopted a policy of ‘No Independence Before Majority 
African Rule (NIBMAR).’ The Rhodesian Front, the white regime run by Ian 
Smith, rejected that policy and wanted to maintain governance over Rhodesia. 
The Smith regime signed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
1965 in opposition to black majority. The British government, the Commonwealth 
and the United Nations condemned this action and declared it illegal. The United 
Kingdom went on to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia, as it viewed their 
actions as racist.   Smith argued that Rhodesia was no longer a British colony and 
that it had gained independence from Britain, although power was not in the hands 
of the black majority. South Africa and Portugal were the only two countries that 
supported Rhodesia and no other country recognized Rhodesia as a state. On 
the macro-economic level, these sanctions encouraged internal production and 
a desire to achieve self-sustenance because many countries refused to trade with 
Rhodesia. In the meantime, two political forces were growing within the black 
majority – the Mugabe-led ZANU party, consisting of the majority Shona people, 
and the ZAPU party headed by Joshua Nkomo, consisting of the minority Ndebele 
people. Africans had always resisted European rulers and in Zimbabwe in 1896-
1897, the first Chimurenga war had been fought. The locals had lost the war due 
to a lack of sophisticated weapons. 
 From July 1964 to 1979, the Second Chimurenga war took place between 
the white Rhodesians and the ZANU and ZAPU forces. This war, also known as 
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the Rhodesia Bush War, was a struggle for liberation from the oppressive white 
minority rule. With China and North Korea backing the ZANU forces, and the 
Soviet Union and East Germany supporting the ZAPU faction, and with no 
foreign support, the Rhodesian government was overthrown. Rhodesia gained its 
independence in 1980 and was renamed Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe became the 
first President of Zimbabwe since Independence to date.  Zimbabwe achieved 
majority rule in 1980, and the first decade after independence, the new government 
focused on programs aimed at building the health and education sectors. The 
economy continued to be run as in the pre-independence period, as a command 
economy. The Zimbabwe government made it clear that the state was to play a 
central role in the country’s economic and social development (UNDP Discussion 
Document 2008). Although not high on a global scale, Zimbabwe’s growth rate 
during the eighties was higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. With 
the end of the liberation war, and good rainfall, farming output strongly boosted 
Zimbabwe’s growth. In the 1980’s however, drought had a negative impact 
on growth. The drought of 1982-3 was followed by another in 1987, when the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP growth was negative.22 As the drought took 
place, there was also a world recession that resulted in commodity export prices 
decreasing. Because of these events, the government decided that it was time to 
shift economic policies.  
 Since 1990, policy makers in Zimbabwe worked to liberalize the 
economic system through the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), 
which allowed for an open market economy driven by a strong export base. The 
main goals of this program were to:
achieve GDP growth of 5 percent during 1991 to 1995•	
raise savings to 25 percent of GDP•	
reduce budget deficit from over 10 percent of GDP to 5 percent by 1995•	
reduce inflation from 17.7 percent to 10 percent by 1995 ( Kanyenze •	
2004 )
ESAP was implemented to achieve economic recovery and sustained growth 
through balancing the budget, strengthening the private sector and removing 
controls on trade. Growth in the 1990s under new macroeconomic policies was 
a failure. Performance indicators show that the economy grew by a respectable 
average of 4.3 percent per annum under the ‘bad’ control policies of the 1980s but 
only by a miserable 0.8 percent under the so-called ‘good’ policies.23  The failure 
to achieve the expected 5 percent growth rate under ESAP can be attributed to the 
adverse effect on the manufacturing industry. Although liberalization was viewed 
by many as positive, it had the effect of exposing the manufacturing industry to 
foreign competition for which it was unprepared. The agricultural sector needed 
22  The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe, Neither Growth Nor Equity. Carolyn Jenkins and John Knight p132
23  Macro-economic and Structural Adjustment Policies in Zimbabwe. Edited by C Mumbengegwi p 3
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the boost in exports and so it benefitted from ESAP. Local manufacturers of goods 
such as clothing, however, faced fierce competition from cheap imports from 
countries such as China and were also affected by the decline of real wages of 
consumers. Some economists concluded that the collapse of ESAP was largely 
due to the government’s failure to control public expenditure and financing of the 
program through borrowing from domestic banks as opposed to other forms of 
financing, e.g. taxation. Realizing that the general public was not satisfied with 
ESAP the government decided to focus on fiscal discipline on the government’s 
part. The next phase of economic recovery consisted of another set of policies 
called the Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation 
(ZIMPREST) from 1996 to 2000 that aimed at improving ESAP. Due to poor 
fiscal policies, however, the budget deficit continued to grow and foreign currency 
reserves remained low. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE ECONOMIC DECLINE
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP(current 
US$ million)
8,135.8 12,882.6 17,875.6 7,913.1 4,712.1 3,372.5 7,033.7
GNP 7,150.0 12,800.0 30,800.0 7,850.0 4,640.0 3,180.0 n.a.





–0. 4 –1.0 –2.6 –4.6 –5.6 –7.5 -4.0
Fiscal deficit, 
including
grants (% of 
GDP)
–18.6 –7.0 –2.7 –0.2 –7.6 –6.1 –3.1
GNS per 
GDP (%)





1.5 0.6 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
GDP growth 
rates
–7.3 –2.7 –4.4 –10.4 –3.8 –6.5 –5.1
CPI inflation 55.6  73.4 133.2 365.0 350.0 237.8 1,216.0
Sources: African Development Bank database; IMF (for balance-of-payments 
current account balance) – pg 12
Table 1 above looks at the key macroeconomic indicators. The figures appear 
inconsistent partly because of the numerous currency conversions that took place 
between 2005 to date. The Reserve Bank has removed zeros from the currency 
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many times in an effort to manage inflation, so that when such efforts are made, 
measures of GDP can be ambiguous if they do not account for these changes.
Civil unresta) 
In 1997, Zimbabwe’s economic decline began to visibly take place. It began with 
the crash of the stock market on November 14, 1997. Civil society groups began 
to agitate for their rights as these had been eroded under ESAP. In 1997 alone, 232 
strikes were recorded, the largest number in any year since independence (Kanyenze 
2004). During the first half of 1997, the war veterans organized themselves and 
demonstrations that were initially ignored by the government. As the intensity of the 
strikes grew, the government was forced to pay the war veterans a once-off gratuity 
of ZWD $50,000 by December 31, 1997 and a monthly pension of $2,000USD 
beginning January 1998 (Kanyenze 2004). To raise money for this unbudgeted 
expense, the government tried to introduce a ‘war veterans’ levy,’ but they faced 
much opposition from the labor force and had to effectively borrow money to meet 
these obligations. Following the massive depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar 
in 1997, the cost of agricultural inputs soared, undermining the viability of the 
producers who in turn demanded that the producer price of maize (corn) be raised. 
Millers then hiked prices by 24 percent in January 1998 by 24 percent and the 
consequent increase in the price of maize meal triggered nation-wide riots during 
the last month. The government intervened by introducing price controls on all 
basic commodities. (Kanyenze 2004)
 Many interventionist moves were undertaken to try to reverse some of the negative 
effects of the Structural Adjustment Programs and to try to strengthen the private 
sector that was suffering from decreasing output and increasing competition from 
cheap imported products. Some of the most detrimental policies that followed 
include:
War in the Democratic Republic of Congob) 
In a move widely criticized, Zimbabwe entered the war in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 1998. Assessing the involvement of Zimbabwe’s troops in the war in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is evident that this was one of the pivotal 
starting points of Zimbabwe’s economic decline. Zimbabwe aligned itself to the 
government of Laurent Kabila and fought against the Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan 
and Burundi forces. Some view the intervention in the war as a move by certain 
individuals to enrich themselves through the illegal diamond industry that was 
booming in the Congo.
The costs to Zimbabwe were estimated to have been almost 3 million USD per 
day, and analysts state that the government spent ZWD 6 billion in unbudgeted 
expenditure on the war.24 Although different sources quote ambiguous values for 
government expenditure for that war, the values still reflect a large portion of the 
budget. Many economists have viewed this as the beginning of the downfall of the 
Zimbabwean economy due to increased unbudgeted government spending. 
The Land Reform Programc)  
24 http://www.hrforumzim.com/reports/tort990003/torture990003b.htm
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Commercial farming was one of the largest contributors to national income 
and export earnings. The question of land ownership has for a long time been 
in contention in Zimbabwe and it has always been an aim of the Zimbabwean 
government to ensure equitable land ownership. ‘About 5,600 white commercial 
farmers had access to 15.5 million hectares of land, while over 780,000 smallholder 
farmers had to subsist on 16.4 million hectares of land. Whereas the average size 
of a commercial farm was over 1,000 hectares, the average size of a communal 
farm was less than 10
hectares.’25 This inequitable distribution of land was a result of the Lancaster 
Agreement that was signed during Independence to protect white farmers from 
losing their land under the new government. The agreement was to last for ten 
years and assured white farmers that land would not be taken from them for land 
resettlement programs without compensation. After 1990, the Lancaster Agreement 
was no longer valid, and the government slowly began to redistribute land while 
compensating the white farmers. According to many independent views, since the 
Lancaster Agreement did not hold any longer, the government in 1994 began to 
distribute the land that was set for resettlement, among the government ministers 
and ruling party loyalists. By 1997, much of Zimbabwe’s very fertile land was 
still in the hands of the thousands of white farmers that resided in Zimbabwe and 
also now in the hands of government officials who were benefitting from initial 
land redistribution efforts. In 2000, President Mugabe initiated the ‘Fast Track’ 
land reform program to redistribute land to the black majority. Many independent 
critics view this as an unruly process that did not redistribute land within the 
judicial framework. Farms were taken by force and many farmers were given a 
one day ultimatum to evacuate their farms without prior warning. This project was 
later relabeled the ‘Fast Track Land Reform program’ and was aimed at creating 
51,000 new farmers. There was a huge disparity between the quality of farming 
that took place on commercial farms and communal farms; many Zimbabwean 
economists argue that this was due to property rights. Commercial farmers had 
title deeds to the land and therefore had access to loans for equipment whereas 
the black majority on communal farming areas suffered from the tragedy of the 
commons.  The government undertook the first of the white owned farm invasions 
in a bid to reclaim land that was in the hands of the white minority. Hawkins 
(2008) states however that the disorderly and hurried way in which the program 
was carried out contributed greatly to a decrease in production. From then on, 
agricultural output, which was once Zimbabwe’s pride, began to fall drastically. 
In spite of falling tax revenues, civil servants’ salaries were increased. The budget 
deficit progressively worsened from 5.5 percent of GDP in 1998 to 24.1 percent 
by the end of 2000. The deficit had been targeted to decline to 3.8 percent of GDP 
by the end of 2000.26
25  Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, A Discussion Paper UNDP and independent economists, 
Zimbabwe 2008
26  Godfrey Kanyenze, The Zimbabwe Situation . www.zimbabwesituation.com
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By 2003, Zimbabwe’s economy was the fastest shrinking in the world, at 18 
percent per year.27 The most detrimental effects of the land reform program on the 
economy have been the following:
Commercial farmers utilized economies of scale to achieve high yields •	
at the lowest possible costs. The Land Reform program redistributed 
land by partitioning land into smaller farms, thereby eliminating this 
cost-cutting mechanism.
A tremendous drop in output has been recorded•	
To demonstrate this decline in output by looking at Table 2 below, wheat production 
has declined from about 270, 000 tons in 1998 to 62,000 tons in 2007. There is a 
wide variation between the production levels, but maize, tobacco and beef have 
fallen by about a third of 1998 levels. The right hand side of the table shows the 
proportion of the commodities that are still being produced by commercial farmers. 
For example, although wheat and dairy production have fallen, the proportion of 
these goods produced by commercial farmers has increased reflecting that small 
holder production of these goods has decreased. Although the table states that 
cotton production dropped to zero on a commercial scale in 2007, small scale 
farmers had taken over the production of this crop.
Table 2: Decline in commercial agricultural production for selected 
commodities between 1998 and 2007
Category Crop Commercial 
Production
Tonnes(0000)
1998   2007











Food crops Maize 521      160 31 36          23 63
Wheat 270        62 23 90          96 106
Soyabeans 113        64 57 99          95 96
Export and 
plantation
Cotton 77            0 0 28           0 0
Tobbacco 210         65 31 97          88 92
Coffee 10            1 10 99         98 99
Tea 18          15 83 99         97 98
Sugar 553       384 69 97         96  98
Livestock Dairy 184        86 47 93         98 105
Beef 350       120 34 67         48 72
TOTAL 2306     957 42
Sources: Commercial Farmers’ Union
27  How the Loss of Property Rights caused Zimbabwe’s Collapse. Craig Richardson. November 14, 2005. 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9294
117
The new farmers do not have access to loans. Due to the tightening •	
of the system, banks started becoming more reluctant to lend money 
to individual farmers. This is because after the Land Reform Program, 
banks had no mandate to lend to farmers as the farmers cannot use the 
land as collateral.
As a result of the lack of access to loans, the government has had to •	
hand out farming inputs including equipment and fertilizer, increasing 
unbudgeted expenses
Today, the government argues that the agricultural sector has collapsed due 
to the continuous effects of drought.  In the Monetary Policy presented by the 
Reserve Bank Governor, Food inflation poses the greatest challenge to efforts 
to tame inflation. The situation has been exacerbated by projected lower than 
normal output of grains as a result of incessant rains experienced during the 
first half of the season and the very hot and dry weather experienced between 
January and February, 2008 (Gono 2008). During the early 2000s, a drought hit 
the southern African region, and the Zimbabwean government often refers to 
this as one of the causes of Zimbabwe’s inflationary economy. The drought led 
to lower tax revenues from the agricultural sector causing the budget deficit to 
increase. But according to Figure 2, when the crisis began around 2000 annual 
rainfall was significantly higher than the calculated average of 754mm. The 
beginning of the crisis corresponds closely to the implementation of the land 
reform program. One can therefore conclude that the drought alone was not 
wholly responsible for the downturn in the Zimbabwean economy. Richardson 
(2005) estimated that the land reform played a bigger role in creating the crisis 
than the drought: ‘My econometric estimates indicate that the independent effect 
of the land reforms, after controlling for rainfall, foreign aid, capital, and labor 
productivity, led to a 12.5 percent annual decline in GDP growth for each of 
the four years between 2000 and 2003. 13 The drop in rainfall in the 2001–02 
growing season contributed to less than one-seventh of the overall downturn. 
Without above-average rains, Zimbabwe’s economy would have been in even 
worse shape, hard as that is to believe.’
Figure 1. Annual rainfall and GDP Growth 
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Sources: Meteorological Services Department, Zimbabwe; and World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (Washington: World Bank, 2002). 2003 is an 
OECD estimate.
One of the main challenges associated with land reform in Zimbabwe is the fact 
that although there was transference of land, there was no transference of skill 
and knowledge about how to run these farms.  The white farmers were forced to 
leave the farms taking their managerial knowledge and in some cases their tools, 
leaving the new breed of farmers with a piece of land and no skills to farm it. 
In retrospect, would it have been more efficient if instead of partitioning these 
farms, the government had allowed a tenancy situation whereby the white farmers 
remain and offer their managerial skills and then the black majority would ‘rent’ 
some of the land? Such a form of private contracting might seem more desirous 
because the economies of scale would not be lost and there would be no social 
cost because of a lack of farming skills. Also larger farms are more resilient to 
handle cyclical turns in the weather making this more efficient at least in the 
short run until the new farmers acquire more knowledge and skills on large scale 
farming.   
When the economy does recover, how will the new farmers pay back these 
subsidized loans they are currently receiving especially since many of them are 
not using the land productively?
Quasi-Fiscal Activities (QFAs)a) 
Quasi-fiscal expenditures by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe consist of  unbudgeted 
spending on government-led initiatives. These expenditures by the RBZ serve as 
a substitute for international loans. Mackenzie and Stella (1996) define a QFA as 
“an operation or measure carried out by a central bank or other public financial 
institution with an effect that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary 
measures in the form of an explicit tax, subsidy, or direct expenditure and that has 
or may have an impact on the financial operations of the central bank, other public 
financial institutions, or government.”28For the RBZ, seigniorage has fallen from 
over 5 percent of GDP in 2001 to about 0.1 percent of GDP in 2005 because, given 
very high rates of inflation, real base money has declined drastically in relation 
to nominal GDP and the RBZ has invested in assets, including QFAs, with large 
negative real interest rates.29 Here seigniorage can be considered to be the net 
revenue earned from issuing currency, i.e. the difference between the production 
cost and circulation cost of issuing currency and the interest earned on securities 
when the securities are traded for notes. These QFAs consist of the following:
subsidies •	 to farmers and banks. These are accounted for as no-interest 
receivables from the government on the ‘other assets’ part of the RBZ 
balance sheet. The major subsidy programs have been to the agricultural 
and public enterprise sectors through programs such as Agricultural 
28  Sònia Muñoz, Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note
29  Sònia Muñoz, Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note
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Sector Enhancement Facility (ASPEF), the Productive Sector Facility 
(PSF) and more recently Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention 
(BACOSSI) – which consisted of imported food hampers that were sold 
at a highly subsidized rate.
losses from exchange rates as banks bought foreign currency from •	
exporters at higher price than they sold it to importers
losses •	 due to the fact that foreign liabilities exceed foreign assets. Total 
external debt increased from US 3,1 billion in 1991 to almost US 5 
billion by 1997, before falling to US 3,5 billion by 2000. This decline 
represents the drying up of traditional sources of external financing 
following the fall-out with the IMF and subsequent withdrawal of 
development partners. ( Kanyeze 2004)
Although the full extent of quasi fiscal activities is unknown, estimates by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put the overall financial borrowing 
requirement at 64 percent of GDP in 2005, when the central budget deficit was 
3 percent of GDP, implying a quasi-fiscal deficit of 61 percent of GDP and of 82 
percent in 2006, when the central government deficit was 7.5 percent, indicating 
a quasi-fiscal deficit in the region of three-quarters of GDP.30
Table 3: Zimbabwe Budget Balance 2007/2008





Revenue 29.4 46.6 99.8
Expenditure 43.3 43.6 86.5
Deficit 13.9 +3.0(surplus) +13.3(surplus)
Domestic Debt, 
year end
0.176 (2006) 21,176 (2007) +21.0 (increase)
Sources:Government of Zimbabwe: Financial Statements 2008 Budget; Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe
IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
An inverse relationship exists between real income and inflation. As 
inflation steadily rises in Zimbabwe, the average consumer’s real income is 
drastically falling because wages are not keeping pace. A series of government 
led initiatives to aid consumers proved to be counter-productive. In July 2007, the 
government engaged in the implementation of price controls to ease the burden on 
consumers. Because producers were not able to meet demand pressures, shortages 
quickly arose. Consumers hoarded the cheaper goods that were now available; 
producers incurred significant losses on selling goods at a price lower than the 
30  Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, A Discussion Paper UNDP and independent economists, 
Zimbabwe 2008
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market price $E, and queues for basic goods became the order of the day (as 
shown in Figure 4 below). As a result, economic activity shifted to the informal 
sector. According to independent estimates, 80 percent of economic activity is in 
the informal sector, however, no formal studies have been made as it is difficult 
to measure.
As a result of the inflationary pressures and price ceilings, the main effects were:
a thriving parallel market•	
shortages of basic goods•	
informalization of the economy as Zimbabweans began to cross borders •	
to buy basic goods and sell them in foreign currency at a much higher 
price.
Figure 2: Effects of a Price Ceiling
Price
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                                                                                            Shortage
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HYPERINFLATION
In the last decade Zimbabwe experienced chronic high inflation which exploded 




Figure 3: The process of hyperinflation
 
   
 
 
As shown in Fig. 3 above, the phenomenon of hyperinflation is always triggered 
when an economic system faces a shock, be it external, political, or domestic. 
In many cases, such an unprecedented shock leads governments to spend more 
money than they receive from revenues, thereby increasing the budget deficit. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the shock consisted of the war veterans’ gratuities in 
1997 and subsequently, the participation of Zimbabwean armed forces in the DRC 
war. 
High inflation in Zimbabwe has been fueled by a rapidly growing money supply 
reflecting growing fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits. Quasi-fiscal losses have 
increased greatly since 2004, due to huge foreign exchange subsidies to public 
enterprises and government, price supports to exporters (to compensate them 
partially for the highly overvalued exchange rate), and interest payments on open 
market operations. 31 In August 2006 Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rose above 
1,000 percent, dramatizing the severity of its economic crisis. Redenominated 
notes were issued in August so that 1,000 old Zimbabwean dollars become one 
new dollar. The annual inflation rate, already the highest in the world, raced to 
1,729.9 per cent in February 2007 from 1,593.6 per cent the previous month. 
On a monthly basis, however, inflation slowed to 37.8 percent from January’s 
45.4 percent. The inflation rate dropped momentarily due to the artificial effect of 
price controls to alleviate the suffering of many Zimbabweans. The controls led to 
hoarding of goods, however, and even longer lines for basic goods. Manufacturers 
were forced to close businesses as they were incurring huge losses.  
In 2007 government spending increased once again in real terms. In the budget 
announcement, there was no mention of ways to lower the Quasi-Fiscal Activities 





























and the budget made very little accommodations for QFAs. In June of the same year, 
the government adopted price freezes, followed by a wage freeze 2 months later. 
According to the government, inflation dropped to 6,592.8 percent in August from 
7,634.8 percent in July.  Queues for basic goods became a common characteristic, 
as consumers hoarded products after price reductions leading to shortages of 
basic goods. This in turn, causes the parallel market to thrive, as individuals 
choose to engage in ‘cross-border trading’ – buying goods in neighboring South 
Africa, Botswana or Zambia and selling them on the parallel market at much 
higher prices. In 2007, the hyperinflation was really biting the pockets of the 
ordinary man on the streets. In an effort to cushion the general consumer from the 
deteriorating value of his money, the government implemented price controls on 
all basic goods. However, these controls backfired as the general public rushed 
to hoard the incredibly cheap goods and any profits that the manufacturers were 
making were inevitably eroded resulting in many of them being forced to stop 
production. 
Expectations of inflation also fuel the crisis. Because people see the prices rising, 
they expect them to continue to do so in the future. The more chronic people’s 
expectations are of an increase in inflation, the more they adapt their behavior 
to fit those expectations. People begin to get rid of their money more quickly, 
causing prices to rise faster.
It is also common knowledge to all Zimbabweans, that for many years, the 
Zimbabwean dollar has been overvalued. For example, in 2007, the official rate 
was still 250 ZWD to one USD, yet the USD was trading at hundreds of thousands 
of Zimbabwean dollars on the parallel market. This posed a huge problem, in that 
only those in influential positions who had access to this rate were able to acquire 
foreign currency from the banks for such a cheap rate and were therefore able to 
finance lavish lifestyles and trips abroad. Consequently, one would find that some 
members of the population were not eager to see the crisis being resolved as they 
were benefitting from it greatly. Also, producers of goods are required to sell 
some of their foreign currency to the Reserve Bank at a much lower rate than they 
would be able to acquire on the parallel market. 
One of the main hindrances to reducing hyperinflation in Zimbabwe is the 
recurring wave of political instability that have resulted in a loss of investor 
confidence and caused many foreign investors to pull out of the country, citing 
that the environment is unstable, unpredictable and risky. The Indigenization 
Bill that was passed in Parliament that aims at shifting 51% of ownership of 
companies into the hands of Zimbabweans has been criticized by some as 
adversely affecting investor relations within the global economy. Analysts argue 
that foreign-owned companies will not be willing to invest in a country where 
their companies have the potential to be nationalized. This results in a reduction 
of foreign currency in the economy. Fig. 3 demonstrates the above as events in 
1997 shocked the system, driving the government to achieving a much higher 
budget deficit. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has over the years been engaged 
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in rapid money supply, for example, increasing M3 supply from 1 638.4% in 
January 2007 to 51 768.8 in November 2007 (Gono 2008), further fuelling 
inflation. 
EMERGENCE OF A PARALLEL MARKET AND MULTIPLE EXCHANGE 
RATES
As can be expected of a hyperinflationary environment, black market for foreign 
currency and basic goods that are either not available in stores or too expensive to 
buy, is now the most reliable source of goods. Having returned home this summer 
to conduct informational interviews, I discovered that individuals and businesses 
alike could not access foreign currency from any banks and had to resort to 
securing this money from the parallel market, which consists of many skilled 
laborers who have had to move from formal employment to become informal 
traders as their formal wages were being eroded by hyperinflation. The main 
currencies that are traded are the South African rand, the Botswana Pula and the 
United States dollar. 
Every day as I travelled through the streets of the capital city, I encountered many 
traders who typically stood by the side of the road and solicited deals by whispering 
to passers-by, “I can help you change your money to Rands, US dollars or pulas.” 
Having just come from the States and in desperate need of the local currency, I 
‘shopped around’ for the best Zimbabwean dollar rate that I could get for my US 
dollars. After some screening, I found one trader who I thought seemed slightly 
trustworthy, and decided to trade with him. In a bid to be as discreet as possible, 
he took me up many flights of stairs of a nearby building, to a room that was filled 
with other traders, and where massive amounts of different currencies were trading 
hands. He quickly handed me the equivalent Zimbabwean dollar amount that I 
required, took my US dollars and immediately began trading with the person next 
to him who was looking for US dollars.  And that was it, I had my foreign currency 
and he had made a huge profit by selling me trillions of Zimbabwean dollars that 
would be worthless by the next morning and obtaining the stable US dollar. Daily, 
the ordinary Zimbabwean is forced to engage in such illegal acts because foreign 
currency and goods are readily available on the parallel market. The parallel market 
is the most desirable choice because it is the most efficient market in Zimbabwe 
currently. It avoids the hassles of applying for bank drafts for foreign currency that 
are never approved; it is very responsive to changes in demand for foreign currency 
and very responsive to what is happening in the media. For example, when the 
Reserve Bank requires foreign currency for a project, usually a QFA, they have 
no alternative but to get the money from the parallel market. Since the bank buys 
the foreign currency in bulk, supply of foreign currency in the market decreases, 
pushing up the trading rate for that day. Other drivers of the market included the 
recent talks between the political parties that sent the rates shooting downwards as 
optimism filled the market. At the first signs of collapse between the two parties, 
however the ZWD to USD exchange rates shot up tremendously. 
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The major problem with foreign currency in Zimbabwe is the fact that there are 
multiple exchange rates (six in August 2008 – the cash rate, the transfer rate, 
the UN rate, the Old Mutual rate, the Inter-bank rate, the government rate). The 
reason behind multiple exchange rates lies in the fact that the government holds 
the government exchange rate at an extremely artificially low rate that no one 
can access except government officials, giving them no incentive to eliminate 
this overvaluation and inequity. Those who can access foreign currency at very 
reduced rates buy it and then sell it at mark-up prices of up to four thousand 
percent. This arbitrage, backed by the population’s inflation expectations, results 
in rapidly increasing prices. Because there are very limited exports, much of 
Zimbabwe’s foreign currency comes in from remittances sent to families by the 
workers in the Diaspora. 
It will be interesting to see what becomes of the many illegal foreign currency 
dealers who have amassed a large amount if foreign currency when the economy 
recovers.   
EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS
Currently the Zimbabwean economy is being run by the informal sector. At least 
eighty percent of the economy uses foreign currency, but there is still a huge 
demand for Zimbabwean dollars because until recently, most stores were not 
allowed to legally sell their goods in foreign currency. As a result, most official 
transactions occur in Zimbabwean dollars leading to a great demand of the local 
currency. Many companies have been forced to close shops and service providers 
such as schools are being forced to charge their fees either in US dollars or in 
fuel coupons, especially when world oil prices are going up. This is very rational 
behavior especially now that the US faces the threat of going into a recession; 
the next best way for companies to store value is to charge in foreign currency. 
If the government was keen, they could possibly initiate a very sophisticated 
form of dollarization, where they used these fuel coupons as currency to restore 
the public’s confidence in some form of storage. The government is reluctant 
to dollarize using the South African rand because of the politics in the region. 
Because of these various factors, people in Zimbabwe generally like to keep their 
money in non-monetary assets or in foreign currency, mainly the British pound, 
the US dollar and the South African rand (ZAR). Because of the economic crisis, 
millions of Zimbabweans are now in the Diaspora, hoping that the remittances they 
send through agents such as Western Union will alleviate the families suffering 
from the hyperinflation. 
The policies that have been adopted so far in Zimbabwe have proven to be 
ineffective as these target the effects and not the causes. These measures, which 
include price controls and price freezes, only provide very temporary alleviation 
from the suffering but are ineffective in the long term. Price controls, imposed in 
Zimbabwe in 2007, faced two major obstacles: the first was to set prices for all 
prices of consumer goods, intermediate goods and raw materials in the economy; 
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the second was to adjust them to scarcities and surpluses. Since the first problem 
made the goal of controlling ‘all’ prices impossible, government usually set prices 
for a basket of consumer goods. But that created another set of problems since 
producers of these products had their prices controlled but not their inputs. Profit 
margins disappeared and, sooner or later, the products themselves.32 Price freezes, 
which were adopted in August 2006 in Zimbabwe, aim at keeping the prices of all 
goods stagnant. This measure is usually difficult to adopt as it requires shops to 
be monitored or for shop owners to submit a list of their prices every so often, but 
this is not feasible as it is time consuming and gives way to corruption.
As the economic crisis deepens, and the general discontent grows, the Zimbabwean 
power making forces are becoming highly centralized due to the mistrust and 
elitism that characterizes the current regime. Many major political and economic 
decisions are controlled by a few in power, which is similar to the economic 
conditions of Russia under Brezhnev.  
POSSIBLE MACRO-ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS
Different solutions have been presented, including recommendations by US 
economist Steve Hanke. In his paper, titled Zimbabwe, From Hyperinflation to 
Growth, Hanke argues that if Zimbabwe adopts certain principles, it could well 
be on the road to recovery. His suggestions include dollarization of the economy, 
which would effectively result in Zimbabwe adopting the US dollar or the South 
African rand as the official currency. As of September 2008, the Zimbabwean 
economy moved to partial dollarization with the Reserve bank approving a few 
licensed producers to sell their goods in foreign currency. Local economists 
have criticized suggestions to dollarize because in the cases where dollarization 
has taken place, the economies have been very small and undiversified such as 
Lesotho that now uses the South African rand. Although it might not be that 
apparent, Zimbabwe’s economy is very diversified. Zimbabwe was ranked among 
many middle income countries such as Turkey, Singapore, Malaysia and Nigeria 
in the 1970’s and used to engage in trade with the US and Europe. Zimbabwe 
had the fourth strongest economy in the world. With this in mind, many feel that 
eradicating the multiple exchange rates would be more desirable. 
Steve Hanke also suggests that Zimbabwe adopts a currency board and a free 
banking system where banks freely issue notes with minimum government 
regulation as opposed to the Reserve Bank handling that responsibility. This is 
because when the state intervenes in note issues, it crowds out competition and 
forces everyone to accept the quality of service set by the state, and this limits 
flexibility if choice. Also in the case where by too many notes are issued, the 
public will have a difficult time getting rid of an over issue of notes. 
While conducting my research, I discovered that many Zimbabwean economists 
were of the opinion that although credible, Steve Hanke’s proposals would 
not function in Zimbabwe, because they do not take into account the political 
32  www.kubatana.net/docs/econ/zimcodd_breakfree_0708.pdf.Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
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economy. They preferred a more comprehensive macro-economic reform strategy 
that corrects that corrects the pricing side, that tackles government expenditure, 
liberalizes the one-sided judicial system, and reduces inflation expectations by 
restoring confidence in the general public. How that will be done is yet to be seen, 
but in the case of Zimbabwe, one cannot separate the politics and the economics 
as the two go hand in hand. 
After careful analysis, I propose that although the ultimate solution in Zimbabwe 
must begin with a political settlement. However, in between now and a political 
settlement much can be done in the short-term to remedy the current crisis.
Short term solutions•	
One problem in Zimbabwe is that the accurate measure of the value of goods 
is distorted by people’s inflation expectations; therefore each retailer sells 
goods at above the real value of the good, so as to evade losses incurred from 
hyperinflationary pressures. 
To tackle this problem in the short term, the government could adopt a store of 
value that is appreciating in value as the official medium of exchange. A good 
example of this could be fuel coupons. However, given the current financial crisis, 
and the lack of access to credit, demand for gas has decreased sharply, causing 
oil prices per barrel to drop significantly since July 2008. Regardless of this fact, 
once the global economy recovers from the worst of the recession period, oil 
prices will begin to stabilize. 
Another way to curb the unprecedented increase in prices and to restore consumer 
confidence is to re-introduce price controls on goods charged in foreign currency. 
Since the government has recently moved to allowing partial dollarization of 
the economy by letting licensed retailers sell their goods in foreign currency, 
they should impose price caps on the prices of basic goods because retailers are 
still inflating prices even though their revenue is in the form of stable foreign 
currencies.  
It is worth noting that these minor remedies will not be able to effect much change 
in the production sector of Zimbabwe. The intractable problem of output can only 
be solved by restoration of investor confidence, and a monetary boost from bodies 
such as the IMF. Policy recommendations that examine the economic decline and 
hyperinflation as solely an economic problem under represent the severity of the 
crisis. Short term solutions exist, but are ultimately inadequate. 
Long term solutions•	
In the long term, once the political impasse has been resolved, the government 
can put in place a comprehensive macro-economic stabilization policy that 
encompasses all sectors of the economy. According to the IMF, there are 5 key 
elements necessary in ensuring that Zimbabwe achieves reasonable stabilization:
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Transparent transfer of quasi-fiscal activities to the government budget, 1. 
as announced by the 2007 budget. 33No entity outside the budget should 
undertake any activity of a fiscal nature (including interest payments, 
subsidized credits etc) without offsetting transfers transparently provided 
for in the budget. Although this would not reduce inflation, it would allow 
for increased transparency and accountability and the rigor with which fiscal 
actions are reviewed would also be applied to these measures.
Substantial fiscal tightening, including the newly absorbed QFAs of the 2. 
RBZ or any other entity.34For example, to lower inflation by about 800 
percentage points, it was found that a minor adjustment of at least 10 
percentage points of GDP would be necessary, based on 2006 figures. This 
must be complemented by government reduction of the government wage 
bill, and reduction of capital expenditure which more than doubled in 2006. 
Liberalizing the exchange regime by unifying the exchange rate and 3. 
removing restrictions on current international payments and transfers. 35 
This would involve the devaluation of the interbank exchange rate, pegging 
it closer and closer to the parallel market rate. Only one exchange rate must 
be in operation.
Deregulating prices and imposing a hard budget constraint on public 4. 
enterprises.36     (Enterprises need a hard budget constraint that requires 
them to cut costs and operate at present levels of budget subsidies 
and agreed pricing formulas. Deregulating prices and allowing public 
enterprises to introduce cost-recovery pricing would be an essential element 
of a plan to move the operation of these enterprises to a commercial footing. 
Price deregulation would likely lead to a one-off spike in prices, but strong 
fiscal adjustment would ultimately reduce inflation pressures.)
Establishing a strong money anchor to reduce inflation and inflation 5. 
expectations.37 
From many cases of inflation that have been studies, it has been concluded 
that output levels can be restored fairly quickly, within the first two years of 
stabilization. In the case of Zimbabwe, maintaining the growth in output will 
depend on addressing a few factors including public enterprise and civil service 
reform, central bank reform, public expenditure and tax reform to sustain the 
fiscal adjustment and stimulate output growth.38
33  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
34  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
35  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
36  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
37  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
38  IMF Working Paper. Lessons from HHigh Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe 
WP0799
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Although there is lack of external support, Zimbabwe could begin an effective 
stabilization program with assistance in the form of policy measures from 
external bodies.  
In conclusion, it is clear that most of the government policies although intended 
for the public good ignored the social costs associated and were not carried out 
in the most efficient, transparent manner. The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe 
would probably be the quickest to revive as it requires basic knowledge and 
minimum skills and it is not dependent on other factors of production besides 
inputs, good rain and knowledge. Manufacturing on the other hand will be slower 
to recover because it is partly dependent on the agricultural sector and requires 
a greater number of skilled labor, most of whom have left the country.  Mining 
and tourism are also strong areas with the fastest growth potential as soon as 
investor confidence is restored in Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe first needs to 
re-examine its political condition, before any long-term stabilization effort can be 
put in place. 
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